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0/ Executive Summary 
In recent years there have been significant advances in the capability and affordability of 
satellite solutions to telecommunications needs.  However, satellite telecommunications 
in Europe do not yet make a significant contribution to the level of European telecom-
munications infrastructure.1  A major constraint on the application of satellite solutions 
to telecommunications has been restrictive regulation at national level. 
The CEC is considering a range of de-regulation measures to open up and harmonise 
the  European  satellite  telecommunications  market.  This  proposed  liberalisation  of 
satellite telecommunications in the EC is seen by some industry observers as a threat to 
European  players.  Their  concern  is  that  key  sections2  of the  European  satellite 
telecommunications market  will  become,  or remain,  dominated by  US  and Japanese 
players.  This  study  has  been  commissioned  to  examine  the likely  impact  of non-
European competitors on a de-regulated European satellite telecommunications market. 
Non-European competitors are already dominant in certain key sectors of the European 
satellite telecommunications market.  Whatever regulatory environment is in  existence, 
their impact will continue to be significant.  We attempt to discover whether their impact 
in  a  de-regulated  environment  will  be  more  harmful,  or less  harmful,  to  European 
players. 
The  European  satellite  telecommunications  market  is  currently  small  and  under-
developed;  its current state of development will  favour  large, integrated players with 
existing satellite telecommunications track records.  No European organisation matches 
this  profile,  whereas  several  US  organisations  are well  placed  to  dominate  a  small 
European market.  Market development is necessary if  European players are to do well. 
Market development requires regulatory change and an increase in commercial activity 
from  satellite telecommunications suppliers.  De-regulation will  encourage investment 
1  European satellite telecommunications revenues are less than 1% of total telecommunications revenues. 
2  Concern is generally focused on the manufacturing of satellites and ground equipment, but some see the entire industry as under thrcaL 
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by existing and new suppliers, leading to increased awareness amongst potential users 
and growing opportunities for new products and services. 
Because  immediate  de-regulation  of  European  satellite  telecommunications  will 
accelerate the development of the market, we believe that it will not harm the overall 
prospects of European satellite telecommunications  players, although their prospects in 
certain sections of the market are not good  under any  regulatory regime.  For some 
sectors, immediate de-regulation will be beneficial to European players. 
....  In the service provision and network operation business, European players should 
be well placed to retain a large share of the European market.  European players 
should be able  to  offer well  tailored  services  at lower cost  than non-Europeans, 
because  of their  advantage  of proximity  and  awareness  of individual  customer 
requirements.  Converting this advantage into a dominant market position will still 
be a significant challenge for European entrepreneurs.  Europe's TOs have many of 
the resources necessary to  succeed in  this market, but for  strategic reasons have 
little interest in developing widely-used domestic or international satellite telecoms 
services.  An  under-developed  market  will  increase  the  competitive  strength  of 
vertically integrated US service providers. 
De-regulation  will  be  beneficial  to  European  service  providers,  increasing  their 
opportunities and accelerating the development of the satellite telecommunications 
market. 
....  The USA  and Japan have a significant  technological and commercial lead in  the 
manufacture  and  sale  of satellite  ground  equipment,  which  will  be  difficult  to 
overcome.  The  European  ground-equipment  industry  is  fragmented,  small  and 
strategically unfocused.  The most promising opportunity to transform this picture is 
rapid growth of the European satellite telecommunications services market, which 
depends  on  early  de-regulation.  An  enlarged  services  market  will  provide  a 
domestic market for European products.  Thus we  have concluded that a delay in 
market development will only widen the gap between European and non-European 
capabilities.  European  manufacturers  do  not  seem  willing  to  invest  in  major 
product-development  programmes  until  they  are  convinced  that  a  significant 
European  market  will  emerge.  Even  in  the  most  favourable  circumstances  for 
European equipment manufacturers their future position appears to be weak. 
De-regulation will  increase  the imports  of US  and  Japanese ground  equipment. 
However, the opportunities for European ground equipment manufacturers will be 
increased, and their confidence should improve.  Some will choose to exploit the new 
opportunities in partnership with US or Japanese manufacturers.  In absolute terms, 
sales of European ground equipment will be greater in a de-regulated environment 
than under current regulatory conditions. 
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...  The manufacture of telecommunications satellites in  Europe should be seen as an 
integral part of the global satellite manufacturing business, covering broadcasting, 
defence, remote sensing and research as well as telecommunications.  Eutelsat is the 
major customer for European satellites, and its major application is TV broadcast-
ing.  De-regulation would increase the competitive pressures on Eutelsat, and focus 
attention  on  Eutelsat's  cost  base.  If this  caused  Eutelsat  to  purchase  its  next 
generation of satellites from non-European sources on cost grounds, it would place 
the  European  satellite  building  industry  in  jeopardy.  Because  of the  relative 
importance  of  broadcasting,  the  rate  of  growth  of  the  European  satellite 
telecommunications  market can  have  only  a  secondary effect  on the market for 
satellites, and hence on the potential competitive position of the European satellite 
builders.  Problems with costs issues (such as economies of scale, lean manufacturing 
and technology change),  and  uncertainties about future  demand for broadcasting 
capacity  mean  that European  satellite builders will  continue  to  confronted with 
extremely difficult market conditions and competitive shortcomings, even if  Eutelsat 
remains as a major customer. 
With  or without  de-regulation,  the European  satellite manufacturers face  major 
uncertainties in their future business projections.  The impact of de-regulation on 
their current order books will be negligible.  The long-term impact of de-regulation 
will be less significant than other pressures such as those described above. 
For each sector, we outline supporting measures that could be taken to strengthen the 
competitive position of European industry. 
Most of the measures that could restrict the activities of non-European players (such as 
postponed  de-regulation  or restrictions  on  equipment  imports) would  also  harm the 
prospects for European players.  For the parts of European industry that will be unable 
to  compete with  non-European  players,  there are supporting  measures  that  can  be 
targeted to improve their performance as far as is possible: 
..,.  encouraging consolidation and co-operation in the European space industry.  This is 
necessary for the health of the satellite manufacturers and the ground equipment 
manufacturers 
..,.  stimulating  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  to  become  active  in  satellite 
telecommunications products and services.  This will  improve the performance of 
the European ground equipment manufacturing sector 
..,.  encouraging a re-focusing of European space and telecommunications research and 
development resources towards satellite telecommunications products and services. 
This should be of specific benefit to European ground equipmertt manufacturing. 
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....  increasing  awareness  of satellite  telecommunications  amongst  potential  business 
users, through demonstrators, training and publicity. 
....  establishing  basic  standards  for  satellite  telecommunications  ground  equipment, 
interfaces and  systems.  This  is  required  urgently  to  increase  the confidence of 
equipment buyers and users. 
These measures cannot make all sectors of the Europea~ satellite telecommunications 
industry competitive,  but will  strengthen  important areas and  increase  the ability-of . 
European players to take advantage of the opportunities offered by de-regulation. 
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1/ Introduction and Scope 
1.1  CONTEXT OF THE STUDY 
Satellites  have  been  used  for  public  telecommunications  since  1965,  when  the first 
international  satellite  trunking  links  were  established.  Since  then,  the  range  of 
applications for which satellite solutions are feasible has grown to cover a wide range of 
telecommunications  services,  with  the balance  shifting  towards  business  applications 
rather than  residential telephony.  However,  although  the  range  of applications has 
grown, satellite telecoms still only accounts for a fraction of a percentage point of global 
telecoms traffic. 
At present, satellite telecoms does not make a significant contribution to the level of 
European infrastructure; but changes in  technology,  user requirements and regulation 
mean that satellite telecoms traffic and revenues in Europe may grow quickly over the 
coming  years  (even  though  the  earliest  application,  international  telephony,  is 
transferring to  terrestrial fibre  solutions).  Many  industry  observers believe  that the 
European satellite telecoms industry is not well placed to benefit from these changes.! 
They  anticipate  significant  market  shares  being  taken  by  non-European  suppliers, 
primarily US and Japanese corporations. 
This study has been commissioned to examine the impact of non-European competitors 
on  the European satellite telecoms  market.  The brief for  the study emphasises the 
requirement to understand the effects of regulatory changes on the competitive position 
of European players. 
12 STRUCTUREOFTHEREPORT 
·Exhibit 1.1 outlines the structure of the report. 
1  See,  e.~-o CEC (1990c).  Full details or  an references are provided in the bibliosrapby. 
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EXHIBIT 1.1:  The Structure of  the Report 
Chapter 1  introduces the subject of satellite telecoms, and defmes the scope of the study in terms 
of  which areas are and are not covered. 
Chapter 2  surveys  the  position  of satellite  telecoms  in  Europe  today,  indicating  the  current 
standing of European players in each area of the market. 
Chapter 3  examines the factors that will determine the size and form of the market in t~e coming 
years.  The demand for services, the availability of  well-matched supply, the constraints 
of regulation, and competition with terrestrial telecoms are all considered. 
Chapter 4  outlines the success factors for competitors in each of the market areas under study 
(service  providers,  network  operators,  and  ground-equipment  and  satellite 
manufacturers).  The performance of different classes of European and non-European 
players against  these success  factors  is  examined.  The key issues  for each  class  of 
European  player  are  identified;  the  large  and  vertically-integrated  nature  of US 
entrants is  identified as being a particular advantage in a small and underdeveloped 
market. 
Chapter 5  introduces three market scenarios, drawing together the outputs of Chapters 3 and 4. 
The flTSt  scenario descnbes the development of satellite telecoms with no regulatory 
changes.  This highlights the problems that will be faced by European industry if de-
regulation does not occur.  The purpose of the other scenarios is to examine the relative 
positions of European players in a rapidly de-regulated satellite telecoms market, and in 
a market where de-regulation is postponed for a set time. 
Chapter 6  surveys the various approaches that can be taken at EC and national level to support 
the  European  satellite  telecoms  industry.  Attention  is  given  to  the delay  of de-
regulation to provide a 'breathing space' for European players to prepare themselves to 
meet open competition.  The conclusion is that delay of de-regulation will be counter-
productive for the overall competitive strength of European players in service provision, 
network  operation  and ground-equipment  manufacture.  The main  beneficiaries  of 
delay  would  be some  of the European telecoms  operators  (TOs).  Other support 
measures are assessed, and recommendations are made to pursue those that could be 
effective. 
1.3  SCOPE OF THE STuDY 
1.3.1  Areas Included and Excluded 
The work has focused on certain areas of the satellite telecoms value chain (as shown in 
Exhibit 1.2).  Below we discuss the various areas in the value chain, and indicate which 
are included in the scope of this study, and why. 
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The 'European telecommunications satellite building industry' is 
not a particularly useful or meaningful term  - it is necessary to 
view all satellite building together to understand the competitive 
situation, cost bases and strategy.  With broad industry groupings 
(such  as  Loral I  Alenia I  Alcatel I  Aerospatiale  I  DASA) 
emerging,  and  widespread  sub-contracting  and  collaboration 
between  frrms,  even  the  'European'  classification  becomes 
blurred.  This study examines the impact of satellite telecoms de-
regulation  on  the  European  satellite  builders,  and  assesses 
various supporting measures for the industry. 
The activity  of launching  satellites  is  becoming  quite  separate 
from  the  activities  of building  or operating satellites.  This  is 
because the business is maturing, and also because new entrants 
into  the  commercial  market  (China  and  Russia)  have 
concentrated their capabilities on launch technology.  The CEC 
has participated in studies in respect of the launching business as 
part of its scrutiny of the European space industry sector, and this 
activity is not included in the present study. 
The  cost  and  accessibility  of  satellite  capacity  is  of  great 
importance  to  those  in  later  stages  of the value  chain.  Our 
picture of likely developments in the satellite access business has 
been taken from  other studies and confrrmed during interviews. 
The CEC has  commissioned  a  number of studies into satellite 
access, 2 and this activity is not included in the present study. 
At present,  because of the immature condition  of the satellite 
telecoms  marketplace,  network  operation  and  management  is 
almost  invariably  integrated  with  the  provision  of services  to 
users (see below).  In time, as with terrestrial telecoms, network 
operation and management will become a distinct activity in the 
value chain.  In  this report the term 'service provision' is  often 
used to cover network operation as well, though the activities are 
discussed separately wherever necessary.  The design of satellite 
networks (shown as separate in  Exhibit 1.2) is at present largely 
integrated with network operation. 
The European service providers can be divided into two types: 
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Manufacturing an~ 
selling ground 
equipment 
Using satellite 
networks 
..,..  telecoms operators (TOs), who offer satellite services as part 
of their product portfolio in their home territory and abroad 
..,..  specialist  satellite  service  providers,  who  offer  a  specific 
range of services, almost exclusively to corporate and public 
sector users.  Some of these are subsidiaries of TOs and some 
are independent of TO involvement. 
This study includes in its scope a wide range of services offered by 
satellite - two-way fiXed,  one-way fiXed,  point-to-point, point-to-
multipoint, land mobile (vehicular and portable), and air mobile. 
Although  it  is  an  important  source  of  revenue  for  satellite 
systems, international telephony trunking by satellite has not been 
analysed  in  detail in  this  study,  because it will  not be affected 
directly by the regulatory changes that are proposed in the CEC 
Green Paper.3 
Ground-equipment manufacturers either sell direct to end users, 
or to  service providers who  then sell on or lease equipment to 
users.  Fixed  transmit/receive equipment, business receive-only 
equipment,  mobile  equipment  and  satellite-specific  network 
management hardware and  software  are covered  in  this study. 
Residential  and  TV  Receive-Only  (TVRO)  terminals  are  not 
covered. 
The requirements and  behaviour patterns of potential users  of 
satellite solutions are included in the scope of this study because 
this area is of vital importance to understanding the development 
of the satellite telecoms market, and the outcome for European 
players.  We  have  not  conducted  original  research  into  user 
requirements or behaviour, but have consolidated the conclusions 
of others and tested these in the process of interviews.4 
In  summary,  the  scope  of this  study  is  satellite  manufacturing,  ground  equipment 
manufacture, the operation of satellite networks and the provision of satellite services. 
Exhibit 1.3 lists the areas which are included and those which are excluded. 
3  This would still be regulated under the 'resetved setvices' regulations as defined in EC Setvices Directive. 
4  See CEC (1992d). 
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EXHIBIT 1.3:  The Scope of  the Study 
Activity  Included in this study 
Manufacturing communications satellites  Yes 
Operating and managing satellite networks  Yes 
Offering services on satellite networks  Yes 
Manufacturing and selling ground equipment  Yes 
Using satellite networks  Yes 
Launching satellites  No 
Selling access to satellites  No 
Using satellites for trunked international telephony  No 
Other satellite applications  .  No 
(public broadcasting, renzote sensing, positioning systems or other applications )5 
1.3.2  Industrial Policy Issues 
Our objective in  this study is to explore what will  happen to the different parts of the 
European satellite telecoms industry given various assumptions about demand, supply, 
regulation  and  technology.  We  do  not attempt to  establish  the national or regional 
strategic importance of different satellite-related activities.  We do not address industrial 
policy issues concerning the desirability of maintaining high-technology capabilities or 
employment. 
Our conclusions in  each case are stated in the following terms: Will European players 
have a strong or weak competitive position?  Will their revenues and profits be high or 
low?  Will their market share be large or small?  We also consider (in Chapter 6 of this 
report) the options for policy makers to alter the outcomes for European players, by 
introducing supporting measures.  However, while we assess the likely impact of each 
supporting measure, we do not propose any programme of measures.  It falls to policy 
makers to attempt to achieve their industrial policy objectives through the selection and 
application of supporting measures. 
1.3.3  Forecasting 
This  study  has  not  concentrated  on  producing  quantified  market  forecasts.  Where 
appropriate,  the forecasts  of others  are  quoted  and  acknowledged.  Where we  use 
5  The boundary between satellite broadcasting and satellite telecommunications bas been defined in  this study to include aU  c:otpOrate 
applications (using two-way VSAT, one-way VSAT, business TV, etc.), and to exclude broadcasting to residential receiven and CATV 
receiven (a distinction that will, in reality, become increasingly blurred. but which serves for the purposes ofthis work). 
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quantified  forecasts  it  is  only  to  illustrate  qualitative  arguments  concerning  relative 
market sizes. 
As with many new services, the level of demand for satellite telecoms at any particular 
point in the future is sensitive to assumptions about many variables.  Confidence in any 
numerical forecast must be low.  It is more productive to attempt to understand what the 
mechanisms  for  growth  may  be  and  which  external  influences  may  prove  to  be 
important.  This study refers to factors in terms of their influence: for example, which 
developments  may  increase  market  size?  which  would  decrease  the performance or 
revenues of European players?  A judgement is  taken  as  to the likely  net effect  of 
different factors, in terms of strong growth, growth, stasis, decline, and so forth. 
1.3.4  The Role of Interviews in the Study 
In  the course of this study we  have interviewed  about 40  participants in the satellite 
telecoms business,  either face-to-face or through telephone interviews.  This has been 
largely separate from the process of gathering information for analysis.  The interviews 
have  had  a  'hypothesis  testing'  format  - asking  interviewees  to  discuss  a  series of 
hypotheses concerning, for example, the state of the European marketplace, customer 
behaviour, competitive strengths of key players, etc.  The hypotheses have been wide-
ranging and deliberately controversial in places.  Where requested, responses have been 
'off the record'.  Annex B gives more detail concerning the interviews. 
The interviews have enabled us to understand where opinion is divided, and to hear the 
factual  and  subjective  arguments  used  to  support various  positions.  Some  of those 
interviewed disagree with some of the conclusions of this study.  We have attempted to 
give space to views that argue against the conclusions reached. 
_  Analy.sy.s -----------~~......_.............---~ 
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2/ The Satellite Telecommunications Marke~  Today 
This  Chapter  surveys  the  position  of satellite  telecommunications  in  Europe today, 
looking at each of the activities in the value chain which is relevant to the scope of the 
study: 
..,..  users of satellite networks (Section 2.1) 
..,..  service providers (Section 2.2) 
..,..  network operators (Section 2.3) 
..,..  satellite owners (Section 2.4) 
..,..  ground-equipment manufacturers (Section 2.5) 
..,..  satellite manufacturers (Section 2.6). 
2.1  USERS OF SATELLITE NETWORKS 
In the past, European satellite telecoms has been the exclusive domain of national TOs 
and their international treaty organisations, who  have used satellites for international 
telephony trunking.  End  users  have  had almost  no  direct involvement with  satellite 
links.  This picture has been changing in recent years, as satellites have become used for 
other ·telecoms applications and broadcasting. 
Apart  from  international  telephony  trunking,  the  current  applications  of  satellite 
telecoms in  Europe are predominantly one-way data and video distribution, and TO-
managed  links  (SMS  - Satellite  Multi-Services).  Several  users  are non-European 
organisations who have gained experience of satellite telecoms in the USA.  Most of the 
installed networks can be described as small and relatively unambitious. 
The new users of satellite telecoms are primarily corporations and public sector bodies 
with  existing  telecoms  requirements.  At  present,  however,  only  a  small  number of 
corporations and public-sector organisations in  Europe make use of satellite telecoms 
(see Exhibit  2.1 ).  The small  size  of the European user base relative to  the USA is 
illustrated in Exhibit 2.2. 
_  Analy_sy_s ----------------------~~~-
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EXHIBIT 2.1:  Corporate Users of  Satellite Telecoms in Europe (  1991) {Source: 
CEC (J992d)J 
VSAT end-users  Business 1V users 
ABB  Italian Civil Aviation Agency  Amdahl 
Agence France Press  Italian Civil Protection Department  Betting Shops (via SIS) 
AGIP  Italian Driving Ucences Agency  BMW 
American Airlines  Italian National Pension Fund  DEC 
Associated Press  I  tali an Railways  Ford 
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro  Knight Ridder  ICL 
Banca Nazionale dell'Agricoltura  McGraw Hill  Norwich Union 
Berliner Bank  Met  eo  Renault 
BP  National Westminster Bank  Texas Instruments 
Campsa  NTB (Norway)  EuroPACE 
Canal INFO  Paris Stock Exchange  Federal Express 
Conoco  Point Research 
Daimler Benz  Press Association (UK) 
Deutsche Bank  Renault 
Domier  Reuters 
Dresdner Bank  Societa Interbancaria per l'Automazione 
EFE (Spain)  Stat oil 
Ericsson  Stockholm Stock Exchange 
ESA  Telel.'llrs 
French Foreign Ministry  Texaco 
Groupe Bull  UK Ministry of Defence 
Hypo Bank  Volvo 
HH Saudi Research 
Note: This is not a completely comprehensive listing, and does not include SMSfiBS users. 
EXHIBIT 2.2: 
The Relative Sizes of 
the European and 
US Satellite 
Telecommunications 
Installed Base 
[Source: CEC 
(J992d)J 
Business TV 
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The smaller European user base can be attributed to the late start in Europe, and to a 
number of mismatches between the available services and the users' requirements: 
....  Problems  with  suppliers.  The  marketing  and  selling  of satellite  solutions  by 
European suppliers has been very low key and market positioning of the service has 
often been inappropriate.  Many potential users are too risk-averse to rely on small, 
young suppliers for their corporate networks. 
....  Coverage.  Many  potential  users  have  pan-European  requirements,  and  few 
suppliers  can  offer  credible,  fully  supported  pan-European  service.  Regulatory 
constraints further restrict users' coverage  . 
..,.  Price.  Prices have  not been set to  give  the significant savings  that would  cause 
corporations to shift from their existing terrestrial solutions  . 
..,.  Applications.  Satellites are particularly suited  to  point-to-multipoint applications 
(such as data distribution).  These applications are not yet well developed in Europe. 
Most current corporate applications rely on  point-to-point terrestrial links, but no 
supplier has specifically offered a satellite telecoms service to meet this market in 
Europe. 
To win business from individual corporate telecoms managers, satellite telecoms players 
have to match a demanding set of cost and risk criteria (see Annex A).  In general they 
are competing against entrenched terrestrial operators with offerings that are seen as 
'safe' by  the customers.  So  far,  on  the  evidence  of sales,  the users  have  not been 
impressed with the available satellite telecoms offerings. 
The European user base is currently too small for clear conclusions to be drawn about 
the likely sectoral breakdown of European satellite users.  In  the USA,  the retailing, 
distribution and financial sectors have been the major users.  The geographical spread of 
businesses in these sectors in Europe is much more restricted; there are, for example, no 
European  equivalents  to  pan-US  retailers  such  as  K-Mart,  and  most  pan-European 
organisations  still  have  strong  national  identities.  Patterns  of use  may,  therefore, 
develop very differently in Europe. 
2.2  SERVICE PROVIDERS 
The  service  provider  is  the  organisation  that  interfaces  directly  with  the  end  user. 
Satellite telecoms service providers have a wide variety of backgrounds: 
..,.  telecoms operators (TOs)  - both monopoly-holders and competitors, some owning 
their own  satellites, some with a purely domestic focus,  some operating away from 
their home base 
..,.  terrestrial value-added network operators (e.g. Reuters, GElS, EDS) 
..,.  fully integrated space equipment manufacturers (e.g. Hughes) 
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....  partially integrated players (e.g. Alpha Lyracom/Panamsat) 
..,.  international treaty organisations (Inmarsat, Eutelsat)l 
..,.  pure satellite service providers (e.g. SIS, Teleport Europe). 
~Report  for CEC DGXJ/1 
With such a diversity of backgrounds, sizes and strategies, the dynamics of the service 
provision market are complex.  Even in the USA, where the market is more mature and 
several rounds of consolidation have occurred, the market is still in flux. 
As with  many markets that are changing rapidly and have a significant technological 
content, the strongest players tend to be vertically integrated, for a variety of reasons 
(discussed in Section 4.2.1 below).  In the USA the most common form of integration is 
for service providers also to be ground-equipment manufacturers and satellite owners. 
In Europe the dominant form of integration for indigenous service providers is satellite 
ownership  and  terrestrial  telecoms.  The  TOs  - through  their  own  satellites  (e.g. 
France, Germany,  Italy,  Spain),  or through  Eutelsat  - are integrated players.  New 
entrants are generally not formally integrated players, although they often have strong 
links with  others that bring some of the benefits of vertical integration (e.g. Teleport 
Europe's  close  relationship  with  AT&T  Tridom).  The  current  service  provider 
marketplace is dominated by the TOs: 
One-way VSAT  Polycom (France Telecom), BT, DBP, Unisource (owned by the 
seiVices  Swedish, Dutch and Swiss TOs), Telespazio (Italian TO owned), 
and Mecom  (Polycom part-owned) are currently the key service 
providers  in  Europe.  TOs  are  involved  in  almost  all  of the 
installed base. 
Business TV seiVices  SIS  (independent and dominant), Teleport Europe, SIP (Service 
Information  aux  Parieurs  - France  Telecom),  Bishopsgate 
(British Aerospace) and EuroPACE (independent) are currently 
the main service providers in Europe.  TOs are involved in only 
2% of the installed base. 
Two-way VSAT  DBP, Telespazio, ANT (Bosch), Teleport Europe, Telef6nica and 
Unisource are the major  two-way  service  providers at present. 
TOs are involved in 75% of the installed base. 
Other se!Vices  Mobile  services  (e.g.  truck  systems),  marine services  and SMS 
services are all  dominated  by  the TOs and the treaty organisa-
1  Although EuteJs:at  has end-user services such as Euteltrac:s,  it does not see service provision as its  major activity, and bas debberately 
minimised its seJVice-provision activities. 
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tions.  Satellite News Gathering services have a significant level of 
independent activity. 
The European industry structure has been a major impediment to market development. 
Neither of the main categories of European service providers (the TOs or the smaller 
entrants) have both the rationale and the resources to develop the market quickly.  The 
TOs position  and  price  their satellite  offerings  as  niche  solutions,  appropriate  only 
where terrestrial links  are very difficult;  they have not been pro-active in developing 
point-to-multipoint business, and prices have not been allowed to undercut terrestrial 
tariffs.  The new entrants do not have the resources to grow quickly on a broad front; 
they have aimed for incremental development of their businesses to reduce the risk, and 
their prices are set to maximise margins rather than to maximise revenues (as part of the 
generally risk-averse approach).2 
Exhibit 2.3  shows the approximate split of revenues for satellite telecoms services (as 
defmed for this study in Section 1.3.1) in Europe in 1991. 
EXHIBIT 2.3:  Satellite Teleco1nmunications Service Revenues in 1991[Source: 
CIT (1992)] 
Information services 
38% 
Total1991 Revenue: ECU 271 million 
Videoconferencing 3%  Business 1V 3% 
SMS!IBS services 
22% 
One-way VSAT services 3% 
SNGS% 
Two-way VSAT services 
11% 
1Vtrunking 
15% 
2  A specific feature of satellite telecoms service provision is the expense of providing ground equipment to users, particularly in the early 
years.  Experience in  the USA and Europe indicates that many early users are reluctant to buy ground equipment outright, so the 
serv1ce provider will onen need to cany these assets itself· a considerable burden for small new entrants. 
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As  this  Exhibit  shows,  the  largest  categories  in  1991  were  Information  SeiVices 
(dominated  by  the  SIS  racing  information  seiVice)  and  the  Eutelsat  SMS  seiVice 
(offered through TOs  ). 
The growth of the US market indicates that a key sector for the development of satellite 
telecoms is interactive VSA T-based seiVices.  Interactive VSAT installations are able to 
support  a  range  of satellite  telecommunications  seiVices,  providing  flenbility  and 
relatively low equipment costs. Expensive functionality is concentrated in hu}?  stations, 
which  can  support  many  hundreds  of terminals  (depending  on  traffic  patterns).  A 
striking feature of the current European VSAT seiVice providers is the high number of 
hub stations that they  have  deployed  (about  16)  relative  to  the number  of revenue 
generating VSA Ts (about 3000).  In the USA the number of terminals per hub is about 
four times as  high.  The consequent low utilisation of many expensive hub stations in 
Europe can  only  be  borne in  the long  run  by  large  organisations  such  as the TOs. 
Smaller seiVice providers have expressed their concern about the substantial overhang of 
hub capacity in the hands of the TOs, and maintain that this has a deterrent effect on 
potential new entrants. 
De-regulation in  the USA  (the 'Open Skies' policy)  stimulated  the North American 
satellite telecoms market in the early 1980s, but European de-regulation has been slow, 
incremental and  patchy in  comparison.  Even in  the most liberal European countries 
there are limitations to PSTN interconnection, complicated fees  to be paid and other 
obstacles.  Access to transponder capacity is often difficult to arrange and local planning 
laws can restrict dish installations.  Many European countries maintain a TO monopoly 
for seiVice provision (see Exhibit 2.4 below). 
EXHIBIT 2.4: 
TO tnonopoly 
Italy 
Spain 
Portugal 
Belgium 
Luxembourg 
Greece 
Ireland 
Satellite Telecoms Regulation in the EC12 (Example- VSAT 
Provision) 
Licences granted 
or not required 
Germany 
France 
UK 
Netherlands 
Denmark 
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Regulation has been a significant constraint to service providers, including those TOs 
wishing  to  operate away  from  their  home bases.  Satellite solutions are particularly 
advantageous for long links, but the patchwork of complex and restrictive regulation has 
prevented any service provider from properly achieving this goal. 
However, whilst  it is  true to say that regulation has significantly delayed the develop-
ment of the· satellite telecoms  market,  the current state of regulation  in  four  major 
national  markets  (Germany,  France,  the  UK  and  the  Netherlands)  is  considerably 
improved.  Many demands for services can now be met by service providers.  Regulation 
alone is  not enough to explain  the current slow growth  of satellite telecoms in  these 
markets; other supply-side constraints, as discussed above, are holding back the rate of 
growth. 
2.3  NE1WORK OPERATORS 
Network operation is defined to include the following activities: 
..,.  installation and setting up of ground equipment 
..,.  administration of contractual arrangements for access to space segment capacity 
..,.  operation of control and management systems (with current systems this is usually 
centred on a network hub station) 
..,.  fault identification, diagnosis and repair 
..,.  technical support for users with network-related problems. 
In terrestrial telecoms, network operation and service provision are increasingly distinct 
elements in  the value chain.  In satellite telecoms the two activities are still inextricably 
linked.  Furthermore, because of the lack  of formal  industry standards and the rapid 
pace of technology development,  network management is  also closely tied to ground-
equipment design.  This brings advantages to players who  are vertically integrated in 
service provision and equipment manufacture. 
Terrestrial network  management  suppliers  have,  to  date,  made little impact  on  the 
satellite market - there is still a technical gulf between the two areas, and the relatively 
small size of the satellite marketplace makes it less attractive to terrestrial suppliers for 
major investments in new products. 
Network management is identified by many service providers, users, equipment builders 
and others as the major technical problem remaining with VSAT systems.3  The ability 
of satellite links to fit  within broader networks and cope with various protocols is also 
3  Sources: Study interviews, industry submissions to ESA, press comments. 
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problematic  (e.g.  ISDN,  FDDI,  frame  relay,  ATM/SDH).  However,  work  on  the 
application of the newer protocols, signalling systems and overall network architectures 
to satellite links is  proceeding steadily (with most of the trials and experiments being 
conducted in the USA). 
2.4  SATELLITE OWNERS 
There are three distinct groups of communications satellites with European coverage: 
..,.  Eutelsat-owned.  These are used  primarily for TV broadcasting, TV programme 
movements ('backhaul'), telecoms and other applications (such as vehicle tracking). 
Access is via the TO of each signatory nation  . 
..,.  Publicly-owned.  France, Germany, Spain, Italy and Turkey all own satellites.  They 
have a variety of applications driven by different national requirements.  All have 
more than national coverage.  Access to these satellites is via the national TO  . 
..,.  Privately-owned.  Individual licences have been granted to a small number of private 
satellites.  These are almost  exclusively  used for TV broadcasting and  backhau~ 
although  it  is  intended  that the forthcoming Orion satellites will  carry primarily 
telecoms traffic.  Access  to these satellites is obtained by direct contact with the 
owners. 
There are other satellites with European coverage, owned by Intelsat and Inmarsat. The 
European coverage of these systems is not as complete as that of Eutelsat.  The use of 
these systems by  telecoms service providers other than  the TOs in Europe has been 
relatively low,  restrained by  their European signatories in  the interests of protecting 
Eutelsat's position; to date, there has been little motivation for the treaty organisations 
to duplicate coverage. 
Inmarsat, however, has shown increasing willingness to test this constraint, and there are 
signs that some Intelsat signatories are in favour of a change.  The Intelsat K satellite 
will provide the first significant broadcasting opportunities for Intelsat in Europe. 
European satellite ownership contrasts sharply with the situation in the USA, where the 
FCC's 'Open Skies' policy has led to a proliferation of privately-owned satellites, and. 
substantial falls  in  transponder access prices.  Europe has the highest access prices of 
any region; moreover the TOs add a premium to these prices when selling on capacity to 
third parties (see Exhibit  2.5  opposite).  (When comparing transponder prices,  it is 
important to note that there are often differences in  the age, power and footprint of 
transponders that can account for price differences.  Many of the Eutelsat transponders 
have a higher specification than those serving the USA.) 
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The main source of revenue for Eutelsat is TV broadcasting (around 60% ).  Satellite 
telecoms  for  business  users  represents  only  around  10%  of revenues,  although  this 
contribution is  growing.  Eutelsat's fmancial  position  is  very sensitive to  the level of 
demand for broadcasting bandwidth, and to competition from other systems. 
EXHIBIT 2.5:  Relative Transponder Tariffs {Source:  Vza Satellite and CIT) 
Italy 
......... 
??\??  ~=: 
-:-::33:%.·:-:  0  '  UK  ::::::::::::::::::  perators 
Index Tariff  :::::::::::::::::::;:;:::::::::::::::: 
taken as  :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
100%  :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
lllfllil 
Eutelsat 
......... 
75% 
IJ 
III!IJ 
Intelsat 
Note: US prices are highly variable and not always transparent. 
Panamsat  US Domestic 
Satellites 
Many integrated US domestic players account for their own transponders at cost plus around 20%. 
Tariff structures  are complex,  making  meaningful  comparisons  difficult.  This  chart is  based on one-year 
36MHz Ku-band prices. 
Technical developments in video compression are expected to present a serious threat to 
the revenues from  leasing transponders for  satellite broadcasting.  It is not clear how 
soon video compression will  make its impact, but technical progress in  1992 has been 
remarkably rapid; observers say that systems that can make use of existing transponders 
could be operational as early as 1994.  The advent of video compression will affect the 
revenues of all satellite owners, including Eutelsat. 
As well as preserving its revenues, Eutelsat must satisfy the interests of its signatory TOs 
and governments.  These interests have  diverged  in  recent years as the strategies of 
different TOs have developed and competition between TOs has become more common. 
National  governments'  telecoms  policies  have  become  strikingly  different,  and  it  is 
increasingly  difficult  for  Eutelsat  to  keep  all  parties content.  Eutelsat has to satisfy 
conflicting demands: 
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....  to provide a reasonable return to its capital providers (banks, TOs and governments) 
....  to act to protect the terrestrial telecommunications revenues of the TOs (i.e.  not 
offering cheap bypass) 
....  to be the mainstay customer for European satellite builders. 
2.5  GROUND-EQUIPMENT MANUFAcnJRERS 
Until the 1980s, satellite ground equipment consisted solely of large earth stations.  The 
revenue from supplying large earth station installations is currently stable at about ECU 
10 million p.a. for around 300 new installations. 
Military and specialist small terminals were first developed in the USA in the 1970s.  A 
manufacturing industry for small commercial terminals grew up in the USA in the 1980s 
following  the  de-regulation  of the  telecoms  sector.  A  large  number  of start-up 
businesses developed products to meet domestic demand for bypass telephony, and the 
VSATsegment emerged as a distinct business area. 
Although revenues in this new market grew rapidly, the cost of developing new products 
and the proliferation of players kept profitability low and led to an industry consolida-
tion in the late 1980s.  The market leaders were acquired by outsiders such as Hughes (a 
large aerospace/defence corporation) and AT&T,  leading to  the formation  of large, 
vertically integrated players.  The consolidation strengthened the industry by reinforcing 
emerging standards.  This enabled a large number of smaller players to remain active by 
developing products that complemented or substituted elements in the industry-standard 
configurations. 
As a Japanese corporation active in the US market, NEC was well placed to participate 
in  the growth  of the  commercial  ground-equipment  industry,  and  the  company  has 
achieved a significant market share.  The success of NEC came in spite of the absence of 
a domestic Japanese market for small satellite terminals. 
No  European manufacturer participated in  the early development of the US  market, 
and European market share in  the USA is nil.  Moreover, there was no commercially 
significant market for small satellite telecoms terminals in  Europe until the end of the 
1980s.  Most of the potential European manufacturers either ignored the sector entirely 
or initiated only low-level product-development activities.  Today,  there are no Euro-
pean products in key parts of the ground-equipment market (such as two-way VSA  T). 
Exhibit 2.6 shows the sales of satellite ground equipment in Europe in  1991.  Although 
residential TV receive-only equipment is not covered by this study, it is included in the 
chart to show  the current and  projected relative sizes of the residential and business 
equipment markets. 
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A number of points emerge from these figures: 
EXHIBIT 2.6: 
Satellite Ground-
Equipment Sales in 
Europe {Source: 
CIT] 
1991 
One-way VSATs (5%) 
Ship Terminals (5%) 
Total •  ECU 360 million 
..,.  A key market segment is commercial two-way small terminals (interactive VSATs). 
As  Exhibit  2.7  shows,  Europe accounts  for  only  2%-3%  of the installed base  of 
interactive VSA Ts worldwide, but is grow~ng  very rapidly from these low levels.  The 
market is dominated by US equipment (currently 100% of sales).4 
EXHIBIT 2. 7:  The World and European Two-Way VSAT Installed Base {Source: 
Booz Allen, Cornsys, CIT] 
1990 
Emope(2%) 
··-...... ·-. ·-. ·-.  .. ·-. 
South··  ••• 
1\mcrica (5%)  ·  •  ••••••. 
·-. 
·--~~~-
640 
1990  1991 
YearEnd 
TOTAL TERMINALS IN 1990 •  71000  EUROPEAN INSTALLED BASE 
4  Some value is added iD Europe • for example, AJ'IIT manufactures STM X.Star equipment in Europe under lit:ence. 
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_..  The European market for one-way VSATs  is  currently equal in  value to that for 
interactive VSA Ts, but will not grow at the same rate.  European suppliers (Matra 
and OTE) have a good share of the current market; US and Japanese suppliers have 
not focused significant resources on this segment in Europe. 
_..  The market for business TVRO terminals is not predicted to rise above about 2% of 
the total ground-equipment  market.  Various  European manufacturers have  the 
capability to produce business TYRO terminals, and can expect about half of the 
European market. 
...  European manufacturers have been relatively successful in establishing their market 
position in the supply of large earth-station equipment, but this market is relatively 
small and has very little growth potential. 
_..  European manufacturers have a strong position in  the market for ship terminals, 
where the market for installations on European registered vessels is currently about 
ECU 18 million p.a. (about one third of the world market).  This market, however, 
will not grow dramatically.  European manufacturers hold about 30% of the world 
market for ship terminals. 
_..  The current  European  market  for  satellite  mobile  terminals  (vehicle-based  and 
aircraft  portable  terminals)  is  worth  about  ECU  9  million  p.a..  European 
manufacturers have a healthy position in  this market, but this will  not necessarily 
translate  into  an  advantage  in  producing  personal  satellite  mobile  terminals  or 
terminals for the other mobile applications that are forecast  to appear.  It is  too 
early to say whether Europe's relatively strong position in ten-estrial personal mobile 
equipment will translate into an advantage in satellite-based systems. 
Ground-equipment  technology  has  advanced  rapidly.  Terminals  have  become 
increasingly powerful,  sensitive,  robust and more easily integrated with  other systems 
components.  Two  technology areas are notable for  their demands (in terms of high 
fiXed costs and skill levels): 
_..  Software production.  Software is an increasingly important component, both in the 
functionality of individual items of equipment and in  the integration of equipment 
into robust systems.  Software development is entirely a fiXed cost. 
_..  Component  integration  of high-frequency  electronics.  The increasing  levels  of 
integration of specialised high-frequency electronics drives up fiXed  costs (research, 
design  and  production),  and  increases  the economies of scale  available  to  large 
suppliers. 
Both  of these  technologies  require  high  up-front  investments.  Potential European 
manufacturers, with small domestic markets and little market experience, have not had 
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the confidence to make these investments.  The economies of scale that are achieved by 
the dominant manufacturers (Hughes, GTE Spacenet, AT&T, NEC etc.), with their high 
worldwide market shares, form a significant deterrent to new entrants. 
The revenues obtained from the sale of ground equipment are related to the size of the 
service provision market.  In the longer run we estimate that equipment sales revenues 
will be about 20 - 30% of service provision revenues. 
2.6  SATELLITE MANUFACI'URERS 
In world terms, building satellites for civil communications accounts for about a quarter 
of total satellite building activity (the rest having military, government, remote sensing, 
positioning, research or other applications - see Exhibit 2.8). 
EXHIBIT 2.8:  Estilnated Total World Satellite Manufacturing Activity [Source: 
CIT, FI/DMS, Euroconsult} 
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Individual  civil  communications  satellites  are  built  to  serve  a  mixture  of 
telecommunications and TV broadcasting needs.  Based on the respective revenues from 
broadcasting  and  telecommunications,  it  is  estimated  that  revenues  for  satellite 
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manufacturing  for  telecommunications  were  about  $560m  in  1990  (including 
international trunked telephony). 
A European satellite building industry developed in the 1970s and 1980s to compete with 
the US satellite builders.  It has depended on civil communications satellites to a much 
greater extent than US industry, where military applications have been more significant. 
European satellite manufacturers have established an impressive record of progress and 
achievement in  the past  15  years.  From a base of zero in  the  1970s,  the European 
industry  achieved  a  20%  share by  value  of the world  civil  communications satellite 
market  in  the  1980s.  In  the period  1990-95,  according  to Euroconsult,  its share is 
projected at 30% by value.  Civil satellites for broadcasting and telecoms have been a 
key  driver  of growth  for  the entire European space industry;  this  contrasts with  the 
USA, where military contracts have been the major driver. 
The main  applications  of European  communications  satellites  are TV  broadcasting 
(over half of the  capa~ity in  orbit) and international telephony (over one quarter of 
capacity in  orbit).  Business telecoms has not been an  important application, but has 
been growing quickly since 1989, and now accounts for approximately 16% of European 
revenues to satellite owners.  Payloads are now designed to give the owner considerable 
flexibility to serve broadcasting, telephony or business telecoms, so satellites can meet a 
range of  possible demand patterns. 
European production has largely been for European domestic coverage; no European 
satellites have been sold for domestic US use.  When competing for business in the rest 
of the world, Europeans have had more success as subcontractors to US  f1I111s  than as 
prime contractors. 
European manufacturers have not had the opportunity to produce long runs of similar 
satellites because this has  not been required by  the domestic European market.  US 
experience with  long runs for  their domestic market, however,  has demonstrated that 
there are substantial economies of scale in satellite manufacture.  This is an important 
factor  in  the  'cost  disadvantage'  of  European  manufacturers  identified  by  many 
commentators.s 
Exhibit 2.9 shows the major players in satellite manufacturing in Europe.  Most are also 
active  in  other areas  of the  space  industry  (launchers  and  vehicles),  the  aerospace 
industry, and the defence industry (missiles and other systems).  Unlike some of their 
US  competitors (Hughes, TRW), they are not integrated into satellite operation and 
service provision. 
S  See Euroconsult (199lb, 1992), Vep/Eurospace, press reports and Ana~  interviews. 
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The industry has developed along national lines,  integrated with  the national defence 
and aerospace industries.  Although there is  significant and growing co-operation and 
consolidation across national boundaries, the national dimension is still significant as a 
driver of strategy and has  a  major bearing on costs.  As the European industry has 
known for many years, the fragmentation of the satellite manufacturers is a significant 
weakness. 
EXHIBIT 2.9:  Players in the European Satellite Manufacturing Industry [Source: 
Euroconsult J 
Gemmny  Frtllace  UK  Italy  Others 
Prime contractors: 
Platforms  DASA  Aerospatiale  BAe  Alenia 
(MBB,  Matra 
Domier) 
Payloads  ANf  Alcatel  Marconi  Alenia 
Propulsion  MAN  SEP,SNPE  BPD 
Sub-contractors  Telefunken  Sextant  Logica  La  ben  Fokker 
Siemens  Sod  em  ThomEMI  Galileo  ETCA 
Teldix  Sag  em  Fiat  CASA 
Nord Micro  Saft  Fiat Spazio  Sener 
SEL  Saab 
Ericsson 
The world satellite manufacturing business is now in a period of overcapacity.  Trading 
conditions will be very difficult for all players, whether US or European, in the next few 
years: 
....  In the USA, the volume of military business is falling, leading to particularly fierce 
competition between US manufacturers for commercial contracts  . 
..,.  Manufacturers are very keen to exploit economies of scale by  a~hieving longer runs 
of similar  satellites.  This  encourages  low  bidding  and  increases  competitive 
pressures  . 
..,.  Demand for  satellites for  TV broadcasting is  not continuing to grow at the rate 
expected by some forecasters.  The number of unused transponders in the USA is 
increasing.  Similarly reduced expectations are apparent in Europe.6 
6  Source: Study interviews. 
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~  Demand outside the European or US markets is growing, but competition is intense 
and many national governments are keen to link the award of contracts to other 
trade or political issues. 
~  Compression technology, which promises to increase the efficiency of exploitation of 
satellite capacity, is threatening to affect the number of satellites required in future. 
This difficult per:iod is exposing the structural.problems of European manufacturers -
particularly fragmentation and low economies of scale - and they are struggling to fill 
their order books.  Industry consolidation, however, is continuing, and this will reduce 
national divisions  of the industry within  Europe and even  across  the Atlantic.  The 
future European market will be less able to support a European satellite manufacturing 
base on its  own;  business  must  be won  in  the rest of the world  market against  US 
competition,  and  in  new  market  areas  (such  as  Low  Earth  Orbit  communications 
satellites). 
In the long run, the revenues that can be derived from satellite manufacturing will be 
considerably smaller than the revenues that are achieved  from  offering services  that 
make use of satellites.  We estimate that they will also be smaller than the revenues from 
the sale of ground equipment to support these services.  The perceived importance of 
satellite manufacturing (in industrial policy  terms)  does not derive from  its  revenue 
contribution  to  the  economy,  but  rather  from  its  strategic  significance  as  a  high 
technology business. 
7  See Annex B for the assumptions behind these figures. 
8  Analysys interviews. 
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3/ Drivers of Change in the Market 
The future growth  and  development  of the satellite telecoms market depends partly 
upon de-regulation, but also  upon the evolution of demand and the behaviour of the 
supply base.  De-regulation alone will  not lead to healthy growth.  There are serious 
weaknesses in  the current service provision supply base that will constrain the rate of 
development, and it will be some time before Europe has a sufficient number of capable, 
well  resourced  and well  motivated  suppliers.  Early de-regulation will  encourage the 
required development of the supply base but will not guarantee success. 
Moreover,  developments  in  European  terrestrial  telecoms  will  eventually  limit  the 
addressable market for certain applications of satellite telecoms in Western Europe.  H 
the satellite telecoms  service  providers do  not join  the  mainstream  of the telecoms 
sector before this window of opportunity is closed,  then satellite solutions will remain 
marginalised and little used in Europe. 
The key· drivers for change will lie in the field of service provision; the success of other 
sectors of the market will be determined by what happens in this sector.  This Chapter 
looks at the determinants of the future service provision market under three headings -
regulation  (Section 3.1 ),  the evolution of demand (Section 3.2),  and the behaviour of 
service providers (Section 3.3).  We then consider more briefly the determinants of the 
future ground equipment and satellite manufacturing businesses (Section 3.4 and 3.5). 
3.1  THE IMPACT OF 'GREEN PAPER' DE-REGULATION ON SERVICE PROVISION 
Regulation will continue to be an important determinant of the size and nature of the 
satellite  telecoms  market  in  Europe.  At  present,  regulations  differ widely  between 
European states,  but  it  is  proposed  that EC Member States'  regulations  should  be 
harmonised within  a common EC framework;  several non-EC European states could 
also be expected to align their national regulation with such a common framework. 
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Exhibit 3.1  summarises the terms of the common regulatory environment proposed in 
the European Commission's Green Paper of 1990.1 
EXHIBIT  3.1:  Sunvnary of  the 'Green Paper' De-Regulation Proposals 
Position: 1  ...  Full bberalisation of receive-only equipment 
... Transmit/receiver terminals subject to type approval only 
-
2  ...  Uplinks should be permitted under licence 
...  Licences should permit non-discriminatory PSIN interconnection 
Earth 
Segment  3  ... Type approvals should be based on European EM emissions standards 
...  National type approvals should be recognised in all EC states 
...  No special type approvals for receive-only equipment not connected to PSIN 
4  ...  Small non-interconnected network licences should be granted 
...  Large and PSIN-connected networks should be granted licences, subject to 
Directive 90/388/EEC (the Services Directive) 
...  A Directive should be issued on the mutual recognition of licences 
s  ...  Operation and regulation of the space segment should be separated 
...  Equitable access should be given to those seeking frequencies or orbital slots 
6  ...  EC competition rules should apply to the owners of space segment capacity as far as 
possible 
... Technical co-ordination procedures should not restrict access to the space segment 
(subject to Community and Member State commitments under international law) 
Space 
Segment  7  ..  Improved access to space segment for telecoms and broadcasting 
...  Direct access to Eutelsat capacity should be permitted by signatory states 
...  Full commercial freedom for Eutelsat within Member States 
8  ...  Space segment prices should follow the principles of cost-orientation 
9  ..  Positions 5 to 8 should be carried out by Member States under Community law 
10  ...  Mobile/position-fiXing systems should not be treated differently from fJXed services 
Mobile 
Systems  11  ...  Mobile terminals should be subject to the same rules as fJXed terminals 
u  ... Mobile licences should be mutually recognised across the EC to allow roaming 
13  ...  Broadcasting remains subject to Directive 89 /552/EEC (TV broadcasting activities) 
Broad-
casting  14  ...  MAC transmissions should be used as stated in Directive 86/529/EEC (updated in 
December 1991) 
...  Broadcasting satellites should be compatible with emerging HDTV standards 
CEC (1990b). 
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The  impact  of the  proposed  new  regulatory  environment  will  be  to  facilitate  and 
stimulate accelerated growth in the European satellite telecoms market, particularly for 
business applications using VSAT solutions.  The new regulations are expectecJ2 to bring 
the following benefits: 
Removal of 
prohibitions 
Simplification of 
operations 
Increasing 
confidence 
Enabling of  pan-
European networks 
Reduction of  costs 
Satellite telecoms will  be available  in  all  EC countries from  a 
number  of  licensed  service  providers.  Interconnection  with 
private networks will be permitted.  PSTN interconnection will be 
permitted in some cases. 
Licensing and registration procedures for equipment, installation, 
transmission  and  reception  will  be more  straightfotward,  and 
differences between  national procedures will  be reduced.  This 
will benefit service providers and users. 
Users,  operators and investors will  have grounds for  increased 
confidence in  satellite solutions.  Today's substantial perceived 
uncertainties  about  the  future  of  satellite  telecoms  will  be 
reduced, although US experience indicates that satellite telecoms 
carries inherently high commercial risks (due to the technology, 
market uncertainty and investment characteristics). 
A  harmonised  regulatory  environment  will  facilitate  the 
establishment of truly pan-European satellite networks  - which 
has  frequently  been  identified  (by  interviewees  and  industry 
commentators) as  a key  requirement for  market growth.  The 
mutual recognition of service provider licences by Member States 
will further increase the rate of growth. 
The costs of deploying and operating satellite telecoms networks 
would be reduced in the new regulatory environment: 
~  Licensing charges and other cost obstacles will not be used to 
restrict activity. 
~  EC terminal type approvals will become 'one-stop', reducing 
costs. 
~  Initial  and  annual  terminal  registration  charges  will 
disappear. 
~  The premiums charged by TOs for space segment resale will 
not  be  sustainable.  Over  time,  the  other  space  segment 
2  Analysys expectations tested in interviews. 
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proposals will result in falling prices for space segment access. 
However,  regulatory  change  alone  will  not  lead  to 
transponder prices falling to US levels. 
The timing of these benefits will vary.  The announcement of a firm timetable for change 
would  yield  immediate  benefits  in  terms  of  confidence.  However,  the  actual 
implementation of  individual proposals in each Member State will spread over a period 
of  time,  with  som-e  proposals,  such  as  mutual  recognition  of  licences,  requiring 
considerable multilateral liaison. 
Liberalisation of the space segment will  not bring about a significant increase in the 
availability of satellite capacity over Europe for several years, due to the lead-time for 
new satellite deployments.  Indeed, it is not clear that the Green Paper proposals will 
ever lead directly to a substantial number of new satellites that would not othetwise have 
been deployed.  The commercial prospects  for  new  capacity over Europe (over and 
above current planned launches) are not generally regarded as attractive. 
Even if all regulatory changes could be fully  implemented overnight, it would take the 
industry  many  months  to  absorb  and  respond  to  the  new  opportunities.  For new 
entrants, it can take six months to two years to develop a business plan, raise finance and 
effect  entry into new  markets.  US  experience indicates that users will  often wish  to 
conduct limited trials for 12-18 months before investing significantly in satellite systems. 
In  summary,  the full  stimulant  effect  of the  Green  Paper de-regulation  will  not be 
apparent immediately.  The impact of regulatory change on  the development of the 
market will be spread over several years by a. number of inherent delays and lags in the 
marketplace. 
3.2  THE EVOLUTION OF DEMAND FOR SATELLITE TELECOMS SERVICES 
As discussed in  Chapter 2 (Section 2.1 ), current realised demand for satellite telecoms 
services in Europe is small.  The. breakdown of users and applications may not yet be a 
good guide to the nature of any wider potential demand.  The way in which  end-user 
demand for satellite telecoms evolves will clearly be a key determinant of the form of the 
future market. 
A fully detailed characterisation of the likely demand for satellite telecoms is beyond the 
scope of this study.  Our understanding of the likely  nature and  level of demand is 
broadly in line with CEC study Prospects and Policy for Europe-wide Specialised Satellite 
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SeTVices.3  In  this section we  consider the likely evolution of demand under four main 
headings: 
~  the evidence for potential demand (Section 3.2.1) 
~  the relative advantages of satellite and terrestrial options (Section 3.2.2) 
~  the characteristics  of demand  for  point-to-point,  point-to-multipoint  an~ mobile 
applications (Section 3.2.3) 
~  possible constraints on demand (Section 3.2.4 ). 
3.2.1  Evidence for Potential Demand 
There  is  considerable  evidence  that  potential  demand  (i.e.  unmet  or  unidentified 
demand) exists for satellite telecoms services.  This potential demand is generally agreed 
to be predominantly for corporate telecoms.  The evidence comes from the following 
sources: 
~  Extrapolation from  the experience of existing European satellite telecoms users. 
Some current European users can be seen as 'pioneers', in that they have similar 
business profues to large numbers of corporations who have exclusively terrestrial 
networks.  Many of the 'pioneer' users claim  that significant benefits have come 
from satellite usage.4  These benefits should apply to similar but more conservative 
users, indicating that, in a developed market, significant real demand would exist. 
~  Extrapolation to  Europe of US  experience with  satellite telecoms.  In the USA, 
satellite  solutions  have  grown  rapidly,  and  now  account  for  about  2%  of total 
telecoms  revenue.  A  simple  extrapolation  of US  experience  to  Europe is  not 
justified, because the geographical contexts and terrestrial telecoms environments 
are  very  different;  however,  comparison  of  US  and  European  circumstances 
supports the view that potential demand exists in Europe. 
~  Mar-ket  research and case studies of potential European users.  A wide range of 
sources have produced forecasts and research reports indicating that demand from 
users can support annualised growth of up to 25%.  While forecasters differ in their 
assumptions and  methods,  there is  consensus  that potential demand for satellite 
telecoms exists. 
3  CEC (1992d). 
4  See CEC (1992d) and Annex B. study inteJViews. 
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..,.  Cost/benefit analysis  of satellite  solutions  compared  to  terrestrial alternatives. 
Objective analyses of fully costed satellite and terrestrial options for a wide range of 
applications indicate that European users would benefit from satellite applications.S 
3.2.2  Satellite vs Terrestrial Options 
Most of the specific user requirements that make up potential demand  - whether for 
point-to-point  applications,  point-to-multipoint,  one-way  or  two-way  could 
theoretically he met by terrestrial solutions.  The opportunity for satellite telecoms arises 
when  the terrestrial solution  is  more expensive  or inconvenient,  as well  as when  no 
terrestrial solution is available (as in  shipboard communications and rapid deployment 
systems, such as those required by the emergency services). 
The advantage or disadvantage of satellite solutions relative to terrestrial solutions will 
change  over  time,  as  technology,  infrastructure  and  user  requirements  change. 
Developments in terrestrial telecoms will therefore be an important determinant of the 
demand for satellite solutions. 
The  following  points  summarise  the  relevant  developments  expected  in  European 
terrestrial telecoms in the next few years: 
..,.  Terrestrial corporate telecoms links will become substantially cheaper than they are 
today.  Price falls  will  be particularly marked  for  international telecoms  and for 
private circuits.  Exhibit  3.2  below  illustrates our expectation  of price falls  for  a 
basket of European international private circuits.  Regulatory pressures and falling 
transmission costs are the main drivers of price reductions  . 
..,..  The availability of higher-bandwidth links with advanced protocols will increase  . 
..,.  Corporate users will develop applications that rely on the cheap availability of high-
bandwidth connections  . 
..,.  A number of TOs will become effective international operators, with the capability 
to offer pan-European corporate telecoms on a 'one-stop' basis  . 
..,.  Corporate users will  be increasingly powerful in  their relationships with  telecoms 
suppliers, demanding high levels of service and substantial discounts on tariffs  . 
..,.  Increasingly significant differences will emerge in the level of telecoms infrastructure 
in different regions of Europe.  The eastern nations, together with rural and remote 
areas,  will  continue to  be poorly  provisioned.  Major conurbations and business 
centres,  on  the  other  hand,  will  see  dramatic  progress  in  their  telecoms 
infrastructure. 
S  See Section 3.3.4 below, and CEC (1992d). 
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EXHIBIT 3.2:  · 
Expected Future 
Tariffs for a Basket 
of  European 
International 
64bit/s Leased 
Lines 
1\  100%  ·······r······r·······r·······r······T········r·······-~·-·······r········j··-·-·-··;····---·r····-·r·····-·l 
:::::::::::::::::::::::.:-:-~.-.--~ ·· ·-·  ·  ·  ·  i-·  --·  ·  ·- -~ ·  ·  ·  ---··j ·  ·  ·-·  ·  ·  ·  ·1· ·---·-·t·-------i·--------i---·  ····1·-·  ·  ·· -· ·  r----··--1---·----·i 
1\ 
1\ 
-8 
.5 
1::  ·c 
ftl  - j 
] 
1\ 
1\ 
1\ 
90% 
80%  ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::-:-:·~··.  ~ ........ l  ........ l  ......... t  ........ i  ........ L  .......  -~ ........  L  ........ i  ........  1  ........  -~ 
70% 
60% 
SO% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
1989  1991  1993  1995  1997  1999  2001 
The relative advantages of satellite and terrestrial options vary widely between different 
kinds of applications (e.g.  point-to-multipoint, point-to-point and mobile).  Exhibit 3.3 
illustrates where satellite solutions are likely to be advantaged: 
EXHIBIT 3.3:  Applications Suitable for Satellite and Te"estrial Solutions,  Today 
and in 2000 
Satellite teleconu  Varies  Te"estrial telecoms 
advantaged  case by case  (fibre & radio) advantaged 
Current position 
~ Point-to-multipoint  ~  Pan-European  ~  Domestic point-to-point 
~  News gathering  point-to-point  ~  Personal mobile 
~  Remote and poorly  ..,.  International trunked  ..,.  PSTN provision 
served areas  telephony 
~  Volatile networks 6 
~  Vehicle location (RDSS) 
Likely position in 2000 
~  Point-to-multipoint  ..,.  Personal mobile  ..,.  Domestic point-to-point 
..,.  News gathering  ..,.  Vehicle location  ~  International 
..,.  Remote and poorly  trunked telephony 
served areas  ~  Pan-European 
~  Volatile networks  point-to-point 
..,.  PSTN provision 
6  i.e. networks wbere the sites are frequently chanf,ing. 
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There has been considerable debate in  the telecoms industry concerning the extent to 
which satellite telecoms will take traffic away from terrestrial networks.  Some claim that 
in the US market the majority of satellite traffic is 'incremental', that is to say that if the 
satellite solution were not available, then the individual corporate application would not 
have been  developed.  7  Others disagree,  interpreting many  US  applications as pure 
bypass exercises. 
Our  view  is  that  whether  or  not  satellite  telecoms  demand  in  Europe  is  truly 
incrementa~ it does not represent one of the major threats to existing TO revenues.  The 
satellite paths that are added to international corporate networks will be overwhelmingly 
new links, part of the current strong growth in international networks.  It is difficult to 
envisage  satellite  links  being  set  up  by  resellers  as  major  bypass  channels  for 
international PSTN  traffic  - if European  international  PSTN regulation  changes  to 
permit bypass services then terrestrial circuits are likely to be used to provide most of 
the bypass trunking links in Europe. 
3.2.3  Characteristics of Demand 
The characteristics of demand are different for  each  of the three main categories of 
application - point-to-multipoint, point-to-point and mobile applications: 
Point-to-multipoint 
applications 
Point-to-multipoint  networks  are  the  most  commonly  cited 
category  of applications  where  satellite  solutions  can  be cost-
advantaged.  Such  networks  need  not  be limited  to  centrally 
broadcast traffic only;  US  experience illustrates that on a point-
to-multipoint  network  implemented  with  interactive  (two-way) 
VSA Ts,  traffic patterns can  develop that are broadly similar to 
the traffic on  terrestrial private-circuit data networks.  Once an 
interactive network is installed, point-to-point traffic can easily be 
accommodated. 
In  the  USA  it  has  taken  many  years  for  corporate  IT  and 
telecoms managers to recognise fully the opportunities that such 
applications offer to their organisations.  Implementing point-to-
multipoint  applications  has  often  entailed  major  redesign  of 
corporate information  flows  and organisational structure.  Such 
significant  changes  within  a  corporation  take  time  and 
commitment if they  are to  be  successfu~ and  there are many 
examples of satellite telecoms contracts that have foundered on 
7  This is not the same as saying that if  the satellite solution "-as removed, the user would let the application lapse - it is difficult to imagine 
K-Mart or General Motors doing without their key business information systems which are currently VSAT-baied. 
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Point-to-point 
applications 
these problems  - for  example  the Federal Express  M/  A-Com 
VSAT  contract  terminated  in  1986.  European  corporate 
telecoms is around five to ten years behind US developments, and 
most  European corporations have  not yet  started to climb  the 
point-to-multipoint learning curve. 
There  will  be  demand  for  point-to-point  links  provided  by 
satellite where: 
..,.  terrestrial  infrastructure  is  not  adequate  (e.g.  Eastern 
Europe) 
..,.  the lead-time for terrestrial links is too long for the needs of 
the user (e.g. satellite news gathering, or countries with very 
slow TO provision) 
..,.  the distance to be covered is very great, and terrestrial tariffs 
are distance-related 
..,.  the terrestrial solution  is  more expensive due to tariffs not 
being cost-based (e.g. international private circuits). 
Pure point-to-point  links  are  common  in  the  USA  over  long 
distances- for example the AT&T Skynet™ service.  The extent 
to which point-to-point satellite links develop in Europe depends 
not on the fundamental relative merits of terrestrial and satellite 
solutions, but on the pricing of each.  This is discussed in Section 
3.3.4 below. 
The  key  point  with  point-to-point  links  is  their  conceptual 
similarity  to  terrestrial  telecoms.  In  contrast  to  point-to-
multipoint  networks,  corporate  telecoms  managers  can 
contemplate  point-to-point  satellite  links  without  needing  to 
worry  about  the  implications  for  their  corporate  MIS  or  IT 
strategy.  The obstacles to use are therefore much reduced. 
The  market  for  point-to-point  private  circuits  in  Europe  is 
currently worth  about ECU 5 billion  per annum,  and growth  is 
healthy.  Because  of its  size  and  maturity,  it  is  a  potentially 
attractive  market  for  new  entrants,  whether  terrestrial  service 
providers or satellite service providersB.  The point-to-multipoint 
market is small and immature in comparison to the point-to-point 
market. 
8  Notably tbe Orion venture, which appears to be planning to concentrate on this area. 
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Mobile applications  Mobile applications form  a  third category of potential demand 
for  satellite  telecoms.  Some  industry  observers  predict  a 
substantial  market  for  personal  mobile  communications  using 
satellites, but this is an area of great uncertainty and speculation. 
If satellite systems do materialise, their share of the market will 
be determined by their merits relative to terrestrial systems (in 
terms of price, weight, battery life, coverage etc.). 
3.2.4  Constraints on Demand 
The following  points  are commonly  cited  as  potential  constraints  on  the growth  of 
demand for satellite telecoms: 
Diffusion rates 
Mix of  demand 
Studies  of the  diffusion  rates  for  the uptake  of new  telecoms 
services  by  corporate users  confirm  that  migration  to  satellite 
so,utions will  not be an  overnight process, even where clear and 
compelling benefits are available to users.9  The slow growth of 
VSAT  usage  in  the  USA  since  1983  (well  below  many 
expectations)  supports  the  view  that  diffusion  rates  may 
significantly limit the rate of uptake in Europe, with the diffusion 
process perhaps being much slower than was observed for other 
telecommunications  innovations  (such  as  mobile  telecoms, 
facsimile  or packet-switched  services).  Annex A  discusses  the 
factors that can combine to slow the rate of diffusion for satellite 
telecoms. 
An important determinant of the shape of the future market will 
be the mix of demand for large and small networks, particularly 
for  two-way  systems.  At present,  two-way  VSATs  in  Europe 
average about 50  terminals per network, compared with around 
100 per network in  the USA.  There are no 'large' networks in 
Europe,  whereas  there  are several  US  networks  of over  1000 
terminals and some of over 5000.  The division of the European 
corporate  sector  along  national  lines  reduces  the  potential 
demand for large networks, and this will persist for many years. 
The effects of European demand being skewed towards smaller 
networks will be significant: 
9  See RACE work (EPF (1992)) and other work on diffusion rates for new telecoms services, Fonteoay (1990) and Muller (1988). 
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Niche orientation 
....  The  utilisation  of expensive  fiXed  assets  (uplinks  and  hub 
stations)  will  tend  to  be  lower,  which  will  reduce  the 
profitability of service providers  . 
.,...  The service providers will  have to build a customer base of 
smaller accounts, and will not be able to rely on the benefits 
of large contracts such as those that have been awarded in the 
USA (e.g. General Motors, Chevron, Chrysler, Rite-Aid). 
....  The demand mix  will  favour  shared-uplink and shared-hub 
solutions. 
....  The benefits of satellite solutions vs terrestrial solutions will 
be reduced, since the level of benefit is directly linked to the 
size of the network. 
It  is  often  maintained,  by  conference  speakers  and  in  the 
telecoms press, that satellite telecoms demand is  different from 
mainstream telecoms demand because it is strongly divided into 
'niche' applications (such as business TV, SNG, rapid deployment 
for emergency services etc.).  Because of this, it is maintained, the 
level of potential demand will be restricted. 
Whilst it is possible to identify many highly specific applications 
for  satellite  telecoms,  there  is  little  evidence  to  suggest  that 
satellite telecoms per se  is  any  more niche-oriented than many 
other  means  of  serving  the  emerging  corporate  networking 
market.  In order to sell modern telecoms services successfully, it 
is  important  for  the  provider  to  understand  highly  specific 
customer requirements and to ensure that they are well matched 
to the features of the product.  This is as true for services such as 
frame relay, SMDS, videoconferencing or IN services as it is for 
VSA Ts or business TV.  The demand for satellite telecoms will be 
made up  of highly  individual implementations, and will  require 
close collaboration between users and service providers to make 
these implementations effective; but this does not mean that level 
of potential demand is low. 
3.3  THE BEHAVIOUR OF SATELLITE TELECOMS SERVICE PROVIDERS 
For potential demand to become realised demand, the requirement must be matched 
against  a  supplier  who  is  able  to  convert  the  opportunity  into  reality.  The  third 
determinant of the nature and size of the future market is therefore the behaviour of the 
supplier (the service provider), which we analyse under the following headings: 
_  Analy_sy_s ------------~------....._~-~ 
3/ DRIVERS OF CHANGE IN THE MARKET Ana.;.sys Repon for CEC DGX/11 
....  service provider credibility and resources (Section 3.3.1) 
·....  the strategic goals of the service providers (Section 3.3.2} 
....  the geographic coverage of service providers (Section 3.3.3) 
....  service provider pricing policies (Section 3.3.4 ). 
Where relevant, we consider the TO and non-TO service providers separately under 
each of these headings. 
3.3.1  Service Provider Credibility and Resources  · 
The health of the satellite telecoms business in Europe depends on the existence of a 
sufficient number of service providers who have the credibility and resources to supply 
services.  Credibility with  customers  is  a  key  requirement  for  selling  any  telecoms 
service, particularly to corporate telecommunications managers, who will continue to be 
inherently prudent and risk-averse.  tO 
The typical perception of service provider credibility varies between TO and non-TO 
providers: 
The market's 
perception of  non-
TO setvice providers 
10  See Analysys (1991) 
At present,  there are fewer  than  20  non-TO  satellite telecoms 
service providers in  Europe.  Many are not yet active,  or have 
only a small number of pilot installations.  No service provider 
has  yet  had  time  to  establish  a  track  record  that  could  be 
completely  reassuring  to  the  average  corporate  telecoms 
manager, and the small number that do have some credibility and 
adequate resources do not constitute a sufficiently large supply 
base  for  rapid  development  of the  market.  All  the  non-TO 
service providers are adversely affected by the image of the sector 
as immature, unstable, risky, and under-resourced. 
This  perception  will  change  as  some  of the  existing  players 
develop  and new  entrants appear.  The rate of increase in  the 
number  and  size  of the  non-TO  service  providers  will  be an 
important  determinant  of  how  quickly  satellite  telecoms  can 
establish credibility with potential customers. 
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The nzarket s 
perception of  TO 
service providers 
The TOs  have  most  of the  attributes  that  are  necessary  for 
credibility with potential satellite customers.  They are perceived 
as being well  resourced, stable,  and technically capable (though 
their  credibility  tends  to  be  confmed  to  their  domestic 
marketplace). 
Most of the TOs, however, seem unlikely to exploit their position§ 
in their home markets (discussed in Section 3.3.2 below), and will 
not use satellite telecoms as a major competitive weapon away 
from  their home markets.  It is  not likely,  therefore,  that the 
existence of this group of credible and well resourced suppliers 
will  be a  source  of substantial growth  and  development in the 
future market. 
Overall,  satellite  telecoms  providers  have  a  poor  image  in  the  European  telecoms 
industry.  One reason is that because of both regulatory and technological factors, it is 
still difficult to embed satellite links .into corporate networks in a transparent way.  The 
technological  difficulties  apply  equally  in  the  USA,  but  there  they  are cited  as  an 
inconvenience rather than a restriction.  If satellite links could be made transparent to 
users through  more advanced network management techniques, an obstacle to selling 
satellite telecoms in  Europe would be removed,  and  the overall credibility of satellite 
telecoms with customers would improve. 
A major application of satellite telecoms in Europe has been the provision of services to 
eastern European states and the eastern part of Germany.  As a result satellite telecoms 
have been associated with  peripheral regions and exceptional requirements.  This has 
been  identified  by  interviewees  as  an  obstacle  to  selling  satellites  for  mainstream 
applications in  regions with good terrestrial infrastructure.  Perceptions will improve if 
there is an increase in the number of installations for mainstream corporate customers 
in major commercial centres. 
3.3.2  The Strategic Goals of the Service Providers 
Another major determinant of the future satellite telecoms business in  Europe is  the 
energy and ambition of the supply base.  A set of suppliers with the strategic goal of high 
growth can bring a range of stimulants to market development.  A passive supply base 
will not take the actions necessary to generate growth. 
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The strategic goalr 
of  the non-TO 
service providers 
The strategic goalr 
of  the TO service 
providers 
AMJysys RqKHJforCEC DGX/11 
A significant proportion of current service providers have niche 
strategies  that  will  not  lead  to  broad  or  rapid  overall  market 
development.  For smaller, younger players, a niche strategy can 
be more appropriate, bringing higher margins and lower risks; it 
is likely that many of the new entrants in  the coming years will 
also  pursue  niche  strategies  for  these  reasons.  However,  this 
approach  can  be  interpreted  differently  by  some  potential 
customers, who  see it as confirmation  of .the limited  ~pe  of 
applications for satellite telecoms.ll 
There are a small number of potential service providers who have 
plans for strong growth on  a broad front.  It remains to be seen 
whether  these  plans  can  lead  to  potential  entrants  obtaining 
access to the financial resources necessary for implementation. 
The  current  TO service  providers  have  a  variety  of strategic 
interests in pursuing satellite telecoms, but none of them has a 
strategy  that  will  lead  to  the  evolution  of  a  major  service 
provision business.  The current TO service provision businesses 
are either: 
~  offering  only  services  that  do  not  compete  directly  with 
terrestrial services (e.g. Polycom) 
~  offering satellite service away from their domestic territories 
as  a  limited  part  of a  broader  terrestrial  portfolio  (e.g. 
Unisource) 
~  offering  satellite  services  to  a  small  subset  of users  with 
exceptional  requirements  (e.g.  Telespazio  and  Deutsche 
Telekom) 
~  providing  no  services  to  any  users  or serving a  very  small 
selected userbase (e.g. Telef6nica  ). 
There is,  at present, no strategic rationale for·  any of the major 
European TOs to develop a significant satellite service provision 
business offering services that overlap with  terrestrial telecoms. 
It is therefore not surprising that they have adopted their current 
modest strategies. 
It appears that few  or none of the current service providers will implement strategies 
that aim for significant growth in the broad marketplace.  This will be a major constraint 
on  the  rate  of growth  and  development  of  the  market.  The  cumulative  level  of 
11  Source: Study interviews. 
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marketing and sales will  be low,  and will  remain largely niche-oriented; this will slow 
down the rate at which awareness, interest and active involvement will diffuse through 
the potential customer base.  At the same time,  the cumulative fmancial  and human 
resources committed to the provision of satellite telecoms will remain low, and the rate 
at which the overall setvice provision business gains credibility will be retarded. 
3.3.3  The Geographic Coverage of Service Providers 
Users, setvice providers and industry obsetvers are agreed that much of the potential 
demand for satellite telecoms will be for pan-European requirements.  But although all 
of the current service providers could, in principle (and if regulation permitted), support 
pan-European networks, none are actually resourced or organised to do so.  Even if de-
regulation were to occur tomorrow, the pan-European capabilities of service providers 
would take several years to develop to an acceptable level.  No existing service provider 
would currently be able to justify the cost of providing for installations, maintenance, 
repair and technical support across more than a small subset ·of the 40-plus European 
states. 
The lack of any truly pan-European service providers will be a significant constraint on 
market development, one which will  extend long after de-regulation.  Some potential 
users will be satisfied with limited coverage, supplemented by special arrangements in 
countries where no support is available; but many will regard this an extra risk, and will 
postpone any involvement in satellite telecoms. 
3.3.4  Service Provider Pricing Policies 
The prices charged by service providers will continue to have a major influence on the 
growth  in  usage  of satellite  telecoms.  Few  customers  will  switch  from  terrestrial 
solutions to satellite solutions unless there is  a net cost saving.  High satellite service 
tariffs will  prevent the implementation of many satellite solutions for which terrestrial 
solutions are not feasible (as discussed in Section 3.2). 
The pricing policies 
of  the TO sen;ice 
providers 
TO service providers currently price satellite links to  match or 
exceed  the price  of terrestrial  equivalents.  Exhibit  3.4  below 
illustrates  this  for  SMS,  the  Eutelsat-based  business  telecoms 
service offered through European TOs.  Although the cost of a 
·satellite link  is  quite independent of the distance covered, SMS 
tariffs  are effectively  variable with  distance,  in  order to  track 
terrestrial equivalents. 
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EXHIBIT 3.4: 
Paris-Brussels 
Frankfurt-Brussels 
Frankfurt-Paris 
Paris-Rome 
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Understandably, the TOs do  not offer cheap satellite links as a 
means of bypassing their terrestrial links.  For point·to·multipoint 
links (such as the Polycom and Mecom setvices  ),  savings can be 
made,  depending on  the number of receive·only  terminals and 
the  nature  of the  traffic,  but  these  networks  would  not  be 
implemented to the same extent on terrestrial links if  there were 
no satellite option. 
Point-to-Point Tariff Comparison for International 64kbit/s Private 
Circuits [Sources: TarificaTM, OECD, service providers] 
Annualised 64kbit/s point-to-point circuit 
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The  non-TO  service  providers'  tariffs  do  not  offer  significant 
savings compared to terrestrial tariffs until the network reaches a 
certain size.  Exhibit 3.4 shows how the point-to-point tariff for a 
leading non-TO service provider compares with various TO links. 
We  believe  that  this  conservative  approach  to  tariffmg  is 
motivated  by  a  desire  to  maximise  margins,  rather  than  to 
maximise revenues.  By behaving this way,  a small and resource· 
constrained service provider maintains a stronger cash position 
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12  IBC Technical Services (1992). 
13  IBC Technical Services (1992). 
and is  less exposed  to risks,  although  the rate of growth of the 
business is retarded. 
This may not continue to be the case; there are indications that 
the disappointing growth  and poor hub utilisation  achieved  by 
some service providers will lead to price cuts.  It is  prob~ble that 
non-TO service  providers would  be prepared to discount  their 
published tariffs if a sufficiently attractive contract were at stake, 
but no such contracts have yet been awarded in Europe. 
The  pricing  policies  of several  non-TO  service  providers  are 
determined by the value-added aspects of their operations (rather 
then  being closely  linked  to  the telecoms  market).  The value 
added by  a niche service provider is  strongly dependent on the 
identification  and  exploitation  of  end-user  demands,  and  in 
meeting these demands many will incur significant costs that are 
not directly related to satellite communications.  For example: 
..,..  SIS  Link,  the  racing  information  service,  operates  over 
11,000  receive-only  terminals.  The costs  of gathering and 
processing the racing information,  and  their other running 
costs, are significantly higher than the expense of the satellite 
network used to provide the service.12 
..,..  Reuters use satellite distribution to serve some of their clients 
with  information  on  fmancial  markets.  The  cost  of  the 
satellite network is estimated to be only a small proportion of 
their total cost of sales,  and their tariffs are related to the 
value of the information provided, rather than the telecoms 
aspects of the business.13 
However, as discussed in Section 3.2.4 above, the overall growth 
of satellite telecoms will be slow and patchy if it is based solely on 
the  identification  and  exploitation  of specific  high-value-added 
niche services.  Growth depends on the development of a broad 
range of services, many of which  must be priced with regard to 
terrestrial telecoms alternatives. 
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At current prices,  major  savings  for  users  (relative to  terrestrial solutions)  are only 
available for medium and large networks.  For two-way networks with fewer than 20 to 
30  terminals,  the existence  of savings  depends on  the mix  of traffic and sites.  The 
evidence of sales to date indicates that the level of savings is too small to attract many 
customers who have a terrestrial alternative. 
As discussed in Section 3.2.4 above, the mix of network requirements in Europe will be 
skewed towards  smaller networks than the average in  the USA,  both because of the 
strong divfsion·. of European business into national units and because of the immature 
state of point~to-multipoint applications.  When this is combined with the current high 
price levels  and limited  opportunity to  achieve  savings,  it is  clear that demand  and 
supply  are  mismatched  - supply  is  priced  to  suit  large  networks  and  broadcast 
applications, but current demand is for smaller networks and point-to-point links.  Prices 
for these services must fall if the market is to grow more quickly. 
There  is  certainly  scope  for  satellite  prices  to  fall.  European  links  are  priced 
substantially higher than US domestic links of similar performance.  Exhibit 3.5 shows 
the differential, and lists the factors that explain why US prices are so much lower.  In 
summary, European service providers require a higher contribution from  each link to 
meet higher flxed  and variable unit costs,  and they are able to charge higher prices 
because the European terrestrial alternatives (both domestically and internationally) are 
significantly more expensive than their US equivalents. 
EXHIBIT 3.5: 
US and European 
Satellite Link Prices 
{Source: Service 
Providers} 
Annualised 
cluzfKe 
for 64/cbit/s 
point-to-point 
linlc 
ECU86000  EXPLANATION 
US Service Provider has: 
.,..  higher hub utilisation 
.,..  competition from cheaper 
terrestrial alternatives 
.,..  lower operating overheads 
.,..  no licence fees 
.,..  cheaper ground equipment 
.,..  cheaper space segment access 
..,..  opportunity to serve areas with 
no terrestrial links 
ECU20000 
Independent European  US Domestic 
Service Provider, 1992  Service Provider, 1992 
NOTE: Sl  @ ECU 0.83 
US price includes ground equipment valued at ECU 26 000 amortised over 5 years 
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As discussed in Section 3.2.2, terrestrial tariffs - particularly international tariffs - are 
projected to fall in the coming years.  Satellite tariffs will have to fall faster if they are to 
increase the level  of benefit  that  a  customer perceives  for  implementing a  satellite 
solution.  This will only be possible if  service providers can increase their asset utilisation 
and reduce their unit costs. 
TO service providers are unlikely to  drop their prices more rapidly than the rate at 
which  terrestrial tariffs fall.  Some existing non-TO service providers with high fixed 
~sts  will gradually drop their tariffs in order to increase their customer base, accepting 
the risks and lower unit margins that this causes.  Some will be unable to stand reducing 
their margins, and so will be unable to grow their business, remaining small and weak. 
New entrants should already be preparing their business plans on the basis that tariffs 
will need to be below today's levels. 
In  summary,  prices must  fall  if there is  to  be growth  of satellite telecoms networks. 
Demand for  larger  networks,  that would  be economic  at today's  prices, will  not be 
significant for several years; demand for smaller networks will not be captured at today's 
tariffs.  Price cuts will come from the non-TO service providers, but will be constrained 
by their cost and risk positions. 
In the longer run, both satellite and terrestrial prices will tend to fall to levels close to 
their relative costs.  It is difficult to predict where the boundary between terrestrial and 
satellite solutions will lie, but it is very unlikely that satellite links will be cheaper than 
terrestrial links for any significant fiXed  point-to-point applications in Western Europe 
after about 200Q.14  By that time, terrestrial links are also likely to be cheaper for many 
small point-to-multipoint applications  - those with  around 20  receivers or fewer.  If 
satellite  telecoms  has  not  firmly  established  itself  in  certain  areas  of the  telecoms 
marketplace (such as point-to-multipoint or mobile), before this situation occurs, then 
its role is likely to be permanently marginalised. 
We believe that the early opportunity mainly lies in meeting demand for point-to-point 
and small point·to·multipoint requirements, by setting prices to serve this market.  From 
this we maintain that there is a window of  opportunity for satellite telecoms in Europe to 
break out of its current marginal position.  This window of opportunity is likely to close 
before the end of the decade.  This conclusion is important when considering the overall 
development of the marketplace (discussed in Chapter 5 below). 
14  This conclusion  is  not  the unanimous view of all  industry  observers.  It is  contested by  those who anticipate major tecbnologic:al 
breaL1hroughs in satellite systems and by those who predid the continuing power ofTOs to keep terrestrial tariffs bigb. 
_  Analy_sy_s ________________  _ 
3/ DRIVERS OF CHANGE IN THE MARKET Anal}'$)'$ RqJon for CEC DGXJ/1 
3.4  DETERMINANTS OF THE FUTURE GROUND-EQUIPMENT MARKET 
Clearly, the main determinant of the future European ground-equipment market is the 
size of the European service provision market.  All of the issues raised in Sections 3.1 to 
3.3 have relevance to the scale and shape of the ground-equipment supply business.  In 
our opinion, the linkage between service revenues and equipment expenditure is such 
that the value of the ground-equipment market will be approximately 20 to 30% of the 
value of the service provision market throughout the remainder of the decade. 
The following factors will have an important bearing on the development of the ground-
equipment market: 
~  The mix of demand will reflect the level of regulatory restriction (as well as the real 
requirements of customers and  the mix  of service  providers).  For example,  the 
market share of one-way VSA Ts in Europe has been much higher than in the USA 
because regulations  have  restricted  the use  of two-way  systems;lS  in  future,  de-
regulation will lead to the sales and market share of two-way terminals increasing as 
'pent-up' demand for interactive services can be met. 
~  The weaknesses in  the European service provision industry (discussed in Section 
3.3) may lead to distortions in the ground-equipment market - good products may 
have poor sales because of difficulties in the provision of services that make use of 
these products. 
~  Europe is well provided with shared hubs for VSA  T networks (see Section 2.2), and 
there is currently sufficient hub capacity to serve the projected growth in terminals 
for several years to come.  This may result in the mix of sales being skewed towards 
terminals for the coming period. 
~  The cost  of ground equipment is  a  major factor in  determining the suitability of 
satellite telecoms solutions for customer requirements.  If  the steady falls in satellite 
terminal prices seen in the USA in  recent years continue, and if they show through 
in  European  equipment  prices,  this  will  be  a  stimulus  to  the  service  provision 
market, and increase equipment volumes. 
In  summary,  a  healthy  European  ground-equipment  market  depends  on  a  healthy 
service provision sector. 
15  In Europe in  1991,  one·way tenninal sales revenues were about the same as two·way sales revenues.  ln tbe USA  in 1991, one·way 
represented less than 20% of total sales revenues.( Sources C.omsys and Via Satellite) 
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3.5  DETERMINANTS OF THE FUTURE SATELLITE MANUFACTURING MARKET 
This  section  considers  the  determinants  of world  demand  for  the  manufacture  of 
communications satellites.  Although  the scope  of the  study  is  limited  to  European 
satellite  telecoms,  this  section  looks  at  the  market  beyond  Europe  (and  includes 
broadcasting),  in  order  to  emphasise  that  the  future  of  the  European  satellite 
manufacturing industry  rests on  many variables  that are not connected with  the de-
regulation of European satellite telecoms. 
It is  relatively  straightforward  to forecast  satellite manufacturing activity  in  the next 
three to five years.  Firm orders have been placed for most of the satellites that will be 
built in this period and manufacturers hav~ been finally or provisionally selected.  We 
anticipate a 20% annual growth in the transponder capacity serving Europe until 1995, 
based  on  analysis  of  the  payloads  of  about  14  launches  in  the  period.16  The 
manufacturers  already  have  a  reasonably  clear  idea  of  their  build  schedules  and 
revenues for this period, except in unfamiliar areas of the market such as LEO satellites. 
There is,  however, considerable uncertainty surrounding activities beyond this horizon. 
It is difficult to forecast so far into the future what the mix of satellite applications will 
be, and how  much  capacity will  be required for each application in each geographical 
zone.  The number of new satellites required to serve this global mix of demand depends 
on the technological solutions that are selected (e.g. large or small satellites, GEO, HEO 
or LEO, etc), and on the match of demand with the capabilities of satellites already in 
orbit (i.e. whether existing transponders/beams can carry the traffic, and whether there 
is spare capacity for this traffic). 
Any forecast of satellite numbers or manufacturers' revenues beyond a three- to five-
year timeframe must be treated as speculative, because of the number of assumptions 
which must be made to reach a figure.  This section discusses a range of factors that will 
drive satellite numbers and revenues. 
Compression  If technology becomes available that can  reduce the bandwidth 
required for the transmission of a video signal, the impact on the 
satellite industry will  be substantial.  Such  technology is not yet 
available, but a number of US firms claim to be close to launching 
products.17  The utilisation of existing satellites, and the demand 
for  new  satellites  with  European  coverage,  would  both  be 
threatened if  these products were successful. 
16  See ChapterS, Exhibit 5.6 for a table or planned communications satellites with European coverage. 
17  Some ortbese were demonstrated at the 1992 ISOG C.onference (Munich). 
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LEO satellites  The success or failure of the various ventures that depend upon 
low earth orbit (LEO) satellites will be a major determinant of 
the shape of the satellite manufacturing sector in  the coming 
years.  For example,  it  is  predicted  that  if the Iridium  LEO 
project is implemented, Lockheed will jump from having almost 
no  presence  in  the  civil  satellites  sector  to being the world's 
largest civil  satellite producer,  ahead of Hughes.18  There is  a 
wide range of other ventures at various stages <?f preparation, but 
it  is  very  difficult  to  predict  which,  if  ~ny,. . will .  reach  full 
deployment. 
GEO satellite trends  There  is  continuing  debate  within  the  satellite  industry 
concerning the relative merits of smaller and larger geostationary 
(GEO) satellites.  The pattern of demand that will fmally emerge 
is not clear, but will be important for the competitive position of 
European  manufacturers.  If US  manufacturers  are  able  to 
continue to build derivatives of their current designs  (with low 
development costs), then European manufacturers will struggle to 
match  these  on  price.  If  demand  is  for  satellites  whose 
specifications are substantially different from current designs, this 
US advantage will be reduced. 
Demand for  For a variety of reasons, many national governments around the 
~national satellites'  world  wish  to  have  nationally  or regionally  controlled  satellite 
systems.  The potential demand for such  systems is significant, 
accounting  for  perhaps  20-30%  of  satellite  launches  in  the 
remainder of this decade, but because the driver of demand is not 
simply commercial, long-range forecasting is not straightforward. 
US  and European satellite manufacturers compete aggressively 
on  price  to  win  this  class  of business,  as  the  platforms  and 
payloads  tend  to  be  derivatives  of existing  designs,  with  low 
development costs. 
The decline in US  The magnitude and details of the reductions in US military space 
defence expenditure  and satellite programmes are difficult to quantify, but the effects 
on satellite  are nonetheless visible.  The entry of traditionally defence-based 
programmes  firms  such  Lockheed into the commercial satellites sector,  and 
the restructuring of the sector (such as General Electric's sale of 
its  satellite division  to  Martin  Marietta),  are indicative  of the 
search to replace lost revenues, and the consequent overcrowding 
of the civil supply base. 
18  ~Forecast  Intemalionai/DMS (1992). 
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Entertainment 
Broadcasting 
International 
trunked telephony 
The primary impact will be in the US domestic  mar~et, affecting 
Europeans  through  their  US  links  (e.g.  Alcatel  I  Alenia  I 
Aerospatiale I DASA /  Lora~ and Matra / Fairchild).  There will 
also be increased competition for  non-US  contracts, which  will 
directly affect Europeans bidding for such work. 
As  a  major  consumer  of satellite  capacity,  the  entertainment 
broadcasting industry is a key driver of demand for new satellites. 
However, the number of channels that can be supported by the 
European marketplace is not yet clear, and the balance between 
satellite distribution, cable distribution and hybrid solutions has 
also  not yet  stabilised.  New  broadcasting formats,  particularly 
HDTV,  are  likely  to  increase  the  capacity  required,  but  the 
timetable for their introduction is uncertain. 
Several  commentators  believe  that  the  broadcasters'  demand 
projections of the late 1980s were over-optimistic, and that there 
will  be increased numbers of idle transponders over Europe by 
1995  even  before  the  potential  effects  of  compression  are 
considered.19  Reduced expectations for  broadcasting traffic  -
while the capacity in orbit is steadily increasing - may undermine 
the viability of some satellites planned for launch after 1995.  If 
launch  programmes  are delayed,  scaled-down  or cut,  this  will 
have a direct impact on European satellite manufacturers. 
International  trunked  telephony  has  historically  been  an 
important  application  for  communications  satellites.  There is 
currently a balance between satellite links and submarine cables 
as bearers for international trunked telephony, with about 500 000 
cable voice paths on  trans-Atlantic routes, and a similar number 
of satellite voice paths. 
A  similar  balance  exists  on  trans-Pacific  routes  (200 000  voice 
paths on each bearer).20  We believe that the decreasing unit cost 
of  fibre-optic  transmission  will  give  submarine  cables  an 
advantage over satellite links in  the long run,  and that they will 
capture more of the medium-term growth in traffic than satellites. 
19  Source: Press comments, CIT and others.  Many comparisons bave been drawn with US experience, where substantial over<apadty still 
exists due to unrealised broadcasting projections. 
20  See IIC (1992), MIRC (1991). 
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As  a  consequence,  we  project  that  international  trunked 
telephony is unlikely to be a major driver of growth for satellite 
manufacturing, although it will  remain an important application 
for several years to come.  The new satellites already scheduled to 
serve this application will be utilised at close to planned levels. 
Satellite  telecoms  currently  occupy  only  a  small  number  of 
transponders over Europe (equivalent to about 5-10% of the total 
capacity), and the utilisation of this capacity is estimated to be no 
better than moderate.21 
If satellite  telecommunications  traffic  were  to  grow  at  30% 
annually until 1995 (the upper limit of forecast growth), and the 
increase in  transponder capacity over Europe is  20%  annually 
(the  projected  rate),  then  in  1995  only  11%  of transponders 
would be needed to cany all of the satellite telecommunications 
traffic, assuming reasonable levels of transponder utilisation.  It is 
quite possible that over 11%  of transponders could be idle (i.e. 
spare) by  1995, in which case no extra (unplanned) transponders 
would  need  to  be  added  to  meet  the  demand  for  satellite 
telecoms.  22 
This  analysis  is  included  to  show  that  satellite  telecoms  is 
extremely  unlikely  to  grow  to  a  level  where  it  results  in  an 
increase in  the planned satellite numbers before 1995.  Even if 
satellite telecoms growth is strong and there is  no idle capacity 
arising from  shortfalls in  other demand, then satellite telecoms 
traffic would result in the equivalent of no more than one or two 
extra  (unplanned) satellites being required over Europe before 
2000.  In the context of the world market, this is less than 1% of 
demand  over  the  period.  For  European  manufacturers  it 
represents a maximum of about 4% of their expected market. 
21  Source: Study interview and revenue allocation calculation. 
22  This OeXJbility  derives from the fad that a powing proportion of transponders in orbit can be configured for either broadcasting or 
telecoms traffic. 
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The future of  the 
international 
satellite treaty 
organisations 
The future  roles,  strategies and purchasing policies of lntelsat, 
Eutelsat and Inmarsat are important determinants of the future 
shape  of satellite  manufacturing.  Historically  responsible  for 
around 30% of world civil communications satellite purchases (by 
value),  their  importance  as  specifiers  and  buyers  is  likely  to 
increase to 35% or more in the years to 2000. 
Each of these organisations is coming under a variety of  pressures 
to change their roles and strategies in the coming years; Intelsat 
and  Inmarsat  have  already  undergone  major  restructuring  to 
increase their commercial focus.  The ownership and signatory 
structures  of  the  organisations  make  them  vulnerable  to 
disagreements and internal stresses.  These may show through in 
the scale of future approved programmes, and in the tendering 
and  selection  procedures  for  placing  contracts  with  satellite 
manufacturers. 
The main area of vulnerability for European manufacturers is the 
purchasing policy of Eutelsat, which  has,  to date, acquired only 
European-built satellites.  If Eutelsat were to buy fewer satellites, 
or  select  US  satellites,  this  would  be  a  major  blow  to  the 
European satellite manufacturing industry. 
Of all of the factors discussed above, only the final two are related to the de-regulation 
of European satellite telecoms.  The change in European regulations might impact on 
the strategies or policies of Eutelsat (discussed further in Section 5.4.3 below), and the 
liberalisation  of satellite telecoms  might slightly  increase the addressable market for 
European  satellite  manufacturers.  Either of these  changes  could  also  increase  the 
opportunities for non-European satellite manufacturers in the European marketplace. 
European de-regulation, therefore, is  only one of many determinants of the size and 
form of the satellite manufacturing industry.  The performance of European players in 
this marketplace is discussed in Section 4.2.3 below. 
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4/ Success Factors for Satellite Telecoms Players 
In this chapter, we first outline the success factors for competitors in each of the three 
market areas under study (Section 4.1 ), before examining the potential performance of 
different classes  of European and non-European players against these success factors 
(Section 4.2).  European players are seen to be better matched to the success factors in a 
well-developed market than in a poorly-developed market. 
The determinants of future performance for European players are then summarised for 
each market area in Section 4.3.1 
4.1  SUCCESS FACI'ORS 
In  order to succeed  in  the satellite telecoms  market,  a  player must be well  matched 
against the factors that are important for winning and retaining business.  This section 
identifies the key  factors  in  each  of the three  market  areas under consideration  -
service providers and network operators, ground-equipment manufacturers, and satellite 
manufacturers. 
We  distinguish  between  those  factors  which  are essential  for  effective  participation 
('Qualifiers'), and  those that are valuable  for  obtaining competitive advantage in  the 
marketplace ('Differentiators').  It  is  not  necessary  for  a  player to  match  all  of the 
differentiating factors in order to be successful. 
4.1.1  Service Providers and Network Operators 
Exhibit 4.1  shows  th~ critical success factors (qualifiers and differentia  tors) for service 
providers and netwo'rk operators.  Below the table we discuss each of the factors in turn. 
1  The assessments of  success factors. and perfonnanc:e a~1inst these factors, are subjective. 
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EXHIBIT  4.1:  Telecoms track record  Qualifier 
Critical Success  Technical capability  Qualifier 
Factors: Setvice  Price of services  Qualifier 
Providers and  Responsiveness to users  Qualifier 
Network Operators  Smooth installations  Qualifier 
Smooth operations  Qualifier 
Geographic coverage  Qualifier 
Financial strength/  stability  Qualifier 
Interconnectivity to other networks  Differentia  tor 
Clarity of offering and prices  Differentia  tor 
Sales and marketing capability  Differentia  tor 
User education skills  Differentia  tor 
Identification of niche services  Differentia  tor 
QUALIFIERS 
Telecoms track  A visible  track  record  of reliable  telecoms  provision  is  a  pre-
record  requisite for  selling  to  most  corporate telecoms  managers.  A 
short record  is  a weakness.  Any reputation for unreliability is 
extremely damaging. 
Technical capability  Corporate  customers  will  look  for  a  high  level  of  technical 
expertise  and  capability  in  potential  suppliers.  This  must  be 
demonstrable  at  every  stage  of the  selling,  specification  and 
installation process,  and continue for the operational life of the 
network.  Service  providers  who  have  to  rely  on  others  for 
significant technical capability will  be inherently weaker in  this 
area. 
Price of  services  Pricing strategy is  an  essential element in the marketing of any 
telecommunications offering.  The mix of connection, rental and 
usage  charges  will  clearly  position  the  offering  relative  to 
competing solutions and will be a major determinant of patterns 
of usage.  Service providers who are vulnerable to increases in the 
costs of their inputs (such as equipment or space-segment access) 
will  fmd  it  more  difficult  to  price  their  services  effectively, 
because of uncertainty over their margins. 
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Responsiveness to 
users 
Smooth 
installations 
S1nooth operations 
Geographic 
coverage 
Financial 
strength/stability 
Most corporate customers will  no longer tolerate traditional low 
levels of service, flexibility or responsiveness from their telecoms 
suppliers  (where  they  have  a  choice).  Their  benchmarks  for 
telecoms supplier responsiveness and service levels are now the 
same as their expectations of other professional service suppliers. 
Service providers must be able to install indoor and outdoor units 
quickly and professionally on customer premises, bring these into 
operation smoothly, and establish interfaces with the customers' 
other telecoms equipment and networks. 
Normal  operation,  reconfiguration,  billing,  maintenance  and 
repair must all be to specification.  A service provider who is, or 
appears to be, overstretched in operational matters will  not win 
business.  Satellite telecoms is perceived by many potential users 
as an  inherently troublesome technology.  Many preconceptions 
are  commonly  held  by  potential  users  about  equipment 
unreliability,  sensitivity  to atmospheric conditions and weather, 
problems with signal delay etc.  The service provider can avoid 
fulfilling  these  preconceptions  only  through  satisfactory 
operational performance. 
The geographic coverage of the service provider needs to be well 
matched to the scope of demand for the offered services.  This 
may  require  a  presence  outside  the  European  region  (in,  for 
example,  North America or the former USSR),  or it may be a 
particular  subset  of the  European  region  (such  as  the  major 
fmancial centres or specific countries).  In general, to be able to 
address the major opportunities, service providers will need to be 
able to cover at least a significant portion  of Western Europe. 
Where  the  geographic  coverage  of  the  service  provider  is 
constrained by  regulations or lack of resources, and a mismatch 
exists, the business will suffer significantly. 
Most  corporate  telecoms  managers  will  not  do  business  with 
suppliers that do not appear to be fmancially strong, well funded 
and stable.  This applies to  divisions  and  subsidiaries of larger 
firms  as well as to independent companies (since such units can 
be sold, closed, or re-focused). 
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DIFFERENTIA TORS 
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Clarity of  offering 
and prices 
Sales and nzarketing 
capability 
User education 
skills 
Identification of 
niche services 
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Service providers should be able to meet the full interconnection 
needs of their customers at all of the required sites, whether this 
is for interconnection to private or public circuits, or for carrying 
voice or data traffic.  This requirement was frequently identified 
in  interviews with service providers and users, as a pre-requisite 
for satellite telecoms being seen  as part of the mainstream  of 
telecoms services.  _; 
Corporate  customers  will  demand  straightforward  service 
definitions and prices, whether they are buying standard services 
or negotiating a custom package.  Service providers that cannot 
present their offerings clearly will not be able to demonstrate the 
benefits  of  their  services,  and  will  lose  business.  Both  in 
interviews for this study and in the press, users have commented 
that they find some of the current service offerings confusing. 
Satellite telecoms service provision has been shown historically to 
be a difficult  product to market and sell,  often because of the 
negative  preconceptions  which  potential  users  hold.  The 
contribution  of the  sales  and  marketing functions  can  thus  be 
crucial in achieving market penetration. 
Ignorance of the capabilities and features of satellite telecoms is 
currently  a  major  constraint  to  growth  in  Europe.  Service 
providers  who  can  develop  the  level  of  awareness  and 
understanding of key groups within  customer organisations will 
gain business and improve their positioning. 
Those  players  that  can  identify  and  exploit  specific  niche 
requirements  for  the  application  of  satellite  services  will  be 
advantaged.  However, it should be noted that fmding successful 
niche strategies relies on either deep insight or good fortune, and 
that, as a general observation from other sectors, many attempts 
to exploit apparently attractive niches do not succeed. 
4.1.2  Ground-Equipment Manufacturers 
Exhibit  4.2  shows  the  critical  success  factors  for  one  particular  kind  of ground-
equipment manufacturer, the VSA T manufacturer. 
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EXHIBIT 4.2: 
Critical Success 
Factors: Growzd-
Equipment 
Manufacturers 
(Example Case: 
VSAT 
Manufacture) 
QUALIFIERS 
Equipment 
perfonnance 
Equip1nent 
reliability 
Equipment prices 
DIFFERENTIA TORS 
Ease of  integration 
Equipment performance  Qualifier 
Equipment reliability  Qualifier 
Equipment prices  Qualifier 
Ease of integration  Differentia  tor 
Sales and distribution channels  Differentia  tor 
User education and marketing  Differentia  tor 
Responsive product development  Differentia  tor 
Quick development cycles  Differentiator 
The  pace  of  improvement  in  satellite  ground-equipment 
performance  is  rapid,  and  obsolescence  is  increasingly  swift. 
There will be no  market for equipment that does not match its 
competitors on price-performance. 
Reliability is sufficiently important to be singled out from other 
performance issues.  The effects  of equipment failures  on  the 
confidence of users are very great; equipment can quickly develop 
a reputation for  unreliability, based on a very small number of 
problems. 
The global  equipment supply  industry  is  highly  competitive in 
most product areas, and contracts are often won or lost on price. 
Clearly, however, competitive pricing must be underpinned by a 
matching cost position.  Because of the high fiXed costs associated 
with the development of today's ground equipment, unit costs are 
highly dependent on the overall volume of product sales.  In the 
key  area of VSA T equipment, the market leaders achieve their 
competitive  cost  positions  by  addressing  the global  market,  in 
order to maximise volumes. 
Equipment that can be integrated effectively with a wide range of 
network management systems, protocols and hardware will have 
an advantage in the marketplace.  Equipment manufacturers who 
can achieve this ease of integration without losing control of unit 
costs will win more business. 
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Equipment suppliers must have effective channels for selling and 
distributing their products, whether they are selling to end users 
or to service providers.  If it is found to be necessary to address 
the global  market to achieve high  volumes and low  unit costs, 
then a sales and distribution presence is  necessary in all of the 
main regional marketplaces (North America, Asia, and Europe). 
The  regional  operation  must  have  all  of the capabilities  and 
resources necessary to be credible and effective, but need not be 
a  large  team,  as  Hughes  and  others  have  demonstrated  in 
Europe. 
As with  service providers  (Section  4.1.1  above),  an  equipment 
manufacturer can  accelerate  the sales of its products by  being 
pro-active  in  the  development  of  knowledge  and  awareness 
amongst potential customers. 
It is  essential  that  improvements  and  upgrades  to  equipment 
address the real needs of customers.  This is  best achieved by 
investing  time  and  resources  in  contact  with  customers  and 
potential  customers,  to  discover  problems  with  existing 
equipment and opportunities for new features and enhancements 
that will be valued.  To quote one US equipment manufacturer, 
'the development of new-generation products must be centred on 
spending time with users, not buried in the laboratory'. 
New  product  releases  and  product  upgrades  are  increasingly 
frequent in the ground-equipment market, as in most technology 
businesses.  Manufacturers  must  at  least  match  the  industry· 
standard product development times.  Fast response to changing 
requirements is a valuable source of competitive advantage. 
4.1.3  Satellite Manufacturers 
Exhibit 4.3 shows the critical success factors for satellite manufacturers. 
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EXHIBIT 4.3: 
Critical Success 
Factors: Satellite 
Manufacturers 
Performance to specification 
Reliability 
Price 
Track record 
Specified performance levels 
Manufacturing lead-time 
Access to new technologies 
Ability to win overseas orders 
Qualifier 
Qualifier 
Qualifier 
Qualifier 
Differentia  tor 
Differentia  tor 
Differentiator 
Differentia  tor 
To participate in  the satellite manufacturing industry it  is  necessary to combine the 
highest standards of engineering design,  production and project management with an 
effective cost-management capability.  The requirements are so stringent that there are 
still only a small number of organisations in the world that have the technical capability 
required to manufacture state-of-the-art communications satellites. 
In  a  recent  study  of the  European  space  industry,2  the buying  criteria  of satellite 
purchasers were identified as follows: 
International Public  European Private  National Public 
Organisations  Organisations  Organisations 
11 Supply price  11 Supply price  1  I Supply price 
21 Fit with technical  21 Delivery schedule  21 Fit with technical 
specifications  specifications 
3 I Financial terms  3 I Reliability  3 I Commercial offsets 
4 I Delivery performance  4 I Financial terms  41 Local content 
51 Incentives  5  I Technology transfer 
Although  the  process  of selecting  suppliers  for  satellite  contracts  often  has  many 
dimensions, it  is  ultimately necessary for manufacturers to be competitive on price in 
order to be selected (although this is  not to  say  that the cheapest bid will  always be 
selected).  The manufacturer's underlying cost position must match the prices offered. 
There are several ways in which the issue of costs can be addressed: 
.-.  Tight control of real costs incurred in  fulfilling the contract.  The management of 
real  costs  covers  control  of the costs  of components  and  subcontracting,  design 
engineering and development, production and testing, and so forth.  Best practice in 
this  area  tends  to  be  found  in  commercial  aerospace  businesses,  and  many 
2  Euroconsult (199la). 
_  Analy_sy..s ________________  _ 
4/ SUCCESS FACTORS FOR SATELUTE TELECOMS PLAYERS Pogr58  ~J}'S  RqKHJ for CEC DGXI/1 
techniques and  methods  have  been  transferred into the space industry from  this 
sector  . 
..,..  The re-use of designs, components, software, production procedures, test equipment 
and other assets can be a major source of cost advantage.  It is widely recognised 
that the marginal cost of replicating an existing satellite is  substantially below the 
original cost.  3 
..,..  A further cost advantage exists where the manufacturer can cross-subsidise research, 
development or production expense from government-funded programmes.  There _ 
are many examples of successful commercial satellite designs and components that 
derive directly from government programmes. 
Substantial cost advantages can be obtained from building long runs of similar satellites, 
and from  achieving significant  technology transfer from  government programmes.  It 
does  not  seem  likely  that  a  manufacturer  without  these  advantages  can  remain 
competitive by simply improving efficiency. 
In order to maximise the length of production runs and achieve other scale economies, it 
is  necessary for  manufacturers to  address the widest possible  market.  This includes 
tendering for satellites in all regions of the world, for governments, private buyers and 
treaty organisations.  The process of selling to each class of customers appears to require 
different skills.  A manufacturer needs to be able to sell effectively in a wide range of 
environments. 
4.2  THE POTENTIAL PERFORMANCE OF CLASSES OF PLAYERS 
For the three market areas under study, this section addresses the strengths, weaknesses 
and  potential  performance  of  different  classes  of players  - Europeans  and  non-
Europeans, TOs and independents, large and small players, and so forth.  Each class is 
assessed against the critical success factors listed in Section 4.1 above.  In some cases the 
assessment depends on the level of market development  - i.e.  it differs according to 
whether  the  European  market  is  small  and  under-developed  or larger  and  better 
structured.  Where this is the case we indicate our assessment for a developed and an 
under-developed market. 
3  Economies of sc.1le are addressed in Euroconsult (1991a) and frequently feature  in press articles and confereoc:e papers.  However, 
reliable quantified assessments of  scale effects are not available. 
-----------------Analy..sy_s _ 
4/ SUCCESS FACTORS FOR SATELLITE TELECOMS PLAYERS IMPACT OF NON-EUROPEAN COMPETITORS ON A DEREGULATED EUROPEAN SATELLITE TELECOMS MARKET  Page 59 
4.2.1  Service Providers and Network Operators 
Our analysis of the potential performance of service providers and network operators 
indicates that European players will  be  at a  competitive disadvantage if the market 
remains small and under-developed.  In a small market, large integrated US players will 
be better matched to the success factors. 
Exhibit 4.4  shows our assessment of how the different classes of service providers and 
network operators will  perform  against  the critical success factors.  Our assessment 
assumes that the market is healthy and growing; the symbols in brackets - {}  - show 
where we believe that performance will  be affected if the European market remains 
small and undeveloped. 
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EXHIBIT 4.4A:  Assessnlent of  the Likely Match between Setvice Providers and the 
Critical Success Factors for the European Market from 1993 
r  Y  J  .'<  T  I  Y  C  1)  N  0  r  I  D  F  I~  :·-' 
Large  Small  European 
European  European  independent 
TOs and  TOsand  service 
subsidiaries  subsidiaries  providers 
Telecoms track record  • 
a  ~ 
Technical capability  a  a {()}  a{()} 
Price of services  0  ~  ()  {~} 
Responsiveness to users  ~  _()  a 
Smooth instailations  a  ~  ~ 
Smooth operations  • 
a  a{()} 
Geographic coverage  ()  ()  a{~} 
Financial strength/stability  •  a  ~  {0} 
Full interconnectivity  ()  ()  ~ 
Qarity of offering and prices  ()  ~  ~ 
Sales and marketing capability  ~  ~  ~ 
User education skills  ~  0  ~ 
Identification of niche services  0  ~  {0}  ()  {~} 
Overaii match  ()  ()  () {~} 
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EXHIBIT 4.4B:  Assessment of  the Likely Match between Service Providers and the 
Critical Success Factors for the European Market from 1993 
fJ  0  T  F  _\'  T  I  _l  L  .Y  r  11  L'  .\- T  n _  1 .\  T  >' 
US/ 
Large Non·  Larg~ US  European  European 
European  satellite  independent  joint 
TOs  businesses  new entrants  ventures 
Telecoms track record  ~  ~  0  ~ 
Technical capability  ~  ~  (){~} () 
Price of services  ()  ()  (){~} () 
Responsiveness to usen  ()  ()  ()  ~ 
Smooth installations  ()  ~  ~  ~ 
Smooth operations  ~{()}  (){~}  (){~}  (){~} 
Geographic coverage  (){~}  (){~}  (){~}  (){~} 
Financial strength/stability  ~  ~  0  ~ 
Full interconnectivity  ~  ~  ~  ~ 
Oarity of offering and prices  ()  ()  ~  ~ 
Sales and marketing capability  ~  ()  ~  () 
User education skills  ~  -~  0  ~ 
Identification of niche services  (){~}  (){~}  ~{0}  (){~} 
Overall match  ()  ()  ~{0}  (){~} 
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We consider the classes of service providers and network operators in turn below. 
Large European TOs and 
subsidiaries 
I  e.g. France Telecom, 
Deutsche Teleko1n, BT] 
Small European TOs and 
subsidiaries 
I  e.g.  Unisource,  Cable & 
Wireless, Belgacont j 
European independent 
service providers 
I  e.g.  Teleport Europe, 
Bishopsgate 
Communications, ANT, 
SIS} 
Although the TOs and their subsidiaries are reasonably 
well matched to the requirements of the market, they are 
unlikely  to  take  advantage  of the  opportunity,  due  to 
broader strategic considerations (see Section 3.3  above). 
Their contribution to the success of the European satellite 
telecoms industry. in  future is  unlikely to be  si~cantly 
greater than it is at present. 
Those  smaller  TOs  with  ambitions  to  broaden  their 
business in  this field  are reasonably well matched to the 
requirements of the market.  These players are not likely 
to have a major impact on  the satellite telecoms market, 
however,  because  satellite  solutions  are only  a  part of 
their portfolio of products.  They will not have a single-
minded concentration on selling satellite solutions. 
The existing independent service providers should do well 
if the  market  is  healthy  and  growing,  but  will  be 
particularly disadvantaged if  this is not the case: 
..,..  They  are  less  able  than  larger  players  to  sustain 
prolonged periods of poor cash flow  or unprofitable 
operations.  They will  not  have  the opportunity for 
flexibility on pricing if  they remam small  . 
..,..  Their track records are being built from zero, and a 
small market slows the rate at which this building can 
occur  . 
..,..  Most will  rely on  equipment manufacturers' support 
for  much  of  their  technical  capability  - this 
dependency  will  remain  until  they  have  grown  to 
several times their current sizes  . 
..,..  They will  not have  the security of owning their own 
satellite capacity.  If there is  not a healthy and open 
market for capacity, then they will be disadvantaged  . 
..,..  Their utilisation  of expensive fJXed  assets is likely to 
remain low, damaging their fmancial performance and 
hence their ability to raise further investment capital. 
The  competitive  performance  of the European  service 
provision  industry will  depend  to  a  great extent  on  the 
success of the independent players.  If this class of players 
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Large non-European TOs 
{e.g. AT&T, MCI} 
is  disadvantaged  because  of  the  condition  of  the 
marketplace,  the  impact  of the  non-Europeans  will  be 
substantially increased. 
Large  non-European  TOs  could  perform  well  in  the 
European market if they decided to enter with adequate 
levels of investment.4  The US TOs, in  particular, would 
be able to transfer much  of their existing experience in 
satellite telecoms to Europe.  If they could demonstrate 
their  long-term  commitment  to  the  European  market 
(through establishing a visible support structure for their 
European operations),  then they would  appear credible 
and attractive to potential customers.  They are likely to 
win the business of US corporations active in Europe who 
are already their customers in  the USA,  Asia  or South 
America. 
Overseas TOs would not have an advantage in obtaining 
satellite capacity  until such  time as  they deployed their 
own satellites in orbital slots with European coverage (or 
LEO systems).  This would not be for some years.  If the 
European  satellite  access  market improves before  such 
new  satellites  can  be  deployed,  this  will  reduce  any 
advantage that can be gained. 
The US TOs currently have a low profile in the European 
satellite services market, not having taken up  any of the 
satellite  telecoms  licences which  have been available  in 
Europe.  This  is  not  based  on  any  concerns  about 
competitive  disadvantage  - rather,  they  have  not  yet 
entered  Europe  because  they  do  not  yet  see  good 
business.  This  does  not give  any  comfort to European 
service providers.  One commented in interview that the 
low profile of US  players was  a symptom of the current 
unhealthy  state  of  the  market,  rather  than  a  direct 
consequence of regulatory restrictions. 
4  In  Exhibit 4.4  it  is  assumed that  these players would  invest  less  if the  market  is  small  (hence their Jeographic  cover&~e would  be 
reduced). 
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Large US satellite 
businesses 
[e.g.  Hughes,  TRW, 
GE/Martin Marietta] 
European independent new 
entrants 
US/European Joint 
Ventures 
f  e.g.  Orion, various other 
rumoured potential 
groupings] 
Analysys Rqott  for CEC DGX//1 
The large  US  satellite businesses with  satellite telecoms 
experience  in  the  USA  could  perform  well  in  the 
European  marketplace  if they  decided  to  enter,  and 
devoted  sufficient  resources  to  the  strategy.  Their 
competitive position would be similar to the US TOs (see 
above), although their telecoms track record and overall 
credibility would  not generally be rated so highly.  It is 
debatable how soon these players could deploy their own 
satellites  over  Europe,  and  what  advantage  this  would 
bring them  in  a market where satellite access had been 
liberalised. 
This class of players is assumed to be generally similar to 
the existing independent service providers, but likely to be 
weaker in  specific areas,  as shown  in  Exhibit  4.4.  It is 
clearly  difficult  to  anticipate  the  profiles  of unknown 
potential new entrants. 
There  are  many  possible  collaborative  groupings  that 
bring  US  and  European  players  together  as  service 
providers.  Several of these groupings have the potential 
to perform well in  the European marketplace,  although 
joint ventures carry extra risks such  as diverging partner 
interests and lack of strategic focus. 
In a healthy, growing market, there will be competition between non-European entrants 
(who  know  the  satellite  telecoms  business  from  their  overseas  experience)  and 
European  players  (who  know  the  European  telecoms  markets).  Some  players  will 
attempt to combine these sources of advantage through US/European joint ventures. 
European service providers should be able to compete well in such a market. 
In  a  small,  under-developed  market,  such  as  exists  at present, non-European service 
providers  (specifically  US  service  providers)  will  be  at  an  advantage, if they  should 
choose to enter.  The potential competitive advantage of the US players comes from two 
sources: 
..,.  The value  of their overseas  experience  is  magnified  if Europe has only  a  sparse 
experience of satellite telecoms  . 
..,.  Their industry structure is better suited to sustaining service provision in an under-
developed market, as explained in Exhibit 4.5. 
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EXHIBIT 4.5:  lnlpact of  Vertical Integration 
In the early stages of the development of a market, successful and dominant players are often those who 
have resources and capabilities in all of the key elements of the value chain.  These 'vertically integrated' 
players can rely on relatively secure supply of the necessaty inputs to each stage of the value chain, at costs 
that are under their control.  They are sensitive to developments and trends in the market, particularly to 
changing end-user requirements, because they are active in all important areas.  Because they are vertically 
integrated, they are able to respond to these developments more quickly, flexibly and safely. 
As markets develop, the benefits of vertical integration are reduced  Players that focus  on particular 
elements in the value chain can achieve a competitive advantage through specialisation.  They can be more 
confident that  the necessary  inputs will  be available because the market  is  larger and more mature. 
Vertically integrated players find it increasingly difficult to match the flexibility, innovation and lower costs 
of the specialist players. 
In European satellite telecoms, the following forms of integration predominate: 
..  The ownership of satellites and the supply of satellite services are integrated with national telecoms 
operations.  Service providers that are not integrated with TOs are small and not integrated with 
other satellite or telecoms activities. 
..  The manufacture of satellites and the manufacture of ground equipment  are integrated with the 
aerospace and defence industries. 
The case of the US players that are looking to compete in Europe is very different: 
..  The ownership of satellites, the supply of satellite services and the manufacture of ground equipment 
are integrated.  In some cases the manufacture of satellites is also integrated. 
..  US players are not integrated into the provision of terrestrial telecoms in Europe. 
The US  form  of integration  is  well  suited  to  the  exploitation  of a  small  and  immature European 
marketplace.  The European forms  of integration would be well  matched to a  mature and developed 
market, but are poorly  matched to a  small,  undeveloped market.5  The high level  of integration with 
terrestriat telecoms is a particular problem, as is the non-participation of potential European ground-
equipment manufacturers in the provision of services. 
The US form of integration has evolved in a competitive environment.  Ground-equipment development is 
acknowledged to be closely linked to service provision, and so there is a strategic rationale for operating in 
both areas.  In contrast, the European position has been a consequence of regulatory restrictions.  The 
potential ground-equipment suppliers have had very strong relationships with individual monopoly TOs, 
and are not willing to take on their major customers by moving into service provision. 
In a mature market, vertical integration is not so necessary for competitive strength.  Service provision can 
become increasingly a 'stand-alone'6 business as the necessary ingredients become more easily available -
standard ground equipment, cheap access to transponders, straightforward terrestrial interconnect, etc. 
S  CEC ( 1992d). 
6  That is, not intepated into physical network ownership.  Some 'stand-alone' terrestrial seJVice providers do offer sateUite seJVic:es, wbicb 
are embedded in their overall product package (e.&- Reuters information distnbution). 
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4.2.2  Ground-Equipment Manufacturers 
Our analysis  indicates  that  the  European  ground-equipment  industry  will  be  at  a 
significant  disadvantage  compared  to  non-European  players,  whatever  happens  to 
European markets or regulation. 
The actual performance of the European ground-equipment industry is dependent on 
the size and growth  of the European satellite services  market,  because the domestic 
services market drives demand for European ground equipment.  If there is only a small 
European market for ground equipment then the European industry will  remain very 
small,  the product portfolio will  stay weak, and the value of exports will  be very low. 
However, if de-regulation brings about a larger market,  the European manufacturers 
will benefit, even if  their share of that market is reduced. 
Exhibit  4.6  shows  our assessment  of how  the different  classes  of ground-equipment 
manufacturers will  perform against the critical success factors.  Again, our assessment 
assumes that the market is healthy and growing; the symbols in brackets - {}  - show 
where we  believe that performance will  be affected if the European market remains 
small and undeveloped. 
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EXHIBIT 4.6A:  Assessntent of  Likely Match between Ground-Equipment Manufac-
turers & Critical Success Factors for the European Market (1993 on) 
Cl'Hl~/'.\"'J'  1)  L  1 )  1  '  1:  .''  1 .\  r  r  J,'  o 1)  r 
Major US/  European  European 
Japanese  one-way  Smaller US  niche product 
manufac- manufac- manufac- manufacturers 
turers  turers  turers  (e.g. marine) 
Equipment performance  a  a  a  a 
Equipment reliability  a  ()  ()  a 
Equipment prices  a  ()  {~}  ()  () 
Ease of integration  a  ~  ()  () 
Sales and distn"bution  ()  {~}  ()  {~}  ()  {~}  ()  channels 
User education and 
~  0  0  ~  marketing 
Responsive product  • 
~{0} • 
()  development 
Quick development  a  ~  ()  ~  cycles 
Overall match  a  () {~}  ()  ()  match 
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EXHIBIT  4.6B:  Assessnzent of  Likely Match between Ground· Equipment Manufac· 
turers & Critical Success Factors for the European Market (  1993 on) 
Equipment performance 
Equipment reliability 
Equipment prices 
Ease of integration 
Sales and distnbution 
channels 
User education and 
marketing 
Responsive product 
development 
Quick development 
cycles 
Overall match 
- match 
]J  0  T  F  S  '1'  I  1 /,  \  F  il  r  ,\'  T  N.  _l  .\'  T  .)' 
Potential 
European 
two-way  . 
manufacturers 
{large firms) 
Potential  US/ 
European  European 
SME entrants  joint ventures 
~  {0}  ~  {0}  ()  {~} 
() 
a {()}  ~  {o}  a{~} 
0  0 
() 
0  () 
~{0} ~  a {ct} 
us 
manufacturers 
not yet active 
in Europe 
() 
() 
~{0} 
0 
() 
() 
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We consider the classes of ground-equipment manufacturers in turn below. 
Major US/Japanese 
manufacturers 
[e.g. Hughes, GTE, AT&T 
Tridom, NEC, Scientific 
Atlanta] 
European one-way 
manufacturers (incL 
Business TVRO) 
[e.g. Matra Marconi, OTEJ 
Smaller US numufacturers 
[e.g. STM,  Wegener} 
European niche product 
manufacturers 
[e.g. ABB Nera,  Thrane & 
Thrane,  Raca~ Philips, 
Newtec, Marconi 
International Marine} 
Potential European two-
way manufacturers (large 
firms) 
The major satellite ground-equipment manufacturers  -
such  as  Hughes,  GTE,  AT&T  Tridom,  NEC,  and 
Scientific Atlanta - are well placed to dominate the main 
equipment markets in Europe, notably the two-way VSA  T 
market.  Some lack an organisational presence in Europe, 
but this can be quickly ·and effectively addr~sse~  when the'· 
decision is taken to do business here.  · 
Although  European  manufacturers  appear  reasonably 
well  placed  in  the one-way  terminal  segment,  it  is  not 
projected to be a  high  growth  area,  and it will  be very 
difficult for these players to make the transition into two-
way  equipment.  European  manufacturers  of one-way 
equipment who do not develop their export volumes will 
suffer  strong  competition  from  US  and  Far  Eastern 
manufacturers with higher volumes and lower unit costs. 
Several  smaller  US  manufacturers  have  made  sales  in 
Europe.  Their long-term performance in Europe depends 
on their ability to develop globally competitive products. 
Joint ventures with Europeans are likely to be particularly 
attractive to those looking to develop their business in this 
market. 
European niche product manufacturers are well placed to 
continue to be successful in their specialised areas.  Most, 
however,  will  fmd  it  difficult  to  grow  large  businesses 
based on products that are outside their current niches. 
The prospects are not good for a European manufacturer, 
or a  group of European manufacturers,  developing and 
entering production with a  new two-way VSAT product. 
The  market-leading  products  have  long  development 
pedigrees,  and  are  continuing  to  improve  their 
performance  in  all  major  respects.  Even  an  intensive 
R&D programme would be unlikely  to match the many 
years of experience of components,  systems  integration 
issues  and  operational understanding that underpin  the 
established products. 
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Small and medium-sized 
enterprises in ground-
equipment manufacturing 
AMiysys Report for CEC DGXIII 
Analysis of the costs and risks of such a European venture 
have  steered  a  number  of  potential  manufacturers 
towards  collaborations  with  experienced  US  frrms  (see 
joint ventures  below).  The magnitude  of the gap  to  be 
closed by an independent venture grows wider with each 
product upgrade announced. 
Exhibit  4.6  above  includes  an  assessment  of  the 
competitive  position  of European  SMEs  in  the  future 
market.  Although  their position will  not be universally 
strong,  some  SMEs  will  enter  the  market  if  it  grows 
rapidly  and  attractive  opportunities  arise.  SMEs  are 
particularly  adept  at  'reverse  engineering'  (within  the 
boundaries  of  patent  and  copyright  law)  - that  is, 
producing cheaper versions of industry-standard products, 
and eroding the margins  of larger players.  They are a 
fertile source of innovation and improvement. 
The current absence of SMEs from the European ground-
equipment  supply  base  is  in  marked  contrast  to  the 
position  in  the  USA.  In  the  early  stages  of the  US 
satellite telecoms market (the mid 1980s), large numbers 
of small new entrants and start-up enterprises were active 
in  products  and  setvices.  The  pace  of  technical 
improvement was  high,  driven by  the energy, innovation 
and  enthusiasm  of  such  players.  Many  of  these 
pioneering organisations have now ceased trading or been 
acquired by larger corporations, having been unprofitable 
or poorly  positioned.  But  in  spite  of the  difficulty  of 
competing  with  dominant  and  well-resourced  market 
leaders, there are still significant second and third tiers of 
players in the USA. 
Europe's  competitive  position  in  satellite  ground 
equipment  is  likely  to  remain  very  weak if no  tier  of 
SMEs grows  in  the industry, and progress relies entirely 
on the traditional large equipment suppliers. 
US/European joint ventures  An  attractive  strategy  for  European  ground-equipment 
manufacturers  is  to  collaborate  with  US/Japanese 
manufacturers.  The  collaboration  could  take  various 
forms: 
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US manufacturers not  yet 
active in Europe {e.g. 
Scientific Atlanta, 
Comstream, Zephyrus, 
many more] 
_.  a  simple  distribution  and  after-sales  agency 
agreement 
_.  a 're-badging' agreement, where the equipment is sold 
under the European brand 
_.  a  manufacturing joint venture, where some value is 
added  by  the  European  player  (components, 
assembly, test, etc.), possibly in Europe 
..  a  joint  venture  to  develop  new  products  for  the 
European  or  world  markets,  where  the  European 
player  has  a  design  role;  manufacturing  could  be 
shared, and some may occur in Europe. 
By  such  means,  the European manufacturer can gain a 
toe-hold  in  a  market  that  would  otherwise  be  very 
difficult,  and can  reduce the product development risk. 
The non-European partner can gain funds for investment 
and have  easier access  to  the European market.  Such 
arrangements are likely to appeal particularly to smaller 
US  manufacturers  whose  European  presence  might 
otherwise  be  limited,  but  some  of  the  larger 
manufacturers already have links that could develop into 
formal joint ventures. 
Over  time  there  may  be  some  skills  transfer  to  the 
European manufacturer, but it should be recognised that 
the  major  short-term  beneficiary  of  joint  venture 
arrangements is  likely  to  be the non-European partner. 
In  industrial policy  terms such  arrangements would  not 
count  as  a  significant  strengthening  of  European 
capabilities. 
Many  US  manufacturers  have  either  not  considered 
marketing their products in  Europe, or have maintained 
only  a  low  proftle  in  Europe,  awaiting  developments. 
Many of the purely domestic US suppliers would struggle 
to market, sell and support their products in Europe, but 
there will be some successful new entrants who will launch 
their products here if the market demonstrates sustained 
growth. 
Whatever  happens  to  European  markets  or  regulation,  non-European  ground-
equipment  manufacturers  will  continue  to  make  a  major  impact  on  the  European 
marketplace. 
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In the service provision  business, market knowledge and market presence have been 
identified as important ingredients for success; these are much less difficult to achieve 
for ground-equipment manufacturers.  A single  European sales and support office is 
generally adequate to maintain contacts with  service providers.  The dynamics of the 
ground-equipment  business  are  much  more  global  than  the  dynamics  of  service 
provision.  This requirement to perfonn in  a global marketplace is a major element in 
the challenge facing European manufacturers. 
It is  possible to envisage a European manufacturer acquiring a  US ground-equipment 
manufacturer as part of a  strategy to develop its capability.  At present, however, no 
European manufacturer seems ready to  take this sort of risk,  and joint ventures seem 
more likely.  Likewise, if  a major European player were to announce a significant entry 
.into  VSA  T  services,  it  is  possible  to  envisage  a  non-European  satellite  ground-
equipment supplier teaming up with a European partner to win the resulting equipment 
supply contract.  Again. however. there is no sign of  such a development at present.  . 
In strategic  terms,  most  European  equipment  suppliers  would  probably gain  more 
through collaborating with non-Europeans than with other Europeans, who share their 
weaknesses.  This is  a major obstacle to supporting measures that rely on a concerted 
effort by European manufacturers (see Sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.5 below). 
4.2.3  Satellite Manufacturers 
Exhibit 4.7 shows our assessment of how US  and European satellite manufacturers will 
perform against the critical success factors.7 
The table shows that European satellite manufacturers appear to be disadvantaged in 
certain respects relative to their US competitors. but that their overall match  to  the 
requirements of the marketplace is still good.  The specific areas of disadvantage are: 
Price  Our interpretation of E uroconsult figures show that the average 
price per kg of Eu:-opean satellites in  1988-91  W2.S  5-15% higher 
than  US  satellites  (  cor.;.pared  with  a  difference  of 50%  in the 
early  1980s).  This  ~ri:c differential was aJso  observed for other 
measures such as price per output watt and price per .\ffiz. 
7  Cnlikc the 6ccvlce provisiort ~d  !rouud·eq<.:j;J~ut mar\::~. •: cc  C..."<  betlew th.'-t pl..ya p<"rfnrm.:\Dce ~  t.c li!'ccted by lbe tae or 
th<' Europe.an marl:rl fur ,....1,.,11~ Lekcnm:nunicati<Jos. 
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EXHIBIT 4. 7: 
Assessment of  the 
Likely Match 
between Satellite 
Manufacturers and 
the Critical Success 
Factors for the 
World Market from 
1993 
Lead-times 
8  EuroconsuH (199la). 
9  Financial Times, 31 July 1992. 
us  European 
satellite  satellite 
manufacturers  manufacturers 
Pedonnancetospeclfication  •  • 
Reliability  •  • 
Price  • 
() 
Track record  a  a 
Specified perfonnance levels  •  • 
Manufacturing lead-time  a  () 
Access to new technologies  •  a 
Ability to win overseas orders  a  ~ 
Overall match  •  a 
European  manufacturers  tend  to  bid  higher  than  US 
manufacturers in tendering for satellite contracts.  Euroconsult8 
has analysed ten recent contracts and concludes that Europeans 
bid higher than US manufacturers in six of the ten cases.  Bids for 
European broadcast satellites since  1990  have been won by US 
manufacturers with bids that were up to 40% below the European 
manufacturers.  9 
European  manufacturers'  low  economies  of  scale  and 
consequently  poor  cost  position  reinforce  the  conclusion  that 
European manufacturers will be disadvantaged on price. 
The longer production runs of US manufacturers tend to lead to 
shorter  manufacturing  lead-times.  Private  customers  in  the 
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Access to new 
technologies 
Ability to win 
overseas orders 
Analysy1 Rcporr f01' CEC DGX/11 
domestic  US  market  have  demanded  much  more  rapid 
deployment  of satellites than  the treaty organisations,  and  US 
manufacturers have learned how to meet these tighter schedules. 
The  massive  difference  in  US  and  European  expenditure  on 
government space programmes gives US  satellite manufacturers 
much easier access to a range of important advanced technologies 
(component  integration,  materials  science,  antenna  design, 
stabilisation and control systems and so forth). 
US  manufacturers  have  demonstrated  a  greater ability  to win 
orders away from their domestic markets by putting together the 
right  package  of price,  performance,  delivery,  fmancial  terms, 
offsets, local content and so forth.  They have also made full use 
of political opportunities and advantages to win business. 
It is possible that continued re-structuring and rationalisation of the European industry 
will  improve the underlying cost position, but this will not show through in the short 
term.  It is unlikely that circumstances will arise that allow European manufacturers to 
achieve the economies of scale that are available to the largest US manufacturers. 
In  Section  2.6  above  it  was  observed  that  there  is  overcapacity  in  global  satellite 
manufacturing,  and  that this  is  expected  to  persist for  some years.·  Overcapacity is 
leading  to  increasingly  aggressive  competition  for  business.  In  such  a  fiercely 
competitive global environment, the Europeans' competitive disadvantages will make it 
difficult for them to increase their penetration of overseas markets, and will increase the 
pressures  of competition  in  vulnerable  areas  of the  European  market  (particularly 
private  satellites).  Moreover,  as  discussed  in  Section  3.5,  the  overall  size  of the 
European .  market after 1995  is  not clear,  and there is  the prospect of demand being 
depressed by an overhang of idle transponders. 
In  such  difficult  conditions,  the  retention  of business  with  the  Europeans'  major 
customer, Eutelsat, becomes significantly more important.  The issues that will affect the 
relationship with Eutelsat are discussed in Section 5.4.3 below. 
4.4  SUMMARY OF lliE  DETERMINANTS OF PERFORMANCE FOR EUROPEAN PLAYERS 
The following Exhibits summarise the key factors which will determine the performance 
of European players in the three market areas under study. 
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EXHIBIT 4.8:  European Setvice Providers 
The competitive advantage of European independent setvice providers depends on: 
..,.  A high growth rate in the European market in 1993 and subsequent years.  This 
will lead to: 
declining benefits from being vertically integrated (reducing the competitive 
advantage of potential US players) 
a growth in revenues and strengthening of fmances 
increased  customer  numbers,  track  record,  credibility  and  breadth  of 
applications, before the 'window of opportunity' begins to close  . 
..,.  A competitive equipment supply market in Europe.  European service providers 
need easy access to the world's best equipment, at prices close to US domestic 
levels  . 
..,.  An accessible  and cost-effective supply of space-segment capacity.  European 
service providers without their own satellites must not be disadvantaged. 
The TO-linked setvice providers are well equipped to succeed.  The main determinant 
of their actual performance is their strategic motivation to develop satellite telecoms, 
which is likely to be low. 
EXHIBIT 4.9:  European Ground-Equipment Manufacturers 
The fate of the European ground-equipment industry turns on the rate of growth of 
the European services market.  European industry will only invest in new products 
and systems if  it has confidence in the size of the domestic European market. 
If  confidence in the size of the potential market grows, European frrms that have the 
required capabilities will  increase their investment  and activity levels.  For many 
frrms, access to key components and technologies (through licensing or partnerships) 
will be necessary to fill gaps in their capabilities. 
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EXHIBIT 4.10:  European Satellite Manufacturers 
The competitive position of the European satellite manufacturers does not primarily 
depend on developments in the European satellite telecoms market 
The main determinants of their competitive advantage will be whether they can: 
~  Establish cost-effective satellite production: 
higher volumes for each platform, payload and propulsion design, to obtain 
economies of scale equivalent to US competitors 
developing lean  manufacturing and component supply chains,  to minimise 
the impact of US cost advantages 
leveraging technology developed for government and military programmes to 
reduce costs on commercial programmes. 
~  Become more focused  on the global satellite market, and integrate more fully 
with the global satellite industry (as partners, suppliers and prime contractors). 
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5/  ·  Scenarios for the Performance of European 
Industry 
This  chapter presents  three  scenarios  for  the  development  of the  market,  drawing 
together the outputs of Chapters 3 and 4.  For each scenario the likely performance of 
each category of European players is assessed.  The three scenarios are: 
~  Scenario 1: no EC regulatory change (Section 5.1) 
~  Scenario 2:  1993 de-regulation (Section 5.2) 
~  Scenario 3: 1995 de-regulation (Section 5.3). 
Section 5.4,  finally  considers  the likely  outcomes  for  European players  in  the main 
market areas under consideration. 
5.1  SCENARIO 1 :  No  EC REGULATORY CHANGE 
In this scenario there is no regulatory action at EC level to liberalise satellite telecoms. 
None of the 1990  Green Paper positions (as summarised in  Exhibit 3.1) are adopted. 
Some national governments continue with their own programmes of liberalisation, but in 
2000  most of today's restrictions still remain in  most  Member States.  Eutelsat space 
segment capacity continues to be accessible only through its signatories.  ETSI produces 
pan-European standards for satellite telecoms, but these are not widely adopted as  a 
basis for approvals or new product design because of continuing national differences. 
Exhibit  5.1  illustrates  this  scenario.  The  preservation  of  the  current  complex, 
fragmented· and r·estrictive European regulatory environment is a continuing burden for 
the independent service providers.  Their market remains effectively restricted to the 
more liberal European states, and even in these markets their penetration continues to 
be weak.  Potentially large  and  valuable  customers  cannot  be converted  to  satellite 
solutions when it becomes clear that the providers cannot offer pan-European coverage. 
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EXHIBIT 5.1:  Tinzelines for Scenario 1 : No EC Regulatory Change 
REGULATORY CHANGE 
Activity to reduce regulatory restriction at EC level 
Activity to reduce regulatory restriction at national level 
NEW ENTRANTS 
Example of an individual potential new entrant: 
-becomes aware of commercial opportunity 
-prepares business plan and tests the market 
-obtains financing 
-begins marketing 
-launches and rolls out products/services 
-early growth phase for products and services 
Cumulative impact of new entrants 
~TDEVELOPMENT 
Diffusion effect becomes significant driver of growth 
Point-to-point & small network applic'ns are attractive 
Point-to-multipoint applications develop 
European Satellite 
Telecoms Service 
Revenues 
1200 
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The independent service providers are unable to overcome most users' perceptions that 
satellite telecommunications is  a  risky,  unusual and generally unattractive solution to 
their corporate telecoms requirements, a view  reinforced by the publicity surrounding 
the cancellation of EC de-regulation. 
Several existing players and potential new  entrants cut back their investment. plans in 
1993-95 because their market projections are unattractive.  Most large potential entrants 
from the USA draw back from becoming European service providers; those already with 
a European presence deciding to remain as equipment suppliers until the market has 
developed  further,  although  one  major  US  player  enters  the  market  through  the 
acquisition of a European independent service provider.  The low  levels  of overall 
investment and the shortage of major new entrants hold back the development of the 
market. 
Most  independent  service  providers  turn  away  from  trying  to  compete  in  the 
mainstream corporate telecoms markets, in  search of niche opportunities that can be 
exploited  within . the  limits  of  regulatory  framework  and  without  major  risk  or 
investment.  This  limits  the growth  in  revenues,  reinforces  the European  image  of 
satellite solutions as a specialist, niche activity. 
Because of the continued small size of the customer base, the service providers do not 
have· the opportunity to work on a large scale with customers to develop new corporate 
applications that make full  use of satellite capabilities.  Point-to-multipoint applications 
remain  rare and  poorly  understood  by  most  corporations.  Diffusion  of knowledge, 
experience and confidence in satellite solutions is very weak. 
None of the independent service providers is sufficiently confident or financially strong 
enough to attempt to stimulate the broad market through major tariff reductions.  Their 
hub utilisation  levels  remain very low,  and their cost of sales is  high.  Satellite links 
remain  considerably  more  expensive  than  they  are  in  the  USA.  The  cost  and 
inconvenience of access to the space segment is not reduced, adding to the expense of 
offering satellite solutions. 
The fmancial performance of many of the independent service providers is poor because 
of the difficult market conditions.  As a consequence of this, two providers are sold very 
cheaply to major US integrated players providers in  1995-96.  On the basis of this small 
investment, these US players are able to continue feeding their ground equipment into 
the European market, pick up business from US corporate customers who also operate 
in Europe, and increase their flexibility to take advantage of opportunities as they arise. 
The large TO service providers and the large TO subsidiaries continue with their current 
strategies, maintaining high  prices for satellite links and aiming to serve only demand 
that cannot be met by terrestrial telecoms (such as links to Eastern Europe, press agency 
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information distribution, emergency telecoms deployment and so forth).  This strategy 
yields low growth and poor hub utilisation, but the TOs can tolerate the poor fmancial 
performance produced by the majority of these operations. 
The smaller TOs, who saw satellite services as one means amongst several for penetrat-
ing  foreign  markets,  have  had  more  success  with  their  other  products  (facilities 
management, terrestrial resale etc), and satellite services have become a small part of 
their overall businesses. 
The price of terrestrial telecoms continues to fall,  particularly international leased-line 
prices.  At the same time, the quality and availability of terrestrial infrastructure rises 
steadily.  As each year passes,  the cost-benefit equation changes to favour  terrestrial 
solutions for an increasing number of applications that could once have been served by 
satellite solutions.  By 2000, many early applications of satellite telecoms, such as those 
running on small or localised VSA T networks, data broadcasting and videoconferencing 
links,  are significantly cheaper to  implement  on  terrestrial networks.  The failure  to 
develop  point-to-multipoint  applications  leaves  the  service  providers  with  a  much 
reduced  potential  marketplace.  The  opportunity  for  Europe  to  develop  a  strong, 
innovative and sustainable satellite telecoms sector has passed. 
The consequences of this scenario for  European players are discussed in Section 5.4 
below. 
5.2  SCENARIO 2: 1993 DE-REGULATION 
In this scenario, European satellite regulation  is  modified along the lines of the 1990 
Green Paper, with the changes coming into effect in  1993.  The EC Member States, and 
some other European States, reflect these changes in  their national regulation during 
1994.  Eutelsat moves to  allow direct access to its satellites in  1994,  and transponder 
prices fall steadily.! 
Existing service providers and potential new entrants respond to the regulatory changes, 
and  reflect  the  new  opportunities  in  their  business  plans,  preparing to  launch  new 
services as soon as possible.  ETSI  moves rapidly to produce European standards for 
ground equipment, interfaces, protocols,  installation, maintenance and other satellite-
related areas, and approvals begin to be granted in 1994. 
1  Transponder prices fall due to tbe elimination of  signato'Y surcharses, the arrival of more non·Eutelsat capacity, Eutelsat policy changes 
designed to increa.'ie transponder utilisation. and the impad ofvideo compression on demand for broadcasting transponders. 
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EXHIBIT 5.2:  Scenario 2: 1993 De-Regulation 
REGULATORY CHANGE 
Anticipation of regulatory change 
Activity to reduce regulatory restriction at EC level 
Activity to reduce regulatory restriction at national level 
NEW ENTRANTS 
Example of  an individual potential new entrant: 
-becomes aware of commercial opportunity 
-prepares business plan and tests the market 
-obtains financing 
-begins marketing 
-launches and rolls out products/services 
-early growth phase for products and services 
Cumulative impact of new entrants 
STANDARDS 
European "paper" standards activity 
De facto European standards emerge 
Standards begin to improve users' confidence levels 
MARKET DEVELOPMENT 
Diffusion effect becomes significant driver of growth 
Point-to-point & small network applic'ns are attractive 
Point-to-multipoint applications develop 
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Exhibit 5.2 illustrates this scenario.  The announcement of a de-regulation timetable is a 
major boost to  the confidence of existing service providers,  and encourages potential 
new entrants to proceed.  As the exhibit shows, there is a considerable lag (potentially 18 
months to 2 years) before the effect of new entrants will be seen in the marketplace. 
The de-regulation process is a·ccompanied by a significant increase in the interest and 
awareness of corporate telecoms managers, several of these becoming new customers in 
1993.  Early growth is  driven by  corporate users and service providers using satellite 
links for existing applications,  such  as  data transfer and videoconferencing, but often 
extending  the  number  of  sites  covered  by  the  customer's  network  and  adding 
international sites.  Most  of the  early  networks  are relatively  small  (less  than  100 
terminals),  and  use  2-way  VSA T  terminals.  The  impetus  to  the  satellite  telecoms 
market provided  by  de-regulation  helps  to  overcome  many  of the other supply-side 
impediments to market growth (as discussed in Chapter 3). 
The financial positions of a number of independent service providers become consider-
ably more healthy as they increase sales and improve the utilisation of their hub stations. 
As their purchased volumes of ground equipment increase, they are able to negotiate 
·lower unit prices.  With their margins expanded, and firmer indications of the existence 
of a sizeable market, some become sufficiently confident to drop their prices, hoping to 
gain share and increase volumes.  Prices begin to fall towards the levels seen in the USA, 
stimulating further growth in usage. 
The increased number of satellite telecoms users accelerates the  diffusion of awareness 
and interest through the potential customer base.  The credibility and track records of 
the service providers increase steadily as their customer lists grow. 
The strong performances of the independent service providers helps  to protect them 
against acquisition by competitors.  One service provider is sold by its parent company 
to a large US player for a substantial sum, but  US entrants hoping to buy market share 
through cheap acquisitions are disappointed. 
The use of satellites for many  of the early applications becomes less attractive in  the 
later  1990s  as  terrestrial  leased-line  prices  fall  (particularly  for  international leased 
lines) and terrestrial infrastructure improves.  By this time, however, satellite solutions 
have  become  familiar  to  many  corporate  telecoms  managers.  They  have  built  up 
relationships  with  service  providers  and  gained  confidence  in  the  performance  of 
satellite solutions.  Many European users and systems integrators have developed a wide 
range of innovative point-to-multipoint applications, and awareness of these is steadily 
spreading  to  other  telecoms  managers,  who  are keen  to  apply  them  to  their  own 
businesses.  For reasons of cost, many of these applications could not be contemplated 
using terrestrial solutions. 
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By  this  stage,  satellite  solutions  are  firmly  entrenched  in  the  European  corporate 
telecoms marketplace.  Hybrid networks, meshed networks, mobile systems and other 
innovations are all available to meet the specific needs of users.  A credible, dynamic 
and generally profitable supply-base has developed, and satellite telecoms is seen as an 
important part of mainstream telecoms. 
The consequences of this scenario for European players are discussed in Section 5.4 
below. 
5.3  SCENARIO 3:  1995 DE·  REGULATION 
In the delayed de-regulation scenario, the measures included in the 1990 Green Paper 
are not put in  place until  1995.  Some EC states continue to liberalise their national 
regulations  in  advance  of EC de-regulation,  but it  is  not until  1996  that adequately 
harmonised pan-European regulation is achieved.  Eutelsat moves to allow direct access 
to its satellites in 1995, and after 1995 transponder access prices fall steadily. 
The intention to de-regulate is  noted by  existing service providers and potential new 
entrants, but most are reluctant to launch new services or even to invest in preparations 
until the marketplace looks less uncertain.  An increase in the marketing and launch of 
new services  occurs in  1995-97,  but because they  are starting from  a low base,  these 
services do not establish significant numbers of users until the end of the decade. 
In the period to 1998, none of the independent service providers has sufficient strength 
or confidence to cut prices in order to increase volumes, so satellite links to not establish 
themselves as being significantly cheaper than terrestrial solutions for point-to-point or 
small network applications. 
ETSI acts to produce European standards in satellite-related areas, but their impact is 
not great.  Because of national regulatory restraints they cannot be applied simply to 
pan-European networks until 1996.  Approvals are problematic in many states, so the de 
facto  industry  standards in  Europe (the leading  US  equipment  designs)  retain their 
importance in the eyes of many potential buyers. 
Exhibit 5.3 illustrates this scenario.  By the late 1990s the door has been closed on using 
satellites for most simple point-to-point and small network applications in Europe.  In 
order to sell satellite links, service providers now have to convince corporations of the 
benefits of more complex applications.  The potential customers, telecoms managers, are 
still  unfamiliar  with  satellite  solutions  and  are  wary  of the  promises  of unknown 
suppliers.  The  applications  need  to  be  individually  tailored  to  specific  customer 
requirements, adding to the selling costs.  These problems hold back market growth. 
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EXHIBIT 5.3:  Scenario 3:1995 De-Regulation 
REGULATORY CHANGE 
Anticipation of regulatoey change 
Activity to reduce regulatoey restriction at EC level 
Activity to reduce regulatoey restriction at national level 
NEW ENTRANTS 
·Example of an individual potential new entrant: 
-becomes aware of commercial opportunity 
-prepares business plan and tests the market 
-obtains financing 
-begins marketing 
-launches and rolls out products/services 
-early growth phase for products and services 
Cumulative impact of new entrants 
STANDARDS 
EW'Opean "paper" standards activity 
De facto European standards emerge 
Standards begin to improve users' confidence levels 
MARKET DEVELOPMENT 
Diffusion effect becomes significant driver of growth 
Point-to-point & small network applic'ns are attractive 
Point-to-multipoint applications develop 
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By missing the opportunity to grow through simple, mainstream applications, the market 
fails  to  reach  a  size  where  diffusion  effects  become significant.  Most  corporations 
remain ignorant of the capabilities of the technology and the suppliers.  From this weak 
base the penetration of the market for more sustainable applications is restricted. 
The effect of delaying de-regulation is very similar to the effect of not de-regulating at 
all  (Scenario  1  ).  By  reducing  growth  during  the  satellite  telecoms  'window  of 
opportunity'  (w~en terrestrial solutions are still  expensiv~ and non-universal},  delayed 
de-regWatioa  ..  prevents  satellite  telecoms  from  breaking  out  of  its  position  as  a 
marginalised and minor element in the European telecoms market. 
The consequences of this  scenario for  European players are discussed  in Section 5.4 
below. 
5.4  THE OUTCOMES FOR EUROPEAN PLAYERS 
5.4.1  The Outcomes for European Service Providers 
Exhibit  5.4  illustrates the projected outcomes for  European service providers in  the 
three scenarios described above. 
Currently,  European  service  providers  dominate  the European  marketplace.  Total 
service revenues in 1992 are estimated to be about ECU 300 million; this is estimated to 
be about 10% of the corresponding world market.2 
In  Scenarios 1 and 3,  the satellite services market grows  to around ECU 600  to 700 
million by 2000, and European service providers' share of the market has fallen to less 
than 70%.  About 30%  of the market is  held  by  the large European TOs and  their 
subsidiaries.  The European service providers have lost most share in the two-way VSAT 
services sector, where large integrated US  players (who  entered through partnerships 
and acquisitions in the mid-1990s) have performed better.  European service providers 
are stronger in the one-way sectors (VSA  T and TYRO) where growth has been weakest. 
2  It is dif(icult to estimate the equivalent total world service revenue because separate service revenues are not available for most regions. 
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EXHIBIT 5.4: 
Revenues to 
European Players 
(Services) 
European Players' 
Market Share 
(European Market) 
European Players' 
Market Share 
(World Market) 
Analysys Report for CEC DGXIH 
Changes in the Revenue and Market Share of  European Satellite 
Telecom1nwzications Service Providers 
high 
Scenario 2 
1992 
low 
low  European Market Size  high 
high 
1992 
Scenarios 1 & 3  Scenario 2 
low 
low 
European Market Size  high 
high 
Scenario 2 
--...... 
1992  - - Scenarios 1 & 3  -... 
low 
low  European Market Size  high 
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The US players have not invested heavily in the European service provision industry -
they  have  concentrated  on  equipment  supply  in  Europe,  and  on  developing  their 
businesses in the Far East and North and South America, where growth has been more 
healthy.  Their relatively strong performance is based on their credibility with customers 
and their underlying technical capability.  They are well matched to the demands of a 
small, underdeveloped European marketplace. 
Very few of the surviving European service providers are achieving expected commercial 
rates of return on their businesses in 2000.  For many, the failure of satellite telecoms to 
become integrated with  the mainstream of corporate telecoms  has undermined their 
business plans and disappointed their fmancial backers.  Their prospects after 2000 look 
poor. 
The  influence  of  the  major  US  players  extends  beyond  their  immediate  service 
businesses.  Over  time,  all  the  TO  service  providers  and  the  independent  service 
providers  have  become  effectively  tied  to  one  or  two  non-European  equipment 
manufacturers as  sources  of two-way  equipment  and  technical  expertise.  They  are 
paying  for  this  support  through  higher  equipment  prices  and  direct  payments  for 
training and support. 
In summary, the performance of the European service providers is weak in the scenarios 
where deregulation is cancelled or delayed. 
In Scenario 2,  1993  de-regulation, non-European satellite service providers have taken 
about 7?% of the mar~et  away from European service providers by 2000, but the market 
leaders are still European.  The total European satellite telecoms services market has 
grown to around ECU 1200  million by 2000, with  two-way VSA  T networks accounting 
for almost 50% of service revenues. 
Because of their larger revenues and better prospects in Scenario 2, and because of the 
early production  of European equipment standards, the independent satellite service 
providers are in  a much  stronger position in  their relationships with  their equipment 
manufacturers.  They are able  to  negotiate  better equipment  prices  and  can  switch 
between suppliers if  necessary.  Because of their higher volumes they are able to support 
a greater level  of in-house technical  resources,  and  are not so  reliant  on  equipment 
suppliers. 
Note about personal satellite ntobile contmwtications: 
Personal satellite mobile communications are not mentioned in the scenarios above.  In 
Section 3.2 we discussed the uncertainties surrounding satellite mobile communications, 
particularly  personal  systems  relying  on  LEO  satellites,  for  which  some  industry 
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observers predict significant demand.  In developing scenarios, it is possible to isolate 
the issues associated with such systems.  For example, the deployment of a successful 
LEO-based  personal  mobile  communications  network  could  be added  to  the  above 
scenarios, without needing to alter the outcome of the scenario in other respects, except 
to take account of the extra satellite manufacturing revenues.  The service providers and 
equipment manufacturers for this service are unlikely to overlap with  the VSAT and 
business TV players. 
5.4.2  The Outcome for European Ground Equipment Manufacturers 
Exhibit 5.5 shows how the revenues, European market share and world market share of 
European ground equipment manufacturers vary in the three scenarios. 
Currently, European equipment manufacturers have  about a  40%  share of the total 
European  ground  equipment  market,  which  is  estimated  at  about  ECU 80  million. 
European manufacturers are strongest in  the areas that are expected  to  grow  more 
slowly  (large  earth  stations,  ship  terminals,  business  TVRO  and  one-way  VSA  T). 
European manufacturers have very limited presence outside Europe, and their world 
market share (for all equipment types) is estimated to be about 6%.3 
In  Scenarios  1 and  3,  while  European  equipment  manufacturers'  revenues  grow  to 
ECU 40-45  million  in  2000,  their share falls  to around 25% of the European market. 
Their world market share falls to about 5%. 
In these scenarios, the non-European equipment suppliers not only capture 75% of the 
European market, but are also able to dominate sectors of the service provision market, 
where  relatively  weak  service  providers  depend  on  them  for  technical  support  and 
credibility with  customers.  They are successful  at  integrating  forwards  into  service 
provision in Europe. 
In Scenario 2,  the Europeans' loss of share is greater, with European manufacturers' 
share falling  to around 20% by 2000,  because of the strong growth  of two-way VSAT 
sales,  where  there is  continued  absence  of European  products.  European  players' 
revenues are significantly higher than in Scenarios 1 and 3, however, and their share of 
the world equipment market remains almost unchanged at 6%. 
3  C.ontrast this with the European manufacturers' share of the total world telecoms equipment market of around 40%. 
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EXHIBIT 5.5:  Changes in the Revenue and Market Share of  European Ground 
Equipment Manufacturers 
Revenues to 
European Players 
(Ground Equipment) 
European Players' 
Market Share 
(European Market) 
European Players' 
Market Share 
(World Market) 
high 
Scenario 2 
1992 
low  ~--------------~----------------J 
low  European Market Size  high 
high 
1992 
Scenarios 1 & 3 
low  ~------------------------------~  low 
European Market Size 
high 
high 
Scenarios 1 & 3 
,~ 
Scenario 2 
1992  .......  - ~I""'" 
low 
low  European Market Size  high 
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The non-European equipment manufacturers achieve significant market penetration in 
Scenario 2,  hut are unable to exploit their relationships with service providers to the 
extent that was possible in Scenarios 1 and 3.  The relative strength of the independent 
European  service  providers  in  this  scenario  keeps  the  equipment  manufacturers  in 
check, and prevents them from dominating the service provision market by integrating 
service provision with their equipment businesses. 
In summary, the European manufacturers do not perform well in any of the scenarios, 
but the loss of  -European share produced by early de-regulation is only 5% greater than 
the loss of share that can be expected if  there were no de-regulation.  In revenue terms, 
the industry does better in the early de-regulation scenario. 
5.4.3  The Outcome for European Satellite Manufacturers 
The fate of European satellite manufacturers under the three scenarios hinges on the 
reaction of Eutelsat to the de-regulation of space segment access.  Eutelsat is the major 
customer for European-built satellites (see Exhibit 5.5). 
If Eutelsat were to  buy  its  satellites on  a  purely commercial basis,  it would  almost 
certainly buy far fewer European satellites.  The impact of this on the economics of the 
European satellite manufacturers would make their position untenable, and production 
of complete geostationary communications satellites in Europe would probably cease. 
The industry would continue to supply satellite sub-assemblies to US manufacturers, to 
build  military,  scientific  and  earth  observation  satellites,  and  to  seek a  share of the 
LEO/HEO market.4 
Exhibit 5.6 shows communications satellites with European coverage, both those which 
currently exist  and those which  are expected by  around 2000.  The exhibit  indicates 
where the European contribution might be at risk. 
Section 3.6  of this report concluded that d~mand for satellites in the period to 2000 is 
unlikely to be affected by variations in the levels of satellite telecoms traffic caused by 
de-regulation.  During the period shown, there are unlikely to be any additions to the list 
of forthcoming satellites. 
The  key  issue  fpr  European  satellite  manufacturers  is  whether  Green  Paper  de-
regulation would cause Eutelsat to change its pro-European purchasing policies.  If this 
were the effect, then we conclude that the impact of non-European competitors would 
be  to  threaten  the  continued  existence  of  an  independent  European  satellite 
manufacturing industry. 
4  Low Earth Orbit satellites and Highly Ellirtical Orbit satellites. 
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Below, we examine each of the Green PaperS space segment positions in turn.  (Caveat: 
The precise legal  interpretation  of each  position is  not fully  transparent in  a  Green 
paper): 
POSITION 5: Regulatory 
separation and equal access 
to orbital slots and 
frequencies 
POSITION 6: Application 
of  competition law 
s  See Exhibit 3.1. 
The main commercial impact of position 5 will be on the 
signatory  TOs,  who  will  have  to  modify  their  current 
approach to the sale of satellite access. 
While this position would lead to a fundamental review of 
Eutelsat's  current  mechanisms,  policies  and  legal 
constitution,  it  would  not  prevent  Eutelsat  from 
continuing to charge the prices that it needs to remain in 
profitable  operation.  If  a  special  regulator  were 
introduced, it would be unlikely to prevent this. 
If  the  terms  of position  5  were  applied  to  the  other 
satellite  treaty  organisations  (which  may  in  fact  prove 
impossible}, this could result in increased competition for 
Eutelsat, as customers could choose to buy from Intelsat 
or Inmarsat if  they wished. 
The requirement to ensure equal access  to  orbital slots 
and  frequency  allocations  is  not  expected  to  have  a 
dramatic impact on  the European picture in  the 1990s6• 
There is unlikely to be a scramble to fill vacant slots in a 
period of over-capacity, and the key frequency allocations 
are not expected to change. 
It  is  possible  that  a  vertically  integrated  US  operation 
could launch (or re-locate) a satellite into a European slot 
in  order  to  support  its  service  provision  business  in 
Europe.  This  would  only  make  sense  commercially if 
access  to  existing  capacity  were  too  expensive  or 
otherwise difficult. 
This position should not harm Eutelsat's revenue position 
unless it were found to be abusing its market power. 
6  It is  quite possible for non-European operatoni to obtain aa:ess to European slots in  the current regulatory eDVironment  (through 
applications at national level). 
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POSITION 7: Direct access 
and commercial freedonz 
for Eutelsat 
POSITION 8: Cost-
orientation for pricing 
Again,  the major  impact  of this position will  be on  the 
signatories.  Provided  that  Eutelsat  charges  different 
customers  equitably,  its  revenue  streams  will  not 
necessarily be affected. 
This position  many  lead  Eutelsat to  rebalance its  price 
structures, but will  not necessarily affect its net revenue 
levels. 
If implemented,  the Green  Paper positions would  lead  to  a  major  upheaval  of the 
Eutelsat  organisational  structure.  However,  the  direct  threat  to  Eutelsat's  future 
revenues from  the terms  of the Green paper is  not great.  When  compared to  the 
challenge  from  the  forthcoming  private  satellite  systems,  and  potentially  from  the 
national systems, the Green Paper is by no means the major threat to Eutelsat revenues 
in the immediate future. 
The Green paper does, however, threaten the revenues of the signatories who control 
access  to  the Eutelsat  system.'  If the signatories were  to  change  their  attitude to 
Eutelsat in the light of their reduced revenues, this could have a much greater impact on 
Eutelsat's commercial position. 
The key question is whether this impact would be sufficient to force Eutelsat to change 
its  procurement  policies,  in  order  to  obtain  the  lowest-price·  satellites  for  its  next 
generation.  It is  not possible  to predict the outcome of this complex  situation with 
confidence, but, on balance, we believe that Green Paper de-regulation is unlikely to be 
a primary cause for  Eutelsat to place orders for Eutelsat ills with US manufacturers. 
However,  a  variety  of  other  circumstances  could  combine  with  the  effects  of 
deregulation to lead to Eutelsat reducing its expenditure on European satellites. 
In  summary,  the  European  satellite  manufacturing  industry  faces  a  difficult  period, 
whether or not  the  European  satellite  telecoms  market  is  de-regulated.  A  possible 
direct consequence of de-regulation could be the loss, to US manufacturers, of contracts 
to build the Eutelsat III series satellites.  This would be a severe blow to the European 
manufacturers, and might lead to the loss of an independent European satellite building 
capability.  On balance, we do  not anticipate this outcome, although the future of the 
manufacturers is far from secure. 
7  If  end users are permitted to access capacity directly, the signatories will have no opportunity to ma'-e money on this transaction. 
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6/ Implications for Regulatory Action and 
Supporting Measures 
6.1  THE NEED FOR SUPPORTING AcrtON 
This study has found that many parts of the European satellite communications industry 
are poorly prepared to take advantage of many of the opportunities that de-regulation of 
satellite communications will bring. 
Many observers argue that there are strong industrial policy reasons for maintaining and 
enhancing  European  capabilities  in  parts  of the  satellite  communications  industry. 
Although (as explained in  Section 1.3.2)  this study does not make a judgement on the 
relative strategic importance of different activities in the space and telecoms sectors, it is 
nevertheless appropriate to examine the likely consequences of measures that might be 
taken as part of national or regional industrial policy.  Moreover, aside from industrial 
policy concerns, the weakness of parts of the European industry will be a constraint on 
the rate of development of the European market, and will  reduce the benefits to end 
users that will  come from  market development.  This concern  makes it  necessary to 
consider  measures  that  could  improve  the  performance  of the  European  satellite 
telecommunications industry. 
This chapter surveys the range of regulatory and supporting actions that are available to 
national governments and EC bodies, and discusses their likely costs and benefits. 
6.2  SURVEY OF THE OPTIONS FOR SUPPORTING AcrtONS 
Exhibit  6.1  summarises the measures that could  be taken by  the CEC and  others to 
attempt to improve the competitive position of European industry in different areas of 
the satellite telecoms business. 
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EXHIBIT 6.1:  List of  Measures Considered to bnprove European Competitiveness 
6.2.1  Early introduction of Green Paper de-regulation measures 
6.2.2  Delayed introduction of Green Paper de-regulation measures 
6.2.3  Accelerated development of standards 
6.2.4  Encouraging the involvement of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) . 
6.2.5  Refocusing support for R&D 
6.2.6  Increasing the awareness of potential users 
6.2. 7  Encouraging industry consolidation and co-operation 
6.2.8  Specific restricting measures: 
..,.  Tariffs and quotas on imported ground equipment 
..,.  Limiting new private satellites 
..,.  Restricting non-European ownership and control 
..,.  Retaining and re-introducing TV broadcasting restrictions 
A key ingredient for the successful implementation of such measures is confidence that 
the declared goals are achievable.  Our contacts with European industry1 indicate that 
there is widespread pessimism about the prospects for dramatic improvements in some 
areas  of  European  satellite  telecoms  - notably  ground-equipment  and  satellite 
manufacturing.  There is  more confidence,  however,  that European service providers 
can do well, and that supporting measures for other sectors can be effective in specific 
niches, with less ambitious objectives. 
In more detail, we found that: 
..,.  There  is  widespread  confidence  that  European  service  providers  can  compete 
effectively  with  non-European  entrants  if  the  environment  is  liberalised.  The 
requirements for supporting measures identified by respondents to this study tended 
to  be  aimed  at  general  market  development,  rather  than  at  fending  off  non-
European entrants  . 
..,.  There  is  very  widespread  pessimism  regarding  the  ability  of European  ground-
equipment manufacturers to take significant market share from US and Japanese 
manufacturers.  This pessimism is a major obstacle to any supporting measures with 
ambitious goals in  this area (such as a generational leap forward in VSATs).  Less 
ambitious goals,  such  as strengthening European equipment niches (e.g.  shipbome 
terminals) or targeting certain equipment components (e.g.  software or encoders) 
are more likely to succeed, since there is more confidence that they can be achieved. 
As  one  might  expect,  however,  there is  wide variety in  the range  of niches  and 
components that are recommended as foci for development. 
1  As indicated  in  Section  1.3.4,  this study has  not  made a statistical survey of industry views.  The levels of confidence or pessimism 
reported bere are based on our limited sample. 
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~  There  is  a  widespread  determination  that  the  achievements  of  the  European 
satellite manufacturers  should  not  go  to waste.  It is  recognised  that European 
manufacturers are at a disadvantage compared with US manufacturers in terms of 
cost, inherent subsidy level and addressable market size.  Nevertheless, there is  a 
belief  that  through  consolidation,  co-operation  and  efficiency  improvements, 
European satellite manufacturers will be able to survive in some form.2 
The following  sub-sections  (  6.2.1  to 6.2.8)  discuss various  specific types  of measure, 
expanding on those listed in Exhibit 6.1. · 
6.2.1  Early Introduction of the Green Paper De-Regulation Measures 
Areas  of bnpact:  Service  providers,  ground  equipment  manufacturers  and  satellite 
manufacturers. 
The impact of early de-regulation along the lines proposed in the EC's Green Paper has 
been discussed in Sections 3.1  and 5.2 above.  For the European service providers, the 
impact will be beneficial.  They are well placed to compete with non-European players; 
their  competitive  position  will  improve  as  the  marketplace  matures;  and  early  de-
regulation will. accelerate the development of the marketplace. 
European ground-equipment manufacturers, on the other hand, are not well prepared to 
succeed in the current marketplace, and will not gain a significant share of the expanded 
market that would result from early de-regulation.  Nevertheless, it is important to note 
that their revenue opportunities will increase, and their confidence in the future size of 
the market will be strengthened if de-regulation proceeds. 
The impact of early de-regulation on European satellite manufacturers is more difficult 
to predict.  The chain of events that could lead to significant loss of business is complex 
and uncertain.  There are many threats to the future of Europe's satellite manufacturing 
industry;  the Green Paper de-regulation is  less  significant  than such factors as space 
segment over-capacity and other world  market developments (as discussed in  Section 
3.6). 
6.2.2  Delayed Introduction of the Green Paper De-Regulation Measures 
Areas  of ilnpact:  Service  providers,  ground  equipment  manufacturers  and  satellite 
manufacturers. 
2  Some interviewees did not  sha~  this view, arguing that only profound intervention by  European governments can save tbe European 
independent cap:.bility. 
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The impact of delayed implementation of the Green Paper has been discussed in Section 
5.3  above.  In  their  feedback  to  ESA  on  the  Green  Paper,  a  number  of industry 
representatives suggested  delay  as  a  means  of supporting European industry.  They 
argued that by  postponing the onset of potentially rapid growth,  delay would provide 
European industry with a 'breathing space' to prepare to compete with non-Europeans. 
Use has been  made of such  'breathing spaces' in  other industrial sectors  - notably 
textiles, iron and steel - with some evidence of success.  In this instance, however, there 
are a  number  of factors  that  make it  unlikely  that a  delay  in  de-regulation  will  be 
effective as a means of increasing European competitiveness: 
~  A  'breathing  space'  for  uncompetitive  industries  is  valuable  when  restructuring, 
rationalisation  or  cost-cutting  are  required.  The  European  satellite  telecoms 
industry,  however,  requires  increased  confidence,  investment  and  commercial 
energy.  We  are not  aware  of any  convincing  precedent for  a  'breathing space' 
stimulating changes of this kind. 
~  Comments from  industry representatives and observers collected in the interviews 
for this study indicate that in the key area of ground equipment, European manufac-
turers would  not take advantage of a postponement.  The rationale for  this is  as 
follows: 
Major investments  in  product  development  would  require  co·nfidence  that  a 
significant  European market would  exist  (penetration of other markets being 
unlikely).  Delay does not increase confidence. 
Because the marketplace is  global  and  the pace of technical improvement is 
accelerating,  US  and Japanese  manufacturers  are likely  to widen  the gap  in 
equipment capability and cost over the duration of the 'breathing space'. 
~  There is  a limited  'window of opportunity' for  offering competitive point-to-point 
satellite links and small satellite networks (see Sections 3.2).  Point-to-point links are 
a relatively straight-forward service that would  have a major stimulating effect on 
the development of the overall satellite telecoms market.  Delayed de-regulation is 
likely to cause this window of opportunity to be missed, with serious consequences 
for the longer term development of the overall market in Europe  . 
..,.  Large  integrated  US  players  are better suited  to  compete in  the current small, 
fragmented marketplace than the small independent European service providers.  A 
postponed de-regulation will make it easier for the large US players to gain effective 
control of some of these smaller and weaker service providers, increasing the impact 
of non-Europeans on European industry. 
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We do not believe that postponement of de-regulation will be beneficial to the European 
satellite telecommunications industry, either in the short or long term. 
6.2.3  Accelerated Development of Standards 
Areas of  impact: Service providers and ground equipment manufacturers. 
Standards can have a major role to play in the development of markets for technology-
based products and services.  De facto  standards emerge when individual players are 
strong·enough to dominate a market with their product or service (for example the IBM 
personal computer).  Formal standards are produced when groups of players recognise 
that it is in their interest to define shared specifications (such as the GSM standards for 
digital  cellular  telecoms).  The existence  of accepted  standards brings  wide-ranging 
benefits that increase the rate of development of the market: 
..,..  Users' confidence in the product or service is increased.  Assurance of the quality, 
legality and compatibility of the product is increased.  The commitment of suppliers 
is made more visible and the risks of purchasing are reduced  . 
..,..  The risk to manufacturers is reduced.  Through collaboration with others to defme 
a standard, the risk of the product failing in the marketplace is decreased, and the 
probability of early obsolescence is lowered  . 
..,..  New entrants benefit if  the standard is non-proprietary.  The risks of designing and 
launching new prqducts and services are reduced through the use of clear and widely 
accepted technical specifications.  The common handicaps of new entrants (weak 
branding and poor differentiation) are less damaging. 
In  the field  of satellite  telecoms  the most  important standards are de facto  ground-
equipment standards developed  by  US  manufacturers  (notably  Hughes  and AT&T). 
These  tend  to  take  the  form  of proprietary  designs,  system  configurations,  coding 
algorithms, etc.  These US de facto  standards apply in Europe as a consequence of the 
strong  position  held  by  non-European  suppliers.  In  the  study  interviews,  service 
providers frequently referred to the dominant US ground-equipment configurations as 
their benchmarks for considering the performance of others. 
The possibility of  a 'great leap forward' for European ground equipment 
In  the course of this  study,  it  has  been  suggested  by  industry  interviewees  that the 
production of formal standards for a new generation of satellite ground equipment could 
give  a  major boost  to  the European  industry,  referred  to  by  some as  a  'great leap 
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forward'.  The  benefits  of  the  GSM  standards  for  European  manufacturers  are 
frequently cited to support this view. 
We agree that a major emphasis on developing European equipment standards would 
form an important part of any initiative to re-invigorate European industry.  However, 
standards development alone cannot bring this re-invigoration.  Several other ingredi-
ents are required for a 'leap forward' by European equipment manufacturers - ingredi-
ents which were present in  some form  for the development of GSM.  Some of these 
ingredients appear to be present for satellite Communications, while others are not.  For 
example: 
..,.  Confidence that a new generation of products is a sound commercial proposition. 
Several European firms appear to be convinced that the VSA  T market will be attrac-
tive,  and  will  require  increasingly  sophisticated  products.  There is  uncertainty, 
however,  about  the players'  ability  to  introduce profitable  p~oducts to  meet this 
demand  . 
..,.  Commitment to co-operate with other European manufacturers to develop shared 
standards.  Many European manufacturers already have close relationships with US 
partners, and may be reluctant to co-operate effectively with a European grouping  . 
..,.  Sufficient technical insight to establish standards that represent an attractive and 
achievable 'step forward'.  Europeans' limited track record and tiny user bases make 
such insight very difficult. 
The problems of staging a European 'leap forward'  in  satellite ground equipment are 
significant, with  few  of the necessary  ingredients available.  There seems to be little 
belief in the industry that such a desirable goal will be attained, and this is likely to be a 
self-fulfilling prophesy.  We conclude that such an initiative is unlikely to be feasible. 
However, many of the benefits of standards can be realised by less ambitious efforts, 
targeted  at  making  ground  equipment  more  attractive  and  accessible,  and  less 
demanding, for users and service providers: 
Supporting type 
approvals 
Changes to the system of type-approvals along the lines envisaged 
by  Positions  1,  3  and  11  of the  Green Paper (see  Exhibit  3.1 
above) will accelerate the removal of bureaucratic restrictions on 
installation  and  use.  Users  and  service providers will  become 
more confident as purchasers of equipment. 
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Producing 
standards for 
interfaces and 
protocols 
Ensuring that 
mainstream 
teleconu standards 
address satellite 
issues 
Standards for  interfaces and protocols will  be valuable to those 
wishing to  offer components or peripheral devices,  or to act as 
systems  integrators.  New  entrants and start-up  manufacturers 
will benefit particularly from such standards. 
Ensuring that  mainstream  telecoms  standards address  satellite 
issues will benefit European service providers who are attempting 
to  embed  satellite  links  in  telecoms  networks,  and  European 
equipment manufacturers who are designing satellite equipment 
to interface with terrestrial systems.  US players are currently at 
an  advantage  in  these  areas  because  of their  experience  and 
resources. 
The arena for standards initiatives will be ETSI.  Europe is fortunate to have such  a 
forum for making progress on satellite telecoms standards, and full use should be made 
of the expertise that exists there.3  If  satellite telecoms standards development does not 
proceed rapidly in ETSI, it will reinforce the view of some interviewees concerning the 
lack of self-confidence of Europe's existing equipment suppliers and the reluctance of 
Europe's TOs to encourage satellite telecoms. 
6.2.4  Encouraging the Involvement of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
Areas of impact:  Ground equipment manufacturers and service providers. 
The space industry and the telecoms industry are dominated by large corporations, but 
both  rely  to  a  significant  degree  on  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises (SMEs)  as 
suppliers of products and services, and as sources of innovation.  Section 4.2.2 noted the 
key role which SMEs have played in the development of the US VSA  T market, and their 
continued importance.  This tier of smaller players is largely absent in Europe, depriving 
European industry of a source of energy for growth and development. 
Various measures can be taken by the CEC and others to support the growth of SME 
involvement in satellite telecoms: 
3  Relevant expertise centres on the Satellite E.'lrth Stations (SES) Technical C.ommittee.  Other TCs with sateUite concerns are Transmis-
sion and Multiplexing (fM) and 1'\etworli. Aspects (NA). 
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Liberalisation 
1neasures designed 
to attract 
entrepreneurs 
Vigilance for anti-
conzpetitive 
practices ainted at 
deterring SM  E 
involve1nent 
Support for satellite 
teleco1ns R&D 
tailored to SM  E 
require1nents 
Ensuring that 
training is made 
available in ways 
that are appropriate 
toSMEs 
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The most powerful incentive to SMEs is the existence of attrac-
tive commercial opportunities.  The Green Paper de-regulation 
should  provide such  opportunities to smaller service providers, 
systems  integrators,  equipment  and  component  manufacturers 
and  resellers,  and  contractors  to  larger  players.  Similar 
regulatory changes in the USA initiated the rapid growth in SME 
activity  of the mid-1980s.  The detailed implementation of the 
Green  Paper  reforms  must  reflect  the  needs  of  smaller 
enterprises  - licence  terms,  type  approvals  and  other bureau-
cracy can easily deter and exclude small players. 
It is very easy for large organisations and bureaucracies, with an 
interest  in  maintaining  the  status  quo,  to  deter  SMEs  from 
exploiting  opportunities  - by  placing  bureaucratic,  legal  or 
commercial obstacles in their path  ..  Larger enterprises can stand 
higher costs and risks to overcome such obstacles.  The interna-
tional  dimension  of  many  satellite  telecoms  opportunities 
increases the risk of such practices. 
Some  of the best  work  in  existing  CEC Programmes such  as 
ESPRIT and RACE has been carried out by SMEs, even though 
they tend to be under-represented.  Many Member States have 
schemes  to  support  SMEs  in  high-technology  areas,  through 
subsidised consultancy, grants and export support.  Such schemes 
can assist satellite telecoms initiatives. 
Training and education (see Section 6.2.6 below) are important if 
European industry is to increase its competitiveness.  For SMEs 
to be attracted to participate, training must be: 
cheap (probably subsidised) 
accessible (without excessive air travel) 
highly focused (short, clear specification, clear benefits) 
practical (based on real equipment, systems and problems) 
backed up  by  on-going support (links to academia, research 
establishments etc.). 
The  CEC  is  well  placed  to  ensure  that  SME  involvement  is  maximised,  and  the 
importance of SMEs in general is clearly recognised by the Commission.  In the field of 
satellite telecoms, SMEs are particularly worthy of support. 
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6.2.5  Refocusing Support for R&D 
Areas  of ilnpact:  Service  providers,  ground  equipment  manufacturers  and  satellite 
manufacturers. 
The total public R&04 funds available for support of the European satellite tel~ommu­
nications industry  are unlikely  to  be substantially increased  above  the current figure 
(estimated  at  about  ECU  300-400  million  annually,  including  all  government  civil 
spending, relevant defence spending and ESA expenditure - approximately 10% of total 
space expenditureS).  In fact,  reductions are more likely  - the overall budgets of ESA 
and the French Space Agency, CNES (the two  main sources of European space R&D 
funding) are under pressure to be reduced, and several other national R&D budgets are 
vulnerable at present. 
European space expenditures are an order of magnitude lower than space US expendi-
ture (Exhibit 6.2), and even after adjusting for the high content of military programmes 
in the US figures,. the value of US support for R&D in  satellite telecommunications is 
many times the European level. 
Given the overall European budgetary constraints, the issue becomes one of allocation. 
There is  a continuing debate within  the European space and  telecoms communities 
concerning the division  of resources between  the various  areas of activity,  and little 
consensus on the objectives or nature of R&D support: 
1111- The  correct  balance  between  satellite  telecoms  R&D  (including  transponders, 
ground  equipment,  transmission)  and  other  areas  of space  research  (launchers, 
vehicles, other satellite areas) is disputed.  The medium-term commercial returns on 
telecoms research are difficult to compare objectively with the longer-term benefits 
of other space programmes. 
1111- The  balance  between  supporting  pre-competitive  research  or more  commercial 
programmes is  difficult  to strike.  The results of 'close-to-market' R&D are more 
predictable and  more  rapidly  available,  but  many  argue  that  the  private  sector 
should invest in such work, and that public sector involvement is not appropriate. 
4  R&D Iaten to include expenditure on 'space infrastructure' (much of ESA's expenditure is classified as infrastructural) 
S  The ratio or R&D expenditure to mar~et size is extremely high in the space sector (compared with other industrial sectors). 
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EXHIBIT 6.2: 
National Space 
Expenditures, 1990 
{Source: CIT} 
~  FiiiDI RqonforCEC  DGX/11 
ECU 30.7 billion 
ECU 3.4 billion 
ECU l.S billion 
USA  Europe  Japan 
Note: These figures exclude expenditure classified as 'commercial'. 
Exhibit 6.3  shows the budgetary split for  the European Space Agency for  1992.  The 
rationale for  this  split  was  questioned  by  some  of those interviewed  for  this  study, 
although  it  was  acknowledged  that  the  allocation  of  budgets  would  always  be  a 
contentious issue.  ESA's telecommunications programmes are concentrated on space 
segment developments (Artemis, Marecs, programmes for Eutelsat etc). 
EXHIBIT 6.3: 
ESA Expenditure 
on Approved 
PrograJn1nes, 1992 
{Source: CIT} 
Space Station and 
Platforms (12%)  TOTAL: ECU 2.731 billion 
A frequently  encountered view  is  that  R&D  resources should be used  to support an 
industrial consortium  of European space and  telecommunications companies, formed 
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with the objective of making a generational leap in  the capabilities of small aperture 
terminal systems.  This great 'leap forwards' was discussed earlier in Section 6.2.3, where 
we concluded that it was unlikely to be a successful venture.  The cost of developing a 
system that could significantly outperform today's two-way shared hub VSA  Ts could be 
several hundred million ECU, which would entail a substantial re-distribution of public 
and corporate R&D funds. 
We ha:ve. come to th.e  following c,onclusions concerning  targ~ting of R&D funding for 
maximum  impact  on  the performance. _of  the European  satellite  telecommunieations . 
industry: 
..,.  Satellite telecommunications  has had  a  relatively  modest  share in  the  historical 
allocation of European and national R&D budgets,  and its percentage share may 
benefit from a review of priorities  . 
..,.  Agencies should consider an increased emphasis on the funding of programmes that 
have  a  strong telecommunications content  rather than  being primarily linked  to 
space technology.  The diffusion of results from  the space industry to the telecom-
munications industry (where they must be applied) is very poor  . 
..,.  Work  that  aims  to  build  on  the existing  capabilities  of devices  and  systems  is 
particularly valuable, to ensure that European research workers are fully  aware of 
the capabilities of state-of-the-art commercial products. 
The  role  of the  CEC is  important  in  influencing  the  agenda .  for  European  R&D 
priorities.  Also the CEC can directly influence R&D activities through its own research 
programmes (RACE, ESPRIT etc).  The CEC is in a position to monitor the distribu-
tion of resources between  R&D objectives, and to identify any mismatch between the 
needs of the European satellite telecommunications industry and the R&D resources 
that it receives. 
6.2.6  Increasing the Awareness of Potential Users 
Areas of  ilnpact: Service providers and ground equipment manufacturers. 
Earlier  chapters  of this  report  have  described  how  many  of the potential  users  of 
satellite telecoms in  Europe are unaware of the benefits or are wary of the potential 
risks.  This poorly-informed and under-developed marketplace has a double impact on 
the prospects for European suppliers: the overall growth of the market is retarded; and 
larger, more experienced and more credible US  players are at an advantage because 
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their stronger  marketing capabilities  and  more  robust  branding are better suited  to 
winning over sceptical users.  6 
There are several  approaches  that can  be taken  to  support the development  of the 
European satellite telecoms market by increasing the awareness of potential users.  Each 
approach can be applied in ways that benefit European players: 
High-profile 
demonstrators 
High-profile public 
procure1nents 
The Commission,  ESA,  Eutelsat  or other bodies could  fund  a 
suitable VSA  T  demonstrator.  This  ~ould probably need to be 
mobile, and should be designed to challenge corporate telecoms 
managers who currently make no use of satellite solutions in their 
corporate networks. 
The  contract  to  develop  and  run  the  demonstrator  should 
probably go  to a grouping of European players.  The emphasis 
should  be on  cost  saving and  reliability in  mainstream applica-
tions,  rather  than  esoteric  advanced  services  (although  this 
emphasis  may  deter  TOs  from  becoming  involved).  The 
demonstrator should be built from 'off-the-shelf equipment that 
is  clearly  priced  (although  this  will  present  a  problem  of 
European content). 
A demonstrator would be a cost-effective means of accelerating 
market development at the same time as boosting the presence of 
a subset of European service providers. 
Many  of  the  risks  and  uncertainties  that  prevent  corporate 
telecoms managers from using satellites would be reduced if  there 
were satellite networks in  use in  more high-profile public sector 
applications. 
An  initiative to provide a network for ETSI is already underway 
(in  partnership with  Eutelsat).  The Italians, French and British 
have  various  public  sector  applications.  Further opportunities 
will arise to use satellites - either in a CEC network, in national 
or local government networks, or in a pan-European public sector 
network (inter-governmental, police, medical, banking, etc.). 
These  networks  should  be  clearly  seen  to  be  cost-effective, 
reliable and relevant to the corporate sector (not, for instance, a 
6  This does not apply to the European TOs. but as discussed in  Chapter 3, they are unlikely to develop their domestic satellite markets 
significantly. 
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Publicity for existing 
users 
Subsidy of  training 
courses and 
awareness senzinars 
for telecorns 
managers 
specialised secure military system).  The public sector networks 
currently  in  place  are  not  publicised  in  a  way  that  registers 
strongly with  corporate telecoms managers.  We encountered a 
view, which may be typical of European telecoms managers, that 
they are 'just costly experiments'. 
Subject  to  the  constraints  of the  Procurement  Directive,  such 
projects should also  provide European service providers with  a 
marketing and sales boost.  Again, there may be some difficulties 
with the level of European equipment content. 
The  Commission  could  raise  the  profile  of existing  users  of 
satellite telecoms, particularly those who have clearly chosen the 
technology  on  a  commercial  basis  that  is  relevant  to  other 
corporate  users  (i.e.  not  TOs  ).  Suit~ble  examples  include 
Reuters,  Deutsche  Bank,  the  Paris  Stock  Exchange,  BP  and 
Daimler Benz. 
Corporate telecoms  managers are an  easily  addressable group. 
They are mostly associated with active national user associations. 
It would  not be costly  or difficult  to target  this  key  group for 
educational  purposes.  In  our  experience  they  are  eager  to 
increase their knowledge and insight if the following  conditions 
are met: 
~  The  content  of  training  courses  must  be  objective  and 
quantitative,  particularly  on  matters of cost,  reliability  and 
performance. 
~  The format must be concise. 
~  The presenters must be professional and well informed, and 
able to answer detailed questions authoritatively. 
It should  be possible for  the CEC or another body to stage an 
appropriate  programme  of sessions  in  a  selection  of Member 
States.  Presenters could be drawn from  the European industry 
without compromising objectivity, while still raising the profile of 
their organisations. 
This measure is not directly supportive of European industry; we 
include it on the grounds that it can accelerate the development 
of the overall market, benefiting European industry indirectly. 
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6.2. 7  Encouraging Industry Consolidation and Co-Operation 
Areas of  impact: Satellite manufacturers and ground equipment manufacturers. 
We distinguish two categories of measure aimed at encouraging consolidation and co-
operation in the European satellite industry: 
Measures to 
encourage 
consolidation of 
satellite 
manufacturers 
Pressures for the consolidation of Europe's satellite builders have 
existed  for  several  years,  and  progress  has  been  made  in 
concentrating  activities  within  a  smaller  number  of  frrms7• 
However,  Europe is  still disadvantaged by  having a fragmented 
and under-scale satellite manufacturing sector. 
In order to realise the main benefits of consolidation, real control 
of the industry needs to be concentrated in the hands of a smaller 
number of players.  It is not sufficient for there to be merely an 
increase  in  co-operation  agreements,  partnerships  and  joint 
venture companies.  For this to occur, some European states will 
have to surrender national control over their space industries but 
to date, this has been politically unacceptable. 
There is a danger that forming ever increasing numbers of joint 
venture  groupings  and  co-operation  agreements  will  actually 
reduce  the  efficiency  and  cost-effectiveness  of the  European 
. industry.  A considerable amount of management time has been 
consumed in recent years with negotiating possible consolidation 
agreements, mergers and take-overs. 
A  complicating  factor  is  the  parallel  rationalisation  of  the 
European aerospace industry.  Many of the parent companies of 
satellite  manufacturers  are  caught  up  in  the  political  and 
commercial negotiations that will  determine the future shape of 
European aerospace.  There is a danger that satellite manufac-
turing  divisions  become bargaining chips within  this  large  and 
extended game, rather than being considered on their own merits. 
The CEC has only limited and indirect influence on the rate of 
consolidation,  so  it  is  important  that  full  use  is  made  of the 
mechanisms that do exist for  influencing industry development. 
For example, the Commission could encourage Member States to 
sacrifice  their  perceived  national  interest  in  maintaining  a 
7  The Euroconsult studies referenced by this report address the recent history or consolidation in detail 
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Measures to 
encourage vertical 
integration of 
European players 
complete  national  satellite  building  capability.  The  strict 
enforcement  of  Procurement  Directives  could  assist  in  this 
process. 
Eutelsat,  as the major customer for communications satellites, 
could have a significant influence on the structure of European 
industry, but its current constitutional position would prevent it 
from  exercising any such  influence explicitly.  ESA is  similarly 
restrained from explicitly exerting any power over the structure of 
the industry. 
The forces which are most likely to correct the industry structure 
spring  directly  from  the  commercial  realities  of  European 
satellite production.  Commercial pressures will continue to force 
the European industry to consolidate and rationalise until it has 
reached a sustainable size. 
Chapter  4  discussed  the  advantages  of vertical  integration  in 
immature  markets.  No  European  satellite  telecoms  player, 
however, is  truly vertically integrated in the satellite telecommu-
nications value chain; the predominant form of integration is with 
terrestrial telecoms (the TOs).s 
It is  difficult  to  envisage  measures that could  be taken by  the 
Commission,  or  by  other  bodies,  which  could  significantly 
increase  the level  of vertical  integration  in  European  satellite 
telecoms and which would have an impact in  a reasonable time. 
It is  more productive to consider measures that will  reduce the 
benefits  of  being  vertically  integrated,  and  thus  reduce  the 
competitive advantage of integrated US players: 
~  Green  Paper  de-regulation,  to  reduce  the  need  to  be  a 
satellite  owner  in  order  to  offer  cost-effective  satellite 
services  . 
..,.  Standards, to reduce the advantage of being both an equip-
ment manufacturer and a service provider  . 
..,.  Other measures to accelerate the growth and maturity of the 
market,  reducing the risks  of buying from  smaller and less 
8  lnmarsat is a partially European integrated player.  Orion Network Systems will be vertically integrated and a partially European player. 
Some of the options for the future of Eutelsat envisage integration into service provision.  There is no prospect or any European service 
provider being integrated into ground-equipment manufacture. 
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fully  integrated suppliers.  Examples include the provision of 
training,  demonstrators,  user  education  and  measures  to 
encourage SME involvement. 
6.2.8  Specific Restricting Measures 
Areas .C?f  ~pact :  Service providers,  ground  equipment manufacturers and satellite 
manufacturers. 
... 
Finally,  we  consider a  number of specific restricting measures which  have been put 
forward as ways of protecting the European satellite industry: 
Tariffs and quotas 
on imported ground 
equipment 
Limiting new 
private satellites 
Tariff barriers to restrict  imports of US  and Japanese ground 
equipment would  slow  the rate of development of the satellite 
telecoms  market,  harming the prospects for  European  service 
providers and  users.  Moreover,  it would  be relatively straight-
forward  for  US  and  Japanese  equipment  builders  to  find 
European partners who could manufacture their products under 
licence in  Europe.  This would  not provide European industry 
with significant medium-term competitive benefits, and would not 
be a very effective supporting measure. 
Import quotas are a common alternative to tariff barriers.  In the 
case of an  unpredictable new market such as satellite telecoms, 
however,  it  would  be very difficult  to  agree a  basis for import 
quotas.  The multilateral negotiation of import restrictions (with 
the importing countries and within the EC) would be difficult and 
time-consuming.  It could not easily be accommodated within the 
schedule for early de-regulation. 
The restriction  of further  private satellites would  preserve the 
current space-segment market share of the European TOs and 
Eutelsat,  and  would  therefore  protect  part  of the  European 
satellite manufacturers' domestic market.  This measure has been 
suggested by  interviewees in  this study as  a  possible protecting 
measure.  This measure can be argued against on two counts: 
~  No  practical  mechanism  for  imposing this  restriction  exists 
within the current international space-segment management 
structures. 
~  The effect  on  European competitiveness would  be indirect, 
delayed and very limited. 
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Restricting non-
European 
ownership and 
control 
Restricting non-European ownership and control is  a legitimate 
and  potentially  beneficial  approach  to  supporting  European 
satellite telecoms  players.  Many  countries,  including the USA 
and Japan, restrict foreign ownership and control of a variety of 
enterprises, to protect 'national interests' and to support domestic 
industries.  In international relations terms, these restrictions do 
not cause the same difficulties as other forms of trade barrier. 
·' 
In the case of satellite telecoms, the most appropriate application 
of these restrictions would be in the area of service provision and 
network  operati~n.  Licences  and  permits  can  be drafted  to 
stipulate limits for non-European ownership. 
The restrictions would  need  to  be sufficient to  encourage non-
European  players  to  share  ownership  and  control  with 
Europeans,  without  completely  deterring  them  from 
participating.  It  will  be  very  difficult  to  strike  this  balance 
correctly across all of the EC countries and each of the relevant 
classes  of  licence.  The  role  of  the  Commission  would  be 
important in setting this balance. 
The  danger  of  retaliatory  measures  is  small,  but  should  be 
considered - similar restrictions for many telecoms activities are 
already in  place in  several non-European markets including the 
USA.  Although US ownership regulations do not appear to cover 
non-interconnected  VSA  T  networks  (this  has  not  been  tested 
with the FCC or in the courts), there is no European presence in 
this  market.  Retaliatory  measures  might  be  taken  against 
European SNG operators. 
Although  the  potential  impact  of retaliatory  measures  is  not 
great, the restriction of non-European ownership could lead to a 
reduction  in  investment  levels  in  European  satellite 
telecommunications.  Important  US  satellite  players  might  be 
deterred from  investing as  heavily  in  the European market as 
they would  have done, if permitted to have full control of their 
operations. 
It would  be difficult  to justify forcing  member states to impose 
restrictive licence terms for  domestic satellite licences,  particu-
larly where the current national regimes have liberal ownership 
conditions.  The  ideal  vehicles  for  this  measure  are the pan-
European licences envisaged in the Green paper. 
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Retaining and re-
introducing TV 
broadcasting 
restrictions 
Analysys FifJQ/ Report for CEC DGXII/ 
Such  measures  would  not  prevent  non-Europeans  from  being 
active in European satellite telecoms, but would help to maximise 
the involvement of Europeans.  Several US and Japanese players 
are already pursuing strategies that rely  on  European partner-
ships. 
Restrictions on satellite TV broadcasting could be used to protect 
the broadcasting revenues of Eutelsat, and preserve its position 
as  the main  customer for  European communications satellites. 
However,  the  reaction  of public  and  political  opinion  to  such 
measures would be hostile, and the regulatory mechanisms would 
have to be intrusive, complex and unusual. 
This  measure  is  included  here  to  highlight  the  difficulty  of 
protecting Eutelsat revenues through regulatory· action.  It is only 
through rather contrived and regressive regulatory measures that 
Eutelsat  can  be  protected from  the commercial pressures and 
uncertainties that face all space-segment owners. 
6.3  CONCLUSIONS ON REGULATORY ACTIONS AND SUPPORTING MEASURES 
There  are  a  range  of measures  that  the  Commission  could  undertake  directly,  or 
encourage others to take, that would strengthen the position of the European satellite 
telecommunications industry.  Many  of the supporting measures will  be required by 
some sectors whether or not de-regulation occurs. 
The restriction  of foreign  ownership  of service  providers  through  the  defmition  of 
licence terms appears to be the only practical restrictive measure that could be taken 
without a clearly negative net effect on  the development of the market.  This measure 
may  steer  non-European  activity  towards  collaborative  involvement  with  European 
partners, without  significantly  damaging  the prospects  for  market  development.  The 
other practical restrictive measures that could be taken to impose limits on the actions 
of  non-European  players  would  have  significant  negative  consequences  for  the 
European marketplace, reversing some of the benefits resulting from de-regulation. 
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Annex A: Satellite Telecommunications Applications 
Al The Range of Applications 
Exhibits Al and A2 (at the end of this annex) are compiled from CEC (1992d).  They 
have  been  included  as  an  illustration  of the  range  of satellite  telecommunications 
services and applications. 
A2  Limitations to the rate of uptake of services 
It is  important to  note that the rate of uptake of satellite telecoms services will  be 
limited by several factors.  As with most ma.rkets, potential satellite telecommunications 
customers need to go through a series of stages1 before they become actual customers: 
Simplified Stages in 'Readiness to Buy' 
..,..  Aware of the satellite telecoms product/service 
..,..  Aware of the general benefits 
..,..  Aware of the potential corporate benefits 
..,..  Convinced of the achievability of the benefits 
..,..  Willing to become a customer 
Different  telecoms  managers  and  corporations  will  proceed  through  these  steps  at 
varying rates:2 
1  Based on the AwarenessflnterestfEvaluation(rrialfAdoption model (see reference Kotler 1988). 
2  Reference E. M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovation, 1\'Y Free Press. 1962. 
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Buying Behaviour Classifications 
Innovators 
Early adopters 
Early majority 
Late majority 
Slow movers 
-The frrst to experiment with new products/services 
- Often have specific applications in mind 
- Respond to growing user base and reduced risks 
- Respond more slowly 
- Risk averse, difficult to convince 
The decision-making process depends on whether existing services are to be migrated or 
new ones developed  . 
..,.  Some potential users may  wish  to migrate existing  applications,  either in full  or 
partially,  onto  satellite networks,  in  which  case the key  individual in  the buying 
decision-making process will be the Telecoms Manager  . 
..,.  Some  may  wish  to  develop  new  applications  that  rely  on  the characteristics  of 
satellite  telecommunications  to  be  viable  (for  example  a  point-to-multipoint 
application).  In this case, many more individuals are likely to be involved in the 
decision  making  process.  IT  managers,  operations  managers,  marketing  and 
strategy executives are all potentially concerned with new applications development. 
The net effect is likely to be that the adoption of satellite telecommunications for 
new and innovative applications becomes a more extended and complex process. 
Corporate telecommunications managers have a range of criteria to satisfy before they 
are prepared to change existing practices: 
Cost/Benefit improvement 
Positive Net Present Value 
Low project risk 
Low on-going risk 
Flexibility 
Simplicity 
Overall credibility 
Lower costs, or greater benefits 
Probably low capital expenditure 
Overruns (cost/time) 
Failure to complete 
Supplier problems 
Future price increases 
Reliability problems 
Supplier problems 
Low 'get-out' costs 
Network flexibility 
Not 'multi-stop shopping' 
Minimum legal concerns 
References 
'scale' ( =  safety) 
Personal rapport 
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EXHIBIT AI:  Satellite Teleco1nmunications Services 
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,.....---...,  • Remote printing 
.  D~ta .  • Audio (background 
sse~nation  music broadcast 
(p~unt·to- ail  .  ·  _ 
mUltipoint)  to ret  s1tes 
"-----...J  •  Database connections 
• General workforce 
training 
• Corporate comms &. 
top management 
Private  messages 
video  • Specific information/ 
networks  training (launch of 
new products/ 
promotions) 
•  Commercialisation of 
products at the POS 
• Database vending/ 
access 
• Insurance claim 
Access to  processing  processing 
resources  • Medical data transfer 
• Market forecasts 
based on daily sales 
data (e.g. supermkts) 
• Reservat'ns system 
• Real-time monitor· 
Real-time 
ing of product 
transactions/  availability at POS 
POst  • Automated teller 
reservation  machines 
• EFrPOS/credit card 
&. cheque authoris'n 
•  Comms to remote 
locations (e.g. oil 
companies) 
Supervision,  • Remote manufactur-
control and  ing process control 
data  •  Environmental 
acquisition  monitoring 
• Disaster controV 
recovery • emergency 
services 
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EXHIBITA2:  Satellite Telecommunications Applications 
.--
aD  = 
~  = 
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~  Land Mobile Radio 
{  Determination 
Satellite Services 
.....  u  (ROSS) 
~ 
c; 
=  .  e  ... 
CIS 
E 
£  =  -
~ 
Satellite News 
Gathering I Special 
Events 
- ,.--
2  8 
~Marine  (SJ;lipboard)  .e  Semces 
"iii  ·~ 
u 
~  ·=  =  ~  s- e 
0  L.-.  ]  1- u  CIS 
0  ~ 
~ 
"0 
0 
~ 
.~ 
7i 
u 
'fj 
';  g_ 
~  ~  .___  ._ 
H 
Fixed Multipoint 
Networks 
H  Standard Services 
(IBS/SMS) 
y  Personal Mobile 
Communications 
Voice 
Services 
Radiodetermin· 
ation Satellite 
Services (ROSS) 
~cial 
~ents 
~ Satellite News 
Gathering 
PrNftamming 
etworks 
(Video) 
Private  ~  Networks 
Point-to-
Multipoint Data 
Dissemination 
(shared service) 
• Undifferentiated user groups 
Two-way voice communications:  • 
• 
• 
• mobile telephony from/to rural/remote locations 
two-way messages  . 
Specific, closed user groups: regional, national or 
private fleets 
. 
. 
Major applications include: 
position fixing/tracking 
fleet location/management 
...  Ad-hoc" services for live transmission of special events: 
spotting venues, fashion shows, major product launches 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Addresses a wide range of user sectors, but is 
opportunistic" 
II 
Uplink services through transportable earth stations: 
broadcasting from remote locations, high flexibility 
Very focused application, addressing the demand for 
live information from the media/broadcasting industry 
Does not include programme distribution (backhaul) 
services, which usually involve fixed systems 
l)rpically have a video component 
Generally use portable VSAT terminals owned by 
service providers 
High standardis'n, same programmes for all end-users 
Applications typically address end-user communities: 
• trade assocns  • educational establishments 
• religious assocns  • leisure groups 
r--One·(Video 
way  Data 
• Generally data networks; 
video is often an add-on 
..... 
• 
• 
• Terminals typically/ultimately 
owned by corporate end-users 
Two-(Data 
way  Video add-on  • Tailor-made applications, 
One-way applications 
based on specific needs of 
individual end-users 
Press agencies & financial institutions are the most 
important user groups 
•  Point-to-point links 
•  Purchased through TOs as private circuits 
•  Not yet defined 
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Annex B: Industry intetv~ews 
Satellite Manufacturer 
Terminal Manufacturer 
Aerospatial 
Alcatel Espace 
Alenia 
British Aerospace 
Hughes 
Lora  I 
Matra-Marconi 
MBB 
Alcatel 
Amstrad 
ANT 
AT&TTridom 
Dornier 
EB Nera 
ERA 
Ericsson 
Hughes 
Motorola 
NEC 
Nokia 
Racal 
Scientific Atlanta 
Siemens 
Thomson-CSF 
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Service Provider  Bishopsgate 
BT 
C&WFrance 
Deutsche Phonesat 
Deutsche Telekom 
France Telecom 
IBM 
InfoAG 
Inmarsat 
Loral (Globalstar) 
Mercury 
Polycom 
SIS Link 
Skyphone 
Teleport Europe 
Telespazio 
Users  IBM 
Mobil data services 
Press Association 
Reuters 
SITA 
Space Segment Providers  Alpha Lyracom (Panamsat) 
Eutelsat 
Intelsat 
SES Astra 
Other  ETSI 
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Glossary 
Backhaul 
Business TV 
CATV 
CEC 
CNES 
Diffusion rate 
DTH,DBS 
Earth stations 
EC12 
ESA 
ETSI 
Eutelsat 
A term for the movement of TV programmes from point to point 
The  use  of television  broadcasting/narrowcasting  for  business 
use, rather than for public entertainment purposes 
Cable Television 
Commission of the European Communities 
Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales (The French national space 
agency) 
The rate at which  awareness,  interest or usage of a product or 
service spreads through a marketplace. 
Direct-To-Home and  Direct Broadcast by  Satellite - two  terms 
for the satellite broadcasting of TV channels 
Fixed  ground  equipment used  to transmit/receive to and from 
satellites 
The 12 member States of the European Community 
European Space Agency 
European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
European Telecommunications Satellite Organisation 
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GLOSSARY Poge2 
FCC 
Analy.sys RqKNt for CEC DGX/11 
Federal  Communications  Commission,  the  US  federal 
communications regulatory body 
Footprint  The area of the earth's sufrace covered by a satellite transmission 
beam 
Frame relay  A protocol for the high speed packets of data 
Ground equipment  Equipment used to transmit to or receive from satellites. 
GSM  Groupe System  Mobile,  a  set  of standards  for  digital  cellular 
telecommunications. 
HEO satellites  Highly Elliptical Orbit Satellites 
Hub stations  For VSA T networks, the main control station that manages traffic 
on the network 
Hybrid networks  Networks that consist of both terrestrial and satellite links 
Inmarsat  International Maritime Satellite Organisation 
IN  Intelligent Network 
lntelsat  International Telecommunications Satellite Organisation 
ISDN  Integrated Services Digital Network 
LEO satellites 
Meshed networks 
MIS 
Low  Earth  Orbit  Satellites. 
geostationary orbits 
LEO  satellites  are  not  in 
An advanced form of VSAT network where pairs of terminals can 
communicate  directly  without  traffic  passing  through  a  hub 
station. 
Management Information Systems 
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Orbital slots  Usually  with  reference  to  geostationary  satellites.  The 
geostationary orbit is  divided  into a  number of 'slots' to assist 
with  the management  of the space  segment.  More  than  one 
satellite can occupy a given slot. 
Payload  The part of a satellite that is  concerned with  the application of 
the satellite (telecoms, broadcasting, remote sensing etc)  . 
Platform  The part of a  satellite that  is  concerned with  maintaining the 
·satellite in orbit (stabilisation and control etc) 
Point-to-point  A form of communication where the transmitted signal has only 
one target destination 
Point-to-multipoint  A  form  of  communication  where  the  transmitted  signal  is 
intended to be received at more than one destination. 
PSTN 
Rapid deployment 
services 
RDSS 
Robust systems 
SAO 
Public Switched Telecommunications Network 
Telecommunications services that need to be deployed quickly in 
case of emergencies, disasters, major events etc. 
Radio  Determination  Satellite Services  - a  service  for  locating 
and  communicating  with  remote  terminals,  normally  vehicle-
mounted. 
Systems  that  are  not  sensitiVe  to  small  changes  in  operating 
conditions, low levels of interference or minor degradations and 
faults. 
Signatory  Affairs  Office.  A  department  of  British  Telecom 
established  to provide service providers with  access  to  satellite 
systems. 
Satellite capacity  The amount of traffic that can be handled by a satellite - various 
measures  exist  Mbits/s,  MHz,  Voice  Paths,  Mbit 
Erlangs/second etc. 
Shared hub VSATs  A type of interactive VSAT system where more than one VSAT 
network is supported by a single hub station 
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SMEs  Small and Medium sized Enterprises 
SMS services  Satellite Multi-Services.  The Eutelsat satellite business service, 
sold through signatory TOs 
SNG  Satellite News Gathering 
Space segment  Refers to the elements of a satellite communications system that 
are in orbit. 
SSSO  Specialised  Satellite  Services  Operators  - a  class  of satellite 
service licence issued in the UK 
Terrestial telecoms  Telecommunications  based  on  copper,  fibre  optic,  radio  or 
microwave links. 
TOs 
Transparent 
satellite links 
Transponder 
Trunked telephony 
TVRO 
Uplink 
VAS 
Telecommunications operators.  This term is used in preference 
to  PTO  (Public  Telecommunications  Operator),  PNO  (Public 
Network Operator), P1T (Posts, Telephony and Telegraphy) or 
others.  The  term  includes  all  'facilities  based' 
telecommunications operators. 
Transparency is  achieved when  the user is  not readily aware of 
the  nature of the medium  that  is  carrying  the call  - Example: 
International PSTN calls, where the user cannot easily distinguish 
whether satellite or undersea cable is carrying the call. 
The  component  on  a  satellite  that  receives  and  re-transmits 
signals  from  earth.  Satellites  can  carry  many  transponders 
operating in different frequency ranges. 
Telephony traffic that has been concentrated on to a single point-
to-point link. 
Television  Receive  Only.  A  term  used  to  describe  ground 
equipment that is  only capable of receiving broadcast television 
signals (for example domestic roof-mounted satellite TV dishes) 
The path between a ground station and a satellite that is used to 
transmit traffic  that is  then broadcast  over  a wide  area by  the 
satellite. 
Value-added  services.  In  telecoms,  services  that  make  use  of 
basic  telecommunications  to  provide  services  that  can  support 
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VASP 
Value chain 
higher prices.  Examples  include  information services,  protocol 
converting  services,  services  that  package  basic  offerings  in  a 
more  convenient  format,  such  as  'bandwidth-on-demand',  etc. 
'This term tends to be used very loosely. 
Value Added Service Provider 
The connected set of activities that allow a product or service to 
be delivered to an end user. 
Vertically integrated  Present in more than one stage of the value chain 
Video compression  Describes techniques  used  to transmit a video  signal using less 
bandwidth than the traditional requirement (about 6MHz) 
VSAT  Very Small Aperture Terminal.  Small dish satellite terminals that 
can have either receive only (one-way) or transmit/receive (two 
way, interactive) capabilities. 
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